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ABSTRACT 
Why do people work in the voluntary sector?  Is the sector distinct, with 
characteristics that differentiate it from the private and public sectors?  Is it important 
to consider the existence of the so-called ‘third sector’ when analysing behaviour in 
the labour market?  Is altruism really an important motivation for workers in this 
sector?   
This dissertation is concerned specifically with the labour market in the voluntary 
sector: that is, workers who are the paid employees of independent nonprofit 
organisations.  Using a large, national dataset, we explore empirically the predictions 
of the economic theory of voluntary organisations.  In particular, is there evidence 
for a ‘warm glow’, the extra utility that workers receive for working towards a goal 
that they share with their employer?  Does this glow exist, and is it brighter in the 
voluntary sector? 
We examine in turn sector differences in wages, working hours, and find evidence 
that employment in the voluntary sector is significantly different in some 
characteristics from both the private and public sectors.    
The main economic theories of voluntary sector wage-setting rely on some 
formulation of ‘warm glow’ utility or intrinsic motivation derived from working for 
an organisation with a mission shared by motivated employees.  This leads to a 
prediction of lower wages in the voluntary sector.  The empirical findings in the 
existing literature have focussed on US data, and the results have been mixed. 
Using pooled cross-sectional and panel datasets based on UK employment data 
between 1997 and 2007, we show that there is some evidence of warm-glow wage 
discounts in the sector for male workers, but that these wage differences have been 
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eroded as the sector has grown.  Although there is not a significant sector wage 
difference found for women, there is evidence that they have also experienced faster 
wage growth in the voluntary sector than the private. 
There are significant sector differences in working hours within the Health & Social 
Work industries, particularly in overtime working.  Workers in the voluntary sector 
work more hours of unpaid overtime, whilst those in the private sector work more 
hours of paid overtime.  Controlling for overtime hours has a significant effect on 
sector wage differentials.  In particular, accounting for unpaid overtime results in 
evidence of a warm-glow wage discount for female workers. 
We analyse this data at a time when the sector has been growing dramatically, driven 
by government policy to reform public services.  Our findings suggest that this 
policy has had unintended consequences for the voluntary sector labour market. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Where is the Warm Glow?  An Introduction 
“And now faith, hope, and charity abide, these three; and the greatest of 
these is charity.” 
Corinthians 1:13, King James Bible 
Introduction 
Why do people work in the voluntary sector?  Is the sector distinct, with 
characteristics that differentiate it from the private and public sectors?  Is it important 
to consider the existence of the so-called ‘third sector’ when analysing behaviour in 
the labour market? 
The voluntary, or nonprofit, sector is bound up with the concept of altruism.  Many 
of the organisations in the sector are registered charities, with approved charitable 
purposes.  We ask whether altruism is really an important motivation for workers in 
this sector.  Although philosophical debates about the nature of altruism have raged 
for thousands of years, the formal economic study of charities as an organisation-
type is a relatively recent development.  Over the past forty years economists have 
tentatively allowed forms of altruism to provide explanations for the behaviour of 
voluntary organisations and those who support them. 
This dissertation is concerned specifically with the labour market in the voluntary 
sector: that is, workers who are the paid employees of independent nonprofit 
organisations.  Using a large, national dataset we explore empirically the predictions 
of the economic theory of voluntary organisations.  In particular, we examine 
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whether there is evidence for a ‘warm glow’, the extra utility that workers receive for 
working towards a goal that they share with their employer.  Does this glow exist, 
and is it brighter in the voluntary sector? 
We examine in turn sector differences in wages and working hours.  We find 
evidence that employment in the voluntary sector is significantly different in some 
characteristics from both the private and public sectors.  We suggest that it is 
important to consider the unique character of the voluntary sector when analysing 
employment – particularly in the industries where the voluntary sector is most 
prevalent.  We analyse this data at a time when the sector has been growing 
dramatically, driven by government policy to reform public services.  Our findings 
suggest that this policy has had unintended consequences for the voluntary sector 
labour market. 
Defining the Voluntary Sector 
The terms “voluntary sector”, “third sector” and “nonprofit sector” are often used 
almost interchangeably.  While the diversity of organisations covered by these 
banners makes tight definition complicated and not necessarily desirable, for the 
purposes of measurement and analysis of the sector an understanding of what is to be 
measured must be established. 
Figure 1 helps us to explore the boundaries of the third sector.  Organisations are 
mapped onto a triangular space, based on their make-up as State, Households or 
Firms.  Across this space are three legal divisions: Public/Private, For-
profit/Nonprofit, Formal/Informal. 
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Figure 1: Defining the Third Sector 
(Adapted from Baubock (1996)) 
The Public/Private distinction is whether the organisation is state-owned and/or state-
controlled.  The For-profit/Nonprofit distinction is a legal definition based on the 
constitution of the organisation, and whether it is permitted to distribute profit or 
surplus to owners or shareholders.  The Formal/Informal distinction is between 
organisations that are formally constituted in law, as opposed to being informal 
groupings with no legal status. 
The shaded triangle in Figure 1 enclosed by these three legal boundaries is the 
organisations generally eligible to register as charities.  Although these organisations 
form the core of the third sector, they by no means define it.  The dashed circle 
encloses three types of organisation which may or may not be considered to be 
within the third sector. 
The first is organisations closest to the State corner.  These would include nonprofit 
organisations that though technically independent are largely funded or controlled by 
the public sector.  Examples of organisations in this category would be universities, 
or local-authority-funded leisure trusts. 
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The second is organisations closest to the Firms corner.  These include social 
enterprises, cooperatives, mutuals and community interest companies which though 
technically for-profit may have primarily social objectives.  Social enterprises have 
been growing in prominence in recent years, but there is no general agreement as to 
the legal structure, constitution, or social aims which an organisation would need to 
adopt in order to be considered a social enterprise (Kerlin, 2006).  These 
organisations are often the ones which form the distinction between the ‘voluntary 
sector’ and the ‘third sector’, with third sector having a broader coverage to include 
for-profits with strong social purposes. 
The third is organisations closest to the Households corner.  These include informal 
associations, clubs, and volunteering which though not formally constituted are still 
an outlet for the voluntary sector in the community.  While these organisations would 
certainly be considered to be within the third sector, their informal status means that 
they often fall ‘below the radar’, and so do not appear in registers or datasets 
(McCabe, Phillimore, & Mayblin, 2010). 
The third sector as commonly defined could include charities and all three of these 
additional organisation-types.  However, the boundaries of these additional 
organisations are not as black and white as the legal boundaries, and so exactly 
where the line is drawn can be a matter of some debate.  In practice, data may be 
difficult to collect or analyse.  This means that practical definitions of the third sector 
may diverge from the theoretical definitions. 
For the purposes of this thesis, we analyse organisations in the voluntary sector, 
defined as a subset of the third sector.  For practical purposes, this sector is identified 
primarily by nonprofit status, and organisational form.  Organisations in the private 
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sector are defined by for-profit status, and organisations in the public sector by state 
ownership and control.  This means that, in general, organisations that are for-profit 
social enterprises, or informal groups or associations, do not appear in the voluntary 
sector classification.1 
The Voluntary Sector in the UK 
Nonprofit organisations in the UK who wish to call themselves charities must 
register with the Charity Commission in England & Wales, or with the Office of the 
Scottish Charity Regulator (OSCR) in Scotland.  The Charities Act (2006) in 
England & Wales and the Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act (2005) in 
Scotland set out the criteria for becoming a charity.  These include constitution as a 
nonprofit organisation, the appointment of directors or trustees who receive no 
compensation or financial benefit from their association with the charity, and the 
adoption of stated charitable aims which conform to a list of permissible charitable 
activities. 
Since coming to power in 1997 the Labour government in the UK has actively 
promoted the involvement of the voluntary sector in the provision of public services.  
This has resulted in dramatic growth in the sector, fuelled by the rise in the number 
of public services contracted-out to the sector through the increasing use of 
commissioning and competitive tendering. 
The value of government contracts with the voluntary sector increased from around 
£2 billion in 1996/97 to £6.88 billion in 2005/06 (Public Administration Select 
Committee, 2008).  This has led to a greater importance for the sector as a key part of 
                                                 
1
 Chapter Three discusses the method of classifying sector used in the data in this analysis.  Appendix 
Two describes the sector variables in the dataset. 
6 
 
public service provision.  One could perhaps argue that a sector driven by voluntary 
donations to pursue the philanthropic objectives of wealthy benefactors was best left 
alone by government.  However a sector responsible for a large proportion of public 
service provision in industries such as social care, competing for contracts in a 
market with other providers, needs to be understood if appropriate policies for the 
establishment and regulation of these providers are to be adopted. 
The Economics of the Voluntary Sector 
Voluntary organisations are a complicated phenomenon, and economic theory has 
responded with a diverse set of theories to explain the existence and behaviour of the 
sector.  There are three main theoretical explanations for nonprofit organisations. 
• Government failure in the provision of public goods; 
• Market failure due to information asymmetries for some services where 
quality is difficult to contract over, measure, or even observe; 
• Harness intrinsic motivation, or the ‘warm glow’, in providing services 
that individuals are willing to support. 
These three explanations are not exclusive: they each explain different facets of the 
diverse voluntary sector.  Government failure can explain the duplication of public 
services by voluntary organisations, such as nonprofit schools providing children’s 
education with a different approach.  Information asymmetries can account for the 
fact that most voluntary organisations are clustered in health and social work 
services, such as care for older people.  Warm glow theories can explain why people 
give to charities when the marginal impact of their gift on the level of service 
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provision is minor, and why their support is not crowded out by government funding 
of the same organisation. 
Warm glow theories have been extended from monetary donations (Andreoni, 1998) 
to the giving of time: volunteering (Baines, 2004;Duncan, 1999).  As leisure time is 
substitutable for paid work, this extension to the donation of time rather than money 
does not seem overly problematic.  However, the theory has then been extended 
further, making predictions about the choices of paid employees working in the 
voluntary sector.  The theory predicts matching between motivated principals and 
agents, with lower wages paid to motivated agents as they receive ‘compensation’ in 
the form of intrinsic utility from contributing to the work of the voluntary 
organisation.  We examine the evidence for a warm glow in wages, and whether this 
is an extension too far. 
Researching Employment in the Voluntary Sector 
A significant challenge in researching the voluntary sector empirically is the 
availability of data.  Many datasets do not separately identify organisations or 
workers in the voluntary sector, instead making only a public/private distinction.  
Even in datasets that do, there is still an issue of sample size, as voluntary sector 
employees makes up only 3% to 4% of the workforce in the UK.  Lastly, there is a 
recurring issue of sample-selection bias, if workers have sorted into sectors based on 
unobserved (or even unobservable) characteristics.  These three issues combine to 
make the sector under-represented in empirical analysis within economics.  
In this thesis we undertake an empirical investigation into the existence of this ‘warm 
glow’ effect on workers in the UK voluntary sector.  We begin by analysing pooled 
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cross-sectional data from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS).  This shows evidence 
of a wage discount for male voluntary sector workers, but no significant discount for 
female workers.  We then analyse the change in the sector wage difference over a 
period of strong growth in the size of the voluntary sector, showing that while it was 
significant ten years ago the wage difference has now all but disappeared.  We tackle 
the problem of sector selection and bias from unobserved worker heterogeneity by 
estimating a panel model, and show that this finding is robust. 
Next, we focus on the health and social work industries, where around two thirds of 
voluntary sector employees are concentrated.  We examine sector differences within 
these industries for a number of reasons.  These encompass much of the caring 
industries (Francois, 2003) where theory predicts we might expect to find mission 
motivation.  Restricting the focus to particular industries also reduces the difficulty 
of controlling for unobservable job heterogeneity between industries.  The empirical 
literature has suggested that within this industry there are voluntary sector wage 
premiums above the private sector wage.  We analyse working hours, and in 
particular unpaid overtime, to show that effective wages are lower in the voluntary 
sector for female workers. 
The main contributions of this dissertation are three-fold: 
• An exploration of the make-up of the voluntary sector workforce, and in 
particular the characteristics of workers who switch into and out of 
employment in the sector’ 
• An empirical analysis of voluntary sector wage data in the UK, to 
identify the changes in sector differentials as the sector has grown; 
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• An examination of the effects of unpaid overtime on sector differentials 
in a key industry for voluntary sector public service provision; 
With this we aim to add to the growing knowledge of the unique nature of the 
voluntary sector, and identify the implications of the changes which it is currently 
undergoing. 
In this dissertation we do not consider the individuals’ choice between different 
altruistic activities e.g.  employment in the voluntary sector, volunteering or making 
a donation.  This is in part due to the lack of good quality data that includes 
information on individuals’ participation in all three activities.  Furthermore, there is 
not a clear understanding of the degree to which these three methods of expressing 
prosocial motivation are substitutes or complements, or whether they are indeed 
driven by the same motivation.  The roles and responsibilities of volunteers are 
usually very different from those of staff, driven by the enforceability of contracts, 
the commitment of individuals, and the regulation of caring industries.  Here, we 
focus on employment in the voluntary sector and on individuals prepared to accept 
lower wages in the labour market to participate in a prosocial organisation.   We 
leave a comparison of outlets for prosocial motivation for future research. 
Outline of the Chapters 
In Chapter Two, we review the economic literature on voluntary organisations from 
the past forty years.  In particular, we explore how the development of the concept of 
altruism has informed economists’ understanding of the voluntary sector. 
In Chapter Three, we use descriptive statistics to explore the UK voluntary sector 
workforce.  This identifies the characteristics that appear to make the sector distinct 
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from the private and public sectors.  We describe the characteristics of ‘sector 
switchers’; workers who move into or out of the sector, and test for changes over 
time. 
Chapter Four tests the ‘warm glow’ prediction of lower voluntary sector wages using 
a pooled cross-sectional dataset from the UK LFS.  We analyse the changes in the 
sector wage differentials over the past ten years of dramatic voluntary sector growth.  
The problem of unobserved heterogeneity is tackled through analysis of sector 
switchers in a panel model. 
Chapter Five explores working hours in the voluntary sector within the health and 
social work industries, where most voluntary organisations are concentrated.  In 
particular, we examine data on unpaid overtime. 
Chapter Six concludes by considering the policy implications of these research 
findings.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Get By With a Little Help From My Friends: A Recent 
History of Charitable Organisations in Economic Theory 
 
Joey:  I'm sorry Pheebs, I just … wanted to do a good deed.  Like - like you did with the 
babies. 
Phoebe:  This isn't a good deed; you just wanted to get on TV!  This is totally selfish. 
Joey:  Whoa!  Whoa!  Whoa!  What about you, having those babies for your brother?  Talk 
about selfish! 
Phoebe:  What - what are you talking about?! 
Joey:  Well, yeah, it was a really nice thing and all, but it made you feel really good right? 
Phoebe:  Yeah.  So? 
Joey:  It made you feel good, so that makes it selfish.  Look, there's no unselfish good deeds, 
sorry. 
Phoebe:  Yes there are!  There are totally good deeds that are selfless. 
Joey:  Well, may I ask for one example? 
Phoebe:  Yeah, it's… Y'know, there's …   no you may not! 
 
Friends, Series 5, Episode 4, (Warner Bros, 1998) 
Introduction 
The search for a “selfless good deed” has occupied both philosophers and the writers 
of American sit-coms for thousands of years.  This challenge, and what it might 
reveal about the underlying motivations of human behaviour, has relevance for many 
disciplines across the social sciences and further afield.  It is also a critical element in 
understanding charitable actions and the behaviour of charities and other nonprofit 
organisations. 
Charities are playing an increasing role in the provision of public services in many 
countries, a development that is generally supported by governments.  Historically 
charities have had an important role in innovating in the health and social care 
sectors, often able to respond to societies’ changing needs faster than the state.  
However, the recent move to involve charities in “quasi-markets” (Greenaway, 
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1991), competing to win contracts to provide public services, has highlighted the 
need for a better understanding of the economics of charities and how their behaviour 
in competitive environments might differ from private firms.  In many countries new 
types of charitable organisation are flourishing, less reliant on voluntary donations 
but responding to the demand from the public sector to contract out many public 
services.  We explore how well economic theory copes with understanding these 
changing organisational forms. 
Ideas about the role of charity in economic theory can be traced back to the origins of 
modern economics and Adam Smith’s discussion of ‘sympathy’ (Smith, 1759).  
However, for much of the history of economics the focus of theory on self-interested 
behaviour has resulted in a separation between the economics of charity and the 
concept of altruism, where charitable behaviour has been modelled as firmly rooted 
in self-interest.  The more recent flow of ideas into economics from psychology and 
the findings of experimental economics have brought consideration of alternative 
motives closer to the mainstream of economic thinking, and economic theories of 
charity have benefited from a wider approach to the basis of behaviour.  
This chapter argues that a debate in the early 1970’s over Richard Titmuss’s (1970) 
analysis of the economics of blood donations played a role in highlighting the lack of 
theoretical and empirical work in this area, sparking a succession of economic 
theories of charitable behaviour that moved altruistic motivations from the fringes 
towards the core of the theory.  The first attempts to explain apparently altruistic 
behaviour relied on self-interested agents realising gains from cooperation, 
particularly in the provision of public goods.  In order to explain why free-riding 
seemed to be much less prevalent in practice than predicted in theory, ideas of “warm 
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glow” then followed, where utility could be gained from both the act of cooperation 
as well as the outcome.  This explanation did not fully tackle the reasons why 
individuals might gain utility from the act of cooperation, and some researchers 
questioned whether all motives for behaviour could indeed be subsumed into self-
interest.  This allowed for the consideration of alternative motivations for action 
sitting alongside altruism. 
More recently, the literature has split into two separate formulations of ‘warm glow’.  
In one strand pro-social motivation is seen as being heterogeneous in the population, 
and the emphasis is on motivated individuals matching and selecting into the 
nonprofit sector.  In the second, the institutional form of the nonprofit, particularly 
the profit non-distribution constraint, is seen as important in determining the ‘warm 
glow’ utility available by placing a restriction on the action of employers. 
This chapter reviews the progress of economic theories of charitable organisation 
over the past forty years, from a focus on self-interested cooperation in reaction 
against Titmuss’s book, to more recent theories of alternative motivations that echo 
his ideas.  We do not set out to critically analyse our understanding of altruism as 
such, but rather to examine how it has been applied in forming economic theories of 
nonprofit organisations. 
In Chapters 3, 4 and 5 we will examine data on workers in the voluntary sector.  We 
use individual level data, and our focus is therefore on individuals.  However, as we 
will see in the literature discussed in this chapter, pro-social motivation in 
employment is entwined with organisational form.  Here we discuss both literatures: 
theories of individual altruism, and theories of nonprofit organisations.  As 
economists’ theoretical understanding of altruism has developed, this has had an 
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impact on the modelling of altruism in both individual and organisational theory.  
For this reason, this chapter is organised by the developments in economists’ 
concepts of altruism. 
Of course, the theories of charity are intertwined with concepts of altruism: what 
does it mean, how should it be modelled, and what does it tell us?  First we must 
explore the changing assumptions about altruism, and then examine how these have 
influenced the development of economic theories of charities. 
What is Altruism? 
In order to include altruism in a theory of charity we must first agree what the term 
means.  At its core, the concept captures a concern for others that is not linked to a 
concern for oneself.  This is an internal state, and is not directly observable.  A 
distinction must be drawn between the acts we observe and the internal state, as there 
can be more than one motivation behind an apparently altruistic act.  Being altruistic 
can create a desire to help others, but the decision to act is taken after considering the 
constraints faced by the agent (Alchian, 1973).  For example, someone with very 
little wealth might be moved by the plight of those even less well-off than 
themselves, but is unable to afford to give even the smallest help.  A rich 
philanthropist may give substantial amounts without a real concern for those the 
donation is helping, particularly if such behaviour can increase social standing.  If we 
call gift-giving, or the observed “altruistic” behaviour generosity, then we can see 
that there is a divide between the act of generosity and the internal state of altruism.  
This highlights that we must try and explain the observable behaviour in terms of 
characteristics that are themselves observable. 
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In this context the word “charity” is used essentially to mean organised altruism, 
whether donating to a cause or founding an organisation.  This means that the focus 
will be on the theoretical and practical difficulties of coordinating altruistic motives 
to action in a group setting. 
A Recent History of the Economic Theory of Charity 
For much of its history a description of altruistic behaviour was considered outside 
the scope of economics.  In The Economics of Charity (Alchian, 1973) Johnson 
writes: 
“Although there is a third, charity, market in which individuals collectively 
provide public goods without the incentives or penalties of the political 
market, virtually no research has been directed to it.” 
The Economics of Charity (Alchian, 1973), Chapter 5, Page 84 
This statement was true when written at the start of the 1970’s, but was followed by 
over thirty years of increasing interest in the voluntary sector and theories of the 
economics of charity.  At this time early discussions of altruism in economics 
centered on a challenge to the strictly independent individual utility functions of 
Paretian welfare economics.  An influential paper by Hochman & Rogers (1969) 
modelled altruism as the inter-dependence of individuals’ utility functions, creating 
some debate within the literature.2  Lindsay (1969) proposed a model of the 
“economics of sharing” to explain the common public provision of healthcare 
services.  This approach used equality of provision as an argument in individual’s 
utility functions in order to model interdependence.  Although this early literature 
                                                 
2
 See  Peacock & Rowley (1975) for a summary of these discussions. 
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certainly acknowledged the possibility of private charity, its focus was largely on the 
role of government in redistribution. 
An influential social policy text published in 1970 discussed the role that altruism 
had to play in economic behaviour, with a specific example in the collection of 
blood.  In The Gift Relationship by Richard Titmuss (1970) the collection of blood 
donations in the UK and USA were compared, examining the success and failings of 
a private market in paid blood donations.  Economic theory predicted that the 
introduction of paid blood donors in the UK would increase the supply of blood.  
Titmuss suggested that this argument was flawed as it relied solely on a model of 
rational self-interest, and ignored the valuable and significant role that altruism plays 
in many types of transaction.  Titmuss argued that the introduction of paid-for blood 
donation to the UK would decrease both the quantity and quality of blood supplied. 
Economists at the time largely disagreed.  Kenneth Arrow (1975) wrote a response to 
Titmuss’s book in which he accepted that the study of altruism was important, and 
acknowledged the role that mechanisms for “truth-telling” play in the efficiency of 
markets with information asymmetries. He disagreed that the conclusions which 
Titmuss had drawn about the supply of blood did indeed follow from the analysis. 
“Why should it be that the creation of a market for blood would decrease the 
altruism embodied in giving blood?  I do not find any clear answer in 
Titmuss.” 
Arrow (1975), page 19 
Translating Titmuss’s framework into the language of utility theory more familiar to 
economists, Arrow identified three motives for action that could lead to seemingly 
altruistic behaviour: 
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• Self Interest – where agents utility does not depend on others (i.e. they 
are self-interested), but the cooperative behaviour is efficient if an 
agreement can be reached that eliminates or reduces free-riding and 
allows the gains from cooperation to be earned; 
• Pure Altruism – where the utility of one agent directly affects the utility 
of another; 
• Impure Altruism – where an agent derives utility from the act of helping 
another. 
Initial theories of the role of nonprofit organisations focussed on the areas that 
economics was best equipped to tackle using the model of rational self-interest.  
These explained the existence of charity as an optimal response to the potential 
efficiency gains of cooperating in a social contract in order to improve society’s 
welfare within a context of self interest.  Ideas of utility gained from the act of 
“doing good”, separate from the outcome of the act, were then developed.  This uses 
the concept of ‘warm glow’, for example that donors gain utility from making a 
donation to charity rather than from the outcome that this donation had.  It is an 
attempt to explain seemingly altruistic behaviour that can overcome the free-rider 
problem.  More recently there has been a return to concepts of altruism where utility 
is gained from the outcome, and where this objective is seen as being separated in 
some way from a self-interested objective.  This means that the debate has gone full 
circle, as the issues addressed are similar to those sparked off3 by the discussion in 
                                                 
3
 While it should be noted that the economics of charity literature has its roots in the earlier welfare 
economics literature, it is argued here that the strong reaction Titmuss’ book created, and its focus on 
gift giving rather than redistribution, made it particularly influential in the ensuing literature. 
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Titmuss’s The Gift Relationship.  We will now discuss each of these approaches to 
charity in turn. 
Charity as Self Interest 
Initial attempts to model charitable acts did not explicitly consider altruism.  Seen as 
being outside the discipline of economics, the theories of charity focussed on self 
interest as the driving force, with constraints that led charitable activities to being the 
optimal response.  This is an attempt to incorporate seemingly altruistic behaviour 
without having to address or acknowledge the existence of altruism at all. 
These theories depict charities as being the result of a social contract to overcome 
some “failure” that leads to inefficient outcomes.  These explanations do not require 
any description of altruistic behaviour, as they are privately optimal if the appropriate 
agreements can be reached and enforced.  They seek to explain seemingly altruistic 
behaviour as the result of complex self-interested behaviour. 
The literature falls into two broad categories: “Government failure” and “Contract 
failure”. 
“Government Failure” in Public Good Provision 
When private firms are unable to provide efficient levels of a public good, there is a 
role for government intervention.  However, institutional constraints may lead to the 
failure of the state to adequately provide these public goods.  Young (2001) outlines 
five constraints on government provision of public goods that could lead to 
government failure, and so require a third organisational type. 
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• Categorical Constraint 
Government provision tends to be standardised, making it difficult to cater for 
those preferring small variations in the nature of service provision. 
• Majoritarian Constraint 
The Government must provide the level of service desired by the median voter in 
order to stay in power.  Voters who would prefer a lower or higher level of 
service provision will be disappointed. 
• Time Horizon Constraint 
Governments tend to have a shorter term outlook due to political terms, which 
may restrict their ability to provide services that would benefit society in the 
longer term. 
• Knowledge Constraint 
The hierarchy and bureaucracy of government can make it difficult to develop 
new ideas or experiment with new types of service provision. 
• Size Constraint 
Due to the intimidating size of government it can be difficult for individuals to 
convey their preferences about service provision. 
Theories of government failure suggest that the formation of a third organisational 
form, the nonprofit firm, can be the optimal response to these constraints.  This 
means that we would expect to see charities providing specialist variations of 
mainstream services, to be taking a longer term view in their service provision, and 
to be innovative in their fields. 
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Weisbrod (1988) advocated government failure as the prime cause of the rise of 
charities, and suggested that charitable activity would be greatest in a population that 
was more diverse, while a more homogeneous population would prefer government 
provision of services.  He suggests that the voluntary sector is necessary in a 
democracy to cater for the needs of minorities which the government is unable to 
help sufficiently.  Furthermore, Weisbrod suggests that this motive for charity 
operation explains the observed growth in the voluntary sector.  As technological 
advances make travel and communication cheaper and easier the members of our 
societies are becoming more diverse (Weisbrod, 1997).  This growing heterogeneity 
makes it harder for governments to cater to minority interests, and increases the 
number of charities. 
Market Failure Due to Incomplete Contracts 
A second explanation that is particularly influential in the literature is that charities 
can exist to help resolve market failure that results from incomplete contracts. In 
particular, where there are significant information asymmetries between buyers and 
sellers or aspects of a good or service that are non-contractible, there is potential for 
market failure leading to inefficient outcomes.  The theories suggest that nonprofit 
organisations provide a way to overcome this failure (Weisbrod & Schlesinger, 
1986). 
If the seller of a good has private knowledge about quality that it is difficult, costly or 
even impossible for the buyer to ascertain then the seller has an incentive to exploit 
this asymmetry for private profit.  Theorists argue that a nonprofit organisation can 
overcome this, as removing the profit motive neutralises the incentive to exploit an 
asymmetry, and market failure is avoided.  While the charity here provides a socially 
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beneficial function, there is no theoretical treatment of the altruism that might lead to 
its conception, or that might motivate managers to forgo private profits in order to 
run it. 
Many sectors in which charities are common, such as health or social care, exhibit 
significant information asymmetries about service quality.  The quality of services 
provided may only be observable when they are consumed – these are ‘experience 
goods’ (Riordan, 1986).  The quality of some services may never be observable, even 
after they have been consumed – these are ‘credence goods’ (Emons, 2001).  If 
quality is difficult, costly, or impossible to measure then this gives the provider 
power to exploit the consumers lack of information in order to maximise profits. 
Hansmann (1980) suggests that the profit non-distribution constraint means charity 
managers have little motivation to maximise profits and are unlikely to take 
advantage of their private information about service quality.  This engenders extra 
trust in consumers and so makes the claims of unverifiable quality credible, helping 
to overcome the potential market failure. 
Handy (1997) offers an explanation for the coexistence of private firms, nonprofits 
and public sector organisations in markets where contract failure due to information 
asymmetry is a feature.  Care recipients in her model have a benefit function which 
trades off two intermediate inputs.  One input is easily observed (X1), and the other is 
difficult or costly to measure (X2).  Suppliers can offer different combinations of X1 
and X2.  The nondistribution constraint provides nonprofits with a comparative 
advantage in the provision of unobservable quality, leading to the provision of 
services with a higher proportion of input X2.  Private firms will provide services 
with a larger proportion of X1.  If there are heterogeneous consumers with different 
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preferences for bundles of X1 and X2 then organisations of different types will be able 
to coexist efficiently in the same market. 
Bilodeau & Slivinski (1998) outline a theory of rational nonprofit entrepreneurship, 
where entrepreneurs wishing to sell a public good in a multi-stage game must choose 
between forming a private company or a nonprofit organisation.  The willingness of 
the public to contribute to the public good is greater if the organisation is bound by a 
non-distribution constraint, as there is less opportunity for the entrepreneur to 
appropriate contributions rather than providing the public good.  If this greater 
willingness is sufficiently large then it can be optimal even for a self-interested 
entrepreneur to choose the constraints of the nonprofit form. 
Similarly, Glaeser & Shleifer (2001) build on Hansmann (1980) and Weisbrod 
(1988) to outline a theory of not-for-profit entrepreneurs, who forgo the profits of a 
private firm in order to harness the voluntary contributions that a nonprofit 
organisation can elicit.  Entrepreneurs make an optimal choice of organisation type, 
choosing to form a nonprofit organisation when the benefits of harnessing 
contributions to the organisation through the credibility of nonprofit status outweigh 
the potential profits of forming a for-profit organisation.  Glaeser & Shleifer also 
show that donors would support nonprofits rather than for-profit organisations even 
in the absence of tax advantages. 
Akerlof (1986) describes partial gift exchange as one explanation for labour contracts 
where workers are paid above the market-clearing wage and firms are rewarded by 
higher labour productivity even when worker effort is difficult to measure.  Akerlof 
suggests that this gift relationship could be sustained by societal norms of a “fair 
day’s work”.  Although Akerlof recognises the importance of social or cultural 
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factors in his model, these remain exogenous.  This leaves the partial gift exchange 
to be an optimal response to a given set of norms.4 
Charity as Caring About the Ends: Pure Altruism 
Theories of charity as purely self interest, excluding altruism, seemed unsatisfactory, 
so next we consider how altruism can be added to a rational self-interested 
framework.  Initially, altruism is incorporated as the welfare of others directly 
entering the agent’s utility function.  Becker (1974) was influential in using the 
concept of pure altruism in his conception of the family: the welfare of members of 
the family directly enters the utility function of the head of household.  Becker then 
extends this model to apply to “… the synthetic ‘family’ consisting of charitable 
person ‘i’ and all recipients of his charity.” Becker (1974); page 1083. 
Given two agents, Ann (A) and Ben (B), there are two possibilities: 
),( BAA XXfU =          (1) 
UA = f (XA,uB (XB))         (2) 
Where UA and UB are utility functions, and XA and XB are the quantities of X 
consumed, by Ann and Ben respectively. 
That is, either the quantity (paternalistic function) of good X consumed by Ben, or 
the utility (non-paternalistic function) from the good X consumed by Ben, enter 
Ann’s utility function directly. 
Roberts (1984) describes a model of private charity and public transfers that uses a 
paternalistic utility function for the preferences of the altruist.  In particular, his 
                                                 
4
 See also Frank and Salkever (1991); Frank and Salkever (1994). 
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model predicts that public transfers will crowd out private giving, and in political 
equilibrium public transfers are “overprovided”, driving private giving to zero.  
Lucas & Stark (1985) examine the behaviour of migrants’ remittances to their home 
countries.  They contrast a self-interested model with a pure altruism case, using a 
non-paternalistic utility function where the weighted utilities of the members of their 
household enter the migrants’ utility function.  Their empirical results do not fully 
support the pure altruism specification, but instead they argue for a “tempered 
altruism” model where migrants are motivated by both altruistic and self-interested 
objectives. 
Under the usual assumptions governing utility functions if Ann had a quantity of X, 
while Ben had none, then both would lead to her giving him some in order to 
maximise her utility.  In the example, Ann’s utility would be maximised when the 
marginal utility of her allocation was equal to the marginal utility that she received 
from Ben consuming his allocation. 
This formulation seems to capture some of the features of altruism.  However, in 
groups it is vulnerable to free-riding.  Ann cares only about the absolute quantity (or 
utility) that Ben receives, whether she gives it to him or not.  If Carol, Dean and 
Erica also have Ben’s wellbeing enter their utility functions, then they will share the 
burden of supporting him.  If marginal utility is decreasing in consumption, then the 
marginal impact of their individual contributions will fall as the number of donors 
increase.  When Ann reduces her transfer to Ben she considers only the loss to her 
marginal utility, and does not internalise the loss of utility to Carol, Dean and Erica.  
This incentive to free-ride can result in inefficiently low transfers being made to Ben. 
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Sugden (1982) explores some of these concerns, by extending Becker’s model of 
charitable giving.  He challenges the applicability of the model to ‘large’ charities, 
where donors may have difficulty observing the contributions of others.  The 
activities undertaken by charitable organisations tend to involve a separation between 
donor and recipient.   The charity provides the mechanism for collecting donations 
from donors and distributing benefits to recipients.  This divide between giver and 
receiver creates a great incentive for free-riding. 
So if we understand altruism in this way, we would expect free-riding to be a real 
problem for the provision of charitable services.  In practice free-riding seems to be 
far less of a problem than predicted.  Many people make small donations to charity, 
where the marginal effect of their contribution is tiny, and the pure altruism theory 
does not explain this. 
Charity as Caring About the Means: Impure Altruism 
In order to explain the lack of free-riding in charitable contributions economic 
theorists introduced the concept of a ‘warm glow’ from altruistic behaviour, where 
impure altruists derive utility from the means rather than the end.   
UA = f (XA,λ.xAB,(1− λ)XB))        (3) 
Where xAB is the quantity of X gifted by Ann to Ben, and λ is weight between utility 
from the means and the ends.  In this framework, a pure altruist is a special case 
where λ=0. 
This is used to explain giving to charity where the final recipient is unknown to the 
donor, the charitable activity is difficult to observe, or is a public good with the 
potential for significant free-rider problems.  As observed by Rose-Ackerman (1996) 
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in her survey of the nonprofit literature this leads to the perverse situation where the 
only people defined as “true” altruists by economists are those who care only about 
ends, and not the means.  In a mixed population the contributions of impure altruists 
could potentially crowd out those of pure altruists, in extreme cases leaving the pure 
altruists giving little or nothing.  Despite this, the impure altruism model has been 
very influential in providing theoretical explanations of nonprofit organisations. 
Rose-Ackerman (1987) focuses on altruistic motives for supporting a nonprofit 
organisation, and suggests that the “ideological entrepreneurs” who start them are 
driven by “strong philosophical or professional commitments”.  This is a ‘warm 
glow’ explanation, where entrepreneurs gain utility from the charities activities 
directly rather than from the outcomes.  Rose-Ackerman also emphasises the role of 
the entrepreneurs in deciding the organisation’s mission, and the challenges that they 
will face in controlling this mission. 
Frank & Salkever (1991) examine the provision of health care by nonprofit 
organisations.  They develop a model of competition between private nonprofit, 
private and government hospitals.  In their ‘pure altruism’ model the nonprofit 
hospital’s objective function contains two arguments: net revenue and unmet 
healthcare need.  In this model nonprofit provision is crowded-out by increases in 
either private or government provision, unless the income effect of charity 
endowment is both positive and very large.  The model is then extended to include 
‘impure altruism’ in the nonprofit objective function by the addition of an argument 
capturing the nonprofits provision relative to its rivals.  It is shown theoretically that 
impure altruism in the nonprofits objective function leads to rivalry between 
competing nonprofits, and could explain the lack of crowding-out of nonprofit 
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provision by private or public sector health care provision.  This model implicitly 
assumes the existence of competing nonprofits, which could be explained through a 
model of nonprofit entrepreneurs such as Bilodeau & Slivinski (1998), discussed 
above.5  Frank & Salkever find empirical evidence in US data of competition 
between nonprofits in the provision of charity healthcare which supports the impure 
altruism nonprofit objective function. 
Young (1983) suggests that charities pay lower rewards to managers as they don’t 
make profits, and this leads to screening of managers.  Managers seeking high 
financial awards will tend to favour private firms, whilst managers who gain utility 
from achieving the objectives of the charity will accept lower compensation to take 
on the job.  This means that managers of charities have an interest in truthfully 
providing the service in order to maximise their own utility, and this makes charities 
services more credible.  More recently, Delfgaauw & Dur (2010) also describe a 
model of managerial selection into the private and public sectors when workers differ 
in managerial ability and prosocial motivation.  Their model suggests negative 
selection of managerial ability into the public sector.  The public sector earnings 
penalty (due to a warm glow effect) is increasing in managerial ability, leading to 
efficient selection of managers into sectors, and arguing against increasing public 
sector compensation in order to attract ‘better’ managers. 
Andreoni (1990) provided the classic reference for “warm-glow” giving by exploring 
its use to model donations to a public good.  His analysis also explored the crowding-
out effect of government grants to nonprofits on the level of donations, with an 
                                                 
5
 Further discussion of the founding of nonprofits and competition for donations can be found in 
Bilodeau & Slivinski (1997) 
 28
impure altruism model predicting that the effects of crowding-out will be less 
significant. 
This formulation of caring about the means leads to theoretical models of nonprofits 
with objective functions that include the level of service they provide or amount of 
goods they produce, often alongside profit or surplus. 
The concept of warm glow can lead to confusion if it is used to describe any utility 
derived from a charitable act.  Andreoni’s proposal for warm-glow giving included 
utility only from the means but not the ends as a solution to the problem of free-
riding in charitable provision.  However, answering “Why do people give money?” 
with “Because they enjoy it” begs the question.  This requires that we can separate 
analysis of the means from the ends, and that the enjoyment of giving without regard 
to the purpose of the gift is included within the definition of altruism. 
The prestige motivation for charitable contributions and participation emphasises the 
social gains from being seen to contribute to the public good (Harbaugh, 1998).  
Prestige provides an intrinsic benefit from involvement with a charity and can 
overcome the free-riding that would be expected with voluntary contributions to a 
public good. 
The popularity of warm-glow theories in this literature has led to its being extended 
to explain the absence of crowding out of donations by government grants to 
nonprofits, volunteering behaviour, voluntary sector wages in the labour market and 
to model the objective functions of nonprofit organisations. 
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Charity as Intrinsic Motivation 
Behavioural economics has had a significant impact on economic theories of 
altruism, by incorporating ideas from the field of psychology and observing in 
experiments subjects’ deviations from core economic assumptions. 
Frey (1997) argues that altruistic motivation cannot be traded off so easily with 
financial self-interested incentives.  He distinguishes between the extrinsic 
motivation of (often financial) incentives and the intrinsic motivation of gaining 
utility directly from undertaking an activity.  His assertion, drawing on evidence 
from the literatures of psychology and experimental economics, is that these two 
motivations can interact.  This has two main implications: 
• “Crowding-Out” effects; 
• “Spill-over” effects. 
“Crowding Out” is observed when the introduction of external incentives for 
performing a task reduces the amount of intrinsic motivation derived from the task, 
with the results that “paying more” leads to lower rather than higher effort. 
“Spill-over” is observed when the introduction of external incentives for one task 
reduces the intrinsic motivation for performing other tasks.  For example, introducing 
payment for a teenager to perform one household chore reduces the effort applied to 
other unpaid, but previously undertaken, chores. 
This interaction is a break with traditional “warm glow” explanations, which 
suggested that the glow produced the same type of utility as payment and agents 
could trade off these utilities internally. 
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This can lead to a labour supply curve that has both upward and downward sloping 
portions.  The implications can run even deeper than this, suggesting that the method 
of reward can also be important, independent of the value of the payment.  If a small 
payment is perceived as a gift or award (such as an Olympic gold medal), then it can 
increase intrinsic motivation.  But if it is perceived as payment for services then 
intrinsic motivation can be crowded out.  For example, allowing volunteers to claim 
their expenses can show that their time is valued and encourage greater volunteering.  
Providing an equivalent small “hourly rate” payment for volunteers could discourage 
volunteering, even if the expected value of the two payment schemes is identical.   
This assertion that the incentive mechanism can have real effects helps to explain 
some of the complex behaviour observed in this area.  Incorporating its implications 
into theoretical models is not straightforward.  
“Some of these efforts to integrate psychological effects into economics have 
been noted by mainstream economists in the sense that they are (often almost 
ritually) quoted at the appropriate moments, but they have had precious little 
effect on economic theory as a whole.” 
Frey (1997), page 122 
Although many of the papers developing theories of nonprofits with a warm-glow 
approach reference the work of Frey and other authors presenting similar evidence, 
the models themselves do not include the implications of an interaction between 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.  These theories have had an effect on economists’ 
understanding of altruism, but have not yet significantly affected the way that 
charitable organisations are modelled.  Recent attempts to address this have been 
undertaken in the pro-social motivation literature, using a Principal-Agent 
framework. 
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Charity in a Principal-Agent framework: Pro-social motivation 
A literature on altruism in a principal-agent framework has developed more recently, 
of which a key paper is Francois’s (2000) development of a model of ‘public service 
motivation’ drawn from the study of public administration. 6  In this model both 
principals and agents receive a warm glow from provision of a service that is 
independent of the organisational structure of the employer (i.e. for-profit or 
nonprofit).  In the spirit of Bilodeau & Slivinski (1998), the choice of organisational 
form is then left to the principal and so is endogenous to the model.  
In Francois’s model nonprofit status provides a method of mitigating the moral 
hazard when effort is unobserved, combined with the potential free-riding of the 
purely altruistic agent.  Nonprofit status allows the principal to credibly commit not 
to exert effort in a project in the case that the agent shirks, due to the fact that in a 
nonprofit the principal is not a residual claimant.  
Bénabou & Tirole (2003) explore intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in tasks within 
the principal agent model.  Their model has a principal with private information 
about benefit of the project to the agent, and so the agent’s motivation.  The extrinsic 
incentives provided by the principal as a payment convey information to the agent 
about the desirability of the task: high extrinsic incentives can send ‘bad news’ about 
the intrinsic payoff to the agent from the task.  Bénabou & Tirole show that in some 
cases rewards can be reduce effort in the short term, while lower incentives can 
provide a signal that the agent is trusted by the principal.  Bénabou & Tirole (2006) 
develop this further, identifying three sources of motivation: intrinsic, extrinsic and 
reputational.  They argue for a need to go beyond the simple dichotomy of pure and 
                                                 
6
 See also Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) for a review of this literature focussing on incentives and 
the role of pro-social motivation in the provision of social services, and Dixit (2002) for a discussion 
of incentives in the public sector. 
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impure altruism to consider the impact that reputation formed through the 
observation of one’s actions by other agents.  Specifically, extrinsic rewards can 
affect the perception of what is a good deed, creating positive or negative 
reputational effects.  They suggest going beyond a ‘fixed’ warm glow from doing 
good, instead considering a variable warm glow effect that is dependent on context 
e.g. what other people are doing.  Ellingsen & Johannesson (2008) also develop a 
model of prosocial behaviour arising from a desire for social esteem, with extrinsic 
incentives providing a signal to agents about the value of impressing the principal. 
Besley & Ghatak (2005) outline a model of “motivated” agents who have a “mission’ 
which they care about, and they gain utility from working with a principal who 
shares their mission.  Agents are prepared to give up some of their pecuniary rewards 
in return for matching with a principal who shares their mission.  The model shows 
the efficiency gains of matching principals and agents who share a mission as effort 
is increased.  The model makes a clear prediction – that wages in industries with 
motivated workers should be lower due to this warm glow accruing to workers. 
Ghatak & Mueller (2011) extend the motivated agents theory to permit a choice of 
organisational form by motivated managers.  Their model shows that when managers 
can choose between for-profit and nonprofit status (where nonprofit means that only 
a fraction α of the profits accrue to the manager) they can use nonprofit status as a 
commitment mechanism that they will not intervene in public good provision in the 
case of worker shirking.  This ensures that individual workers’ efforts have an impact 
on public good provision.  Managers’ trade-off the lower rents in a for-profit firm 
against the lower wages paid to workers in a nonprofit firm.  This leads to a 
prediction of lower wages in nonprofits due to the reduction of efficiency wages.  
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Ghatak & Mueller conclude that the existence of nonprofits occurs when the supply 
of motivated agents is high, when labour markets are slack (so that firms do not need 
to compete for motivated agents), and in industries where the financial rewards are 
relatively less significant.   
Going Full Circle: A Return to Titmuss 
These ideas echo the original predictions of Richard Titmuss, and his ideas about the 
interaction of altruism and economic behaviour.  So, in a sense, our understanding of 
these concepts has gone full circle. 
One of the problems that theories of altruism have to tackle is their conflict with a 
model of self-interest, long one of the core assumptions of neo-classical economics.  
The growth of Experimental Economics as a method of testing game-theoretic 
predictions, and its subsequent findings, challenge some of the core assumptions 
about economic behaviour. This has prepared the way for some level of discussion 
about these assumptions within the mainstream of the discipline.   
For example, Frohlich, Oppenheimer, & Moore (2001) write: 
“Traditionally, economists have assumed self-interest governs economic 
choices. Recently, some social scientists and economists, especially those 
working in game theoretic and experimental areas, have begun to treat self-
interest as a testable hypothesis.” 
Frohlich, et al (2001), page 271 
While there is no suggestion that core assumptions such as rational self-interest are to 
be abandoned across economics, the interaction of game theory and experimental 
economics has created a space in which it is now legitimate in the economic 
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mainstream to discuss these issues.  This has helped in part to break down the taboo 
in economics of incorporating ideas from other disciplines in the social sciences.  In 
particular, insights from psychology have been brought into economic models under 
the banner of “behavioural economics”. 
“Over the years, some prominent researchers in both economics and 
psychology have criticized some of the tenets of mainstream economics as 
psychologically unrealistic and proposed alternative assumptions that they 
believed would improve economic analysis.  …  Commonly labeled 
“behavioral economics”, these efforts to incorporate more realistic notions 
of human nature into economics have expanded enormously in the last 
decade.  While still controversial, behavioral economics is on the verge of 
“going mainstream”, especially in top departments in the U.S.” 
Rabin (2002), page 657 
Experiments conducted with a range of cooperative experimental games (see Fehr & 
Schmidt (2006) for a recent review) show that perceptions of fairness are important 
in gift-giving.  Examining games with different endowments has demonstrated the 
role of entitlement in defining fair outcomes.  Games involving punishment 
mechanisms show that violation of norms has an influence in decisions to cooperate. 
This literature has developed a body of consistent experimental findings that seem to 
challenge the self-interest assumption.  They do not however point unambiguously to 
an alternative model.  In their review of the experimental economics evidence on 
giving, Fehr & Schmidt (2006) outline three “departures from the standard self 
interest model” in the literature.  In addition to self interest, agents may also have 
preferences over: 
• The resources allocated  to other agents; 
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• The fairness of other agents’ behaviour; 
• The type of preferences of the other agents. 
The first encompasses the warm-glow explanations of the previous literature.  It also 
extends to conditional preferences such as inequity aversion, where agents receive 
disutility from inequitable distributions whoever receives more.  The second group 
broadly covers reciprocity, where actions are taken in response to the intentions of 
other agents.  This is distinguished from the self-interested reciprocity observed in 
repeated games, where cooperation is utility maximising, but is instead reciprocal 
behaviour based on the perceptions of the motivations of other agents.  The third 
involves decisions based on the type of preferences that other agents hold, rather than 
their direct actions; for example, rewarding other altruistic people and punishing 
selfish people. 
This literature provides a basis on which to challenge and reform our understanding 
of self interest.  The development of theories of charities stands as an example of the 
benefits to a research program of accepting criticism and suggestions from wider 
disciplines that share research topics. 
Where is the Warm Glow?  A Utility Framework 
The literature reviewed in this chapter has shown that there is a wide range of 
theories of prosocial motivations, and a variety of explanations for their 
manifestation in independent nonprofit organisations, such as charities.  An 
individual, i, can gain work utility from several sources: 
 = (, , 	)   


> 0;	

> 0;	    (4) 
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Where wi is the wage earned, ji is the characteristics of the job, gi is the utility from 
taking prosocial actions.  The hourly wage paid in the job is an observed variable, 
and will be the dependent variable in wage equations to analyse sector differences.  It 
is reasonable to think that some jobs, such as working in a care home, provide the 
opportunity to gain some utility from helping others regardless of the type of 
organisation.  These characteristics are contained in ji, and will be captured through 
controlling for industry and occupation.  Changing job characteristics may increase 
or decrease utility, so the first derivative is uncertain.  Further to these observed 
characteristics is the unobserved source of utility gi.  Individuals gain utility in gi 
from taking actions that have an impact on others, and only gain this utility if they 
undertake the action.  The propensity of individuals to receive warm glow utility is 
taken as exogenous, and we do not explore the formation of altruistic preferences. 
As we have seen earlier in this chapter, the literature proposes two main mechanisms 
for this warm glow utility being observed in the nonprofit sector: organisational and 
individual.7.  In the first, all workers have the potential to receive warm glow, but 
only nonprofits offer this utility due to the non-distribution of profits constraint 
(Francois, 2000, 2003; Hansmann, 1980; Rose-Ackerman, 1996).  This enables a 
credible commitment from employers not to divert rents from the production of a 
public good  In the second, there are at least two types of workers: pro-socially 
motivated and non-motivated; and motivated workers match and sort into the 
nonprofit sector (Besley & Ghatak, 2005; Delfgaauw & Dur, 2007, 2010; Dixit, 
2002).  Both of these mechanisms predict that motivated workers will choose to 
work in the nonprofit sector, leading to a warm glow wage discount.  Where they 
                                                 
7
 Also discussed above is the literature on the prestige/self esteem motive for prosocial motivation 
(Bénabou & Tirole, 2006; Harbaugh, 1998); however we do not analyse this motive further in this 
dissertation. 
 37
differ is on the prediction for sector switchers.  Workers switching sector in the 
organisational explanation will not exhibit pro-social motivation in the private sector.  
However, if workers who sort are of different types, then the second explanation 
predicts that the workers switching sector would continue to be intrinsically 
motivated.   
Motivated workers making altruistic actions in all organisational types will not be 
detected in sector differences, but instead will be captured in industry differences.  
We model nonprofits as offering utility from action that is not available to workers in 
for-profit firms.  This is treating donated labour in a similar way to monetary 
donations.  Donors gain warm glow from the act of giving to charity beyond the 
utility received from the ends of the donation.  Although the act provides the utility, 
this does not mean that donors gain warm glow utility from giving money to private 
firms.  In order for a charitable donation to provide warm-glow utility from the act of 
giving the donor must believe that it will be used for charitable purposes.  The same 
principle is applied to donated labour here: motivated workers donating labour 
(through either unpaid overtime or lower wages) do so in the context of a nonprofit 
employer because the nonprofit can more credibly commit to using that donation for 
charitable ends rather than extracting it as profit.  This framework can be justified 
within a number of the theories of altruism.   
Firstly, it can be justified where nonprofits operate in markets with significant 
information asymmetries and the non-distribution constraint provides a credibility 
mechanism for providing uncontractible quality, as per Handy (1997).  The non-
distribution constraint also provides a credible way for employers to commit not to 
appropriate motivated workers effort away from uncontractible quality and towards 
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contractible quality or cost-reduction.  Secondly, the undertaking of altruistic 
activities within nonprofits, and the acceptance of lower extrinsic rewards, could 
provide both intrinsic and reputational benefits as per Bénabou & Tirole ( 2006).  
Thirdly, the context of undertaking altruistic acts (within an organisation with 
explicit prosocial objectives, as opposed to for-profit) can affect the intrinsic 
motivation, as per Frey (1997), with extrinsic incentives crowding-out the intrinsic 
motivation in a for-profit setting. 
These theories all make the prediction that we would observe not only selection of 
mission-motivated workers into nonprofits, but also that we would observe 
differences in the warm glow utility gained by workers switching between sectors.  
This utility framework is used in the empirical analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 as the 
basis for the models estimated. 
One further distinction needs to be made.  Most of the theories discussed in this 
chapter use the term to refer to “nonprofits” as covering the public sector, the 
independent nonprofit (“voluntary”) sector, or both organisation types together.  
Both the theoretical and empirical work usually explores comparisons between the 
private sector and either the public sector or the voluntary sector, excluding the other 
or combining it within or other sector.  In the empirical work in this thesis we include 
the three sectors separately.  This however means that theory is less clear on what the 
differences between the public and voluntary sectors will be for mission motivation, 
as both are assumed to be mission motivated. 
As we will show in the next chapter, significant numbers of workers move among all 
three sectors, and so it is possible to explore this question.  If both the public and 
voluntary sectors are equally mission motivated then, after controlling for other 
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characteristics, we would expect to see that there are no differences in donated 
labour.  However, there is some suggestion that we might expect to find higher levels 
of mission motivation in the voluntary sector.  This would be the prediction of both 
early nonprofit theory (Weisbrod, 1988) and more recent motivated agent theory 
(Besley & Ghatak, 2005).  The increased flexibility of voluntary organisations to 
provide heterogeneous public goods (and so to have heterogeneous missions) leads to 
the potential for better matches between mission-motivated principals and agents in 
the voluntary sector than the public sector, leading to higher levels of warm-glow 
utility. 
Implications for Future Research 
This chapter has suggested that the economic theories of charity have come full 
circle, and now include some appreciation of the complexity of altruistic motivations, 
and the ways in which intrinsic and extrinsic motivation can interact.  Our current 
models of nonprofit organisations have a utilitarian underpinning of impure altruism 
extended to provide an objective function as an alternative to profit maximisation.  
These models make some predictions that are indeed borne out in the data.  
However, they do not make explicit the link between impure altruism on an 
individual level, and the behaviour of an organisation made up of many individuals. 
There is still a disconnection between the behavioural theories and the models of the 
behaviour of charitable organisations.  Intrinsic motivation theory implies that the 
mechanisms of contracting between government and nonprofits could have as much 
of an effect as the incentives themselves, but this has not been fully incorporated into 
models of nonprofit organisations.  For example, models of nonprofit competition 
and contracting with the public sector often include a warm-glow objective function, 
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but do not consider that the institutional structure itself could affect that glow.  It is 
important to consider whether a tender and contract method will produce an efficient 
outcome when contracting with a nonprofit, or if instead the mechanism used will 
crowd out the intrinsic motivation which gives the nonprofit its advantage. 
There is still much to be done in developing economic theories of charity.  With the 
apparent growing importance of the nonprofit sector it is perhaps becoming even 
more important that these issues are addressed.  
The discussion here is not intended to suggest that the rational self-interested homo 
œconomicus should be abandoned to model charities and nonprofits as being 
completely altruistic.  Titmuss in his original book did not describe even the 
voluntary community blood donor as purely altruistic: 
“No donor type can, of course, be said to be characterized by complete, 
disinterested, spontaneous altruism.  There must be some sense of obligation, 
approval and interest; some awareness of need and of the purposes of the 
blood gift; perhaps some organized group rivalry in generosity; some 
knowledge that fellow-members of the community who are young or old or 
sick cannot donate, and some expectation and assurance that a return gift 
may be needed and received at some future time. 
The Gift Exchange (Titmuss, 1970), Chapter 5, Page 89 
Charity is a fundamentally complex phenomenon, and it is right that there are many 
explanations for its different facets.  This chapter is intended to depict the 
development of the economic theory of charity as a journey through the motives 
underlying behaviour, from a self-interested starting point to a consideration of the 
inclusion of a richer model of explicit altruism.  It also shows how a challenge issued 
from one discipline to another to explain the implications of fundamental 
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assumptions can result in fruitful research culminating in a richer understanding of 
human behaviour. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Describing the Voluntary Sector Workforce 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces the datasets used in this research.  Firstly we outline the data 
available on the voluntary sector.  Secondly we explore in turn the characteristics of 
the voluntary sector workforce, jobs and organisations, drawing comparisons with 
the private and public sectors.  Lastly we examine whether the characteristics of 
workers switching into and out of the voluntary sector have changed over time. 
The Datasets 
Two datasets are used to analyse the voluntary sector workforce in this chapter.  
These are the UK Labour Force Survey (UK LFS), and the Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey (WERS).8  Each of these datasets has advantages and 
disadvantages in the study of this sector.  Empirical analysis of the two datasets is 
combined to investigate the economics of the voluntary sector labour market in the 
UK. 
UK Labour Force Survey (UK LFS) 
The data used here is from the LFS over a ten year period between 1998 and 2007.  
The survey collects detailed information on around 50,000 households a year, 
following individuals for five consecutive quarters.  Questions are asked about 
employment, household status, and other individual characteristics. 
                                                 
8
 See Appendix One for more detail on the construction of the datasets used. 
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The survey seeks information on respondents during a specific reference period, 
normally a period of one week or four weeks immediately prior to the interview. 
The LFS is the source of the internationally comparable (International Labour 
Organisation) measure known as 'ILO unemployment'. 
Sampling the Voluntary Sector in the LFS 
The LFS provides a large sample of workers in the voluntary sector.  Organisational 
characteristics such as number of employees are gathered from workers’ recall and 
so are not necessarily precise.  The question about sector first asks: 
“Q89 SECTOR – For your main job, do you work for a private firm or 
business or a limited company (1) or some other kind of organisation (2)?” 
Employees in the voluntary sector should answer “(2)”, and will then be asked: 
“Q90 SECTRO – If respondent answered (2), then what kind of non-private 
organisation was it?” 
Q90 involves a choice of eight categories, one of which states, ‘a charity, voluntary 
organisation or trust’. It is this choice that has been used to differentiate voluntary 
sector employees. 
Details of second and additional jobs are not gathered in sufficient detail to identify 
voluntary sector workers.  These jobs are therefore omitted – if there are more of 
these types of job in the voluntary sector then this could potentially under-count 
voluntary sector jobs. 
On the basis of these questions, employers are classified into one of three sectors: 
private, public or voluntary.  It should be noted that this classification is based on the 
reported sector by the individuals interviewed.  This has led to some concern about 
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the misclassification of sector.  This is of particular concern when analysing panel 
data that records workers who switch between sectors.  The issue of misrecording 
error is discussed in Gregg et al (2011), who show that levels of misrecording would 
need to be very high to significantly affect the conclusions from their model.  They 
also note that misrecording is mainly attributable to self-employed general medical 
practitioners and staff in higher education.  The former will be excluded as we 
examine only those in employment, whilst the latter will be excluded when we 
narrow the focus to the Health and Social work industries. 
In this chapter two versions of the UK LFS data are used.  The first is the pooled 
cross-section.  This combines the wave one observation, collected in a face-to-face 
interview, for each worker to build a ten-year dataset.  The second is the longitudinal 
LFS, which uses the first and fifth observation on each worker, one year apart, to 
build a panel dataset. 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) 
The 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS 2004) is the fifth in a 
series of surveys aiming to provide a nationally representative account of the state of 
employment relations and working life inside British workplaces. Previous surveys 
were conducted in 1980, 1984, 1990 and 1998.  WERS surveys organisations with 
more than five employees to build a large depository of information on employment 
relations.  WERS 2004 Cross-section Survey includes 2,300 workplaces, 1,000 
employee representatives and 22,500 employees, with an organisational response rate 
of 64%. 
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Sampling the Voluntary Sector in WERS 
WERS organisation data is collected from management, financial accounting 
sources, and is checked at the organisational level.  This ensures that the 
organisation’s sector is reliably reported, and data about the organisation 
characteristics and size is accurate. 
Many voluntary organisations are small, with few paid staff, and so those with fewer 
than five employees will have been omitted from the WERS survey. 
Voluntary sector workers who work in the sector as a secondary or additional job 
will be included in the survey, as the selection of employees is conducted from all 
employees on the payroll, so there should be a representative sample of part-time and 
temporary voluntary sector workers. 
Describing the Voluntary Sector 
This chapter uses the UK LFS 1998 to 2007 to describe the characteristics of workers 
within the voluntary sector, and to draw comparisons with the private and public 
sectors.  The analysis is split into three sections: 
• Workers and Jobs; 
• Workers in the Health & Social Work industries; 
• Workers moving between sectors, using the longitudinal element of the 
UK LFS; 
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Workers & Jobs in the Voluntary Sector 
Table 1 shows the proportion of workers in each sector, by gender.  This shows that 
only a relatively small proportion of workers (2.6%) are employed in the voluntary 
sector. 
The mean characteristics of workers in the three sectors are shown in Table 2 below.  
The first four columns show mean values or proportions for the whole sample, 
private, public and voluntary sectors respectively.  The fifth column tests the 
hypothesis that the voluntary sector mean is significantly different from the private 
sector mean.  The sixth column tests the hypothesis that there is a significant 
difference between all three sectors. 
Workers in the voluntary sector are predominantly female, with two thirds of the 
workforce made up of women.  Mean hourly pay in the voluntary sector is £0.75 
lower than the private sector – this difference is small but statistically significant. 
Workers in the voluntary sector are on average four years older than those in the 
private sector.  Correspondingly they have more work experience (~3 years), but 
interestingly have less tenure with their employers by about 1.5 years.  There are 
significantly higher proportions of voluntary sector workers in part-time and 
temporary jobs, consistent with the lower tenure.  The proportion of voluntary sector 
workers with a degree education is twice that of the private sector, and 
correspondingly the proportion of workers in professional occupations is 
significantly higher in the voluntary sector. Whilst only about 5% of private sector 
workers are employed in the health & social work industries, nearly 60% of 
voluntary sector workers work in these industries. 
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MAKE-UP OF SECTORS  
 Male Female TOTAL 
Private 77.25% 57.47% 67.19% 
Public 21.26% 38.94% 30.25% 
Voluntary 1.50% 3.59% 2.56% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 
Table 1: Proportion of Workers by Sector and Gender 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1998 - 2007 
SUMMARY STATISTCS 
Variable Whole 
Sample  
Private 
Sector 
Public 
Sector 
Voluntary 
Sector 
Vol. versus 
Private 
All-Sector 
Difference 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Test Statistic† Test Statistic‡ 
 (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Probability) (Probability) 
       
Hourly wage 
(£) 
10.26 
(7.827) 
10.01 
(8.483) 
10.88 
(6.289) 
9.48 
(5.536) 
-5.31 
(0.000) *** 
345.03 
(0.000) *** 
Age 
(years) 
39.7   
(11.63) 
38.6   
(11.93) 
41.9   
(10.59) 
42.7    
(11.17) 
27.22 
(0.000) *** 
2317.61 
(0.000) *** 
Experience 
(years) 
22.1   
(12.39) 
21.2 
(12.70) 
23.6   
(11.49) 
24.4   
(12.15) 
19.88 
(0.000) *** 
1069.48 
(0.000) *** 
Tenure 
(years) 
7.88   
(8.32) 
7.00   
(7.90) 
10.04   
(8.97) 
5.54   
(5.98) 
-13.79   
(0.000) *** 
3758.71 
(0.000) *** 
Male 
(proportion) 
0.491   
(.499) 
0.565   
(.495) 
0.345   
(.475) 
0.287   
(.452) 
-41.30 
(0.000) *** 
10633.86 
(0.000) *** 
Part-Time Work 
(proportion) 
0.231   
(0.421) 
0.200   
(0.400) 
0.287   
(0.452) 
0.363   
(0.480) 
30.42 
(0.000) *** 
2754.89 
(0.000) *** 
Temporary Job 
(proportion) 
0.049   
(0.216) 
0.037    
(0.189) 
0.072   
(0.260) 
0.091   
(0.288) 
20.93 
(0.000) *** 
1557.23 
(0.000) *** 
Degree Education 
(proportion) 
0.216   
(0.411) 
0.164   
(0.370) 
0.322   
(0.467) 
0.326   
(0.468) 
32.46 
(0.000) *** 
7768.51 
(0.000) *** 
Professional 
(proportion) 
0.429   
(0.494) 
0.367   
(0.482) 
0.556   
(0.496) 
0.552   
(0.497) 
29.05 
(0.000) *** 
7698.96 
(0.000) *** 
Health & Social 
Work Industry 
(proportion) 
0.138   
(0.345) 
0.053   
(0.225) 
0.287   
(0.452) 
0.597   
(0.490) 
116.63   
(0.000) *** 
26356.59 
(0.000) *** 
Observations 244,466 164,255 73,943 6,268   
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
†
 Significant difference between Voluntary and Private tested by regressing the relevant variable on sector dummies (Yi=α + 
βPPUB + βVVOL + ei by OLS for continuous variables and logit for binary variables, and testing the hypothesis that βV=0.  For 
continuous dependent variables the test statistic is a t-test, and for binary dependent variables the test statistic is a z-test. 
‡ Joint significance of the sector dummies in the regressions uses an F-test for continuous dependent variables and a χ2 test for 
binary dependent variables, testing the constraint that βP = βV = 0 
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Sector 
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Figure 2 shows the distribution of the age of workers in the three sectors.  From this 
we can see that the higher average age in the voluntary sector is driven both by a 
later peak in the age distribution (around age 40), and the fact that the age 
distribution does not tail off so sharply in later years.  This suggests that the 
voluntary sector employs a much greater density of older workers than the private 
sector.  The public sector age distribution is more similar to the voluntary sector’s, 
but still without such a large number of older workers.  We will explore later in this 
chapter the extent to which this can be explained by workers switching into the 
voluntary sector later in their working life. 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of tenure by sector.  This shows that the pattern of 
short tenure in the voluntary sector is much more similar to that of the private sector 
than the longer public sector tenure.  The proportions of workers with very low 
tenure in the voluntary sector is very similar to the private sector, and the histogram 
suggests that the difference in means between the sectors is driven by the longer tail 
of the private sector distribution; there are very few voluntary sector workers with 
tenure greater than 20 years despite the older workforce.  This is consistent with the 
expansion of the sector, and the switching in to the voluntary sector of older workers 
from the other two sectors. 
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WORKER AGE 
 
Age (years) 
Figure 2: Mean Worker Age by Sector 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1998-2007) 
 
WORKER TENURE 
 
Tenure (years) 
Figure 3: Mean Worker Tenure by Sector 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1998-2007) 
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The average hourly wages for male and female workers are shown in Table 3.  For 
both men and women pay in the public sector is highest.  While for men pay in the 
voluntary sector is at a slight discount to private sector wages, they are not 
statistically significantly different.  For women the opposite is true, with private 
sector wages significantly lower than voluntary sector wages. 
Variable Whole 
Sample  
Private 
Sector 
Public 
Sector 
Voluntary 
Sector 
Vol. versus 
Private 
All-Sector 
Difference 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean t-value† Test Statistic‡ 
 (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Probability) (Probability) 
       
MALE 
Hourly wage (£) 
11.58 
(8.915) 
11.35 
(9.382) 
12.46 
(7.069) 
10.82 
(6.616) 
-0.15 
(0.881) 
805.67 
(0.000) *** 
FEMALE 
Hourly Wage (£) 
8.99 
(6.354) 
8.28 
(6.765) 
10.04 
(5.660) 
8.937 
(4.934) 
6.79 
(0.000) *** 
2317.61 
(0.000) *** 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
†
 Significant difference between Voluntary and Private tested by regressing hourly pay on sector dummies for male and female 
workers (Yi=α + βPPUB + βVVOL + ei  
‡ Joint significance of the sector dummies in the regressions uses an F-test for continuous dependent variables, testing the 
constraint that βP = βV = 0 
Table 3: Mean Gross Hourly Pay by Sector and Sex 
 
The histograms of log hourly pay are shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5.  For both male 
and female workers the distribution of voluntary sector pay is more concentrated 
than the private sector. 
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HOURLY WAGES FOR MALE WORKERS 
 
Log Hourly Pay 
Figure 4: Histogram of Gross Hourly Wage Distribution by Sector for Male Workers 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1998-2007) 
 
HOURLY WAGES FOR FEMALE WORKERS 
 
Log Hourly Pay 
Figure 5: Histogram of Gross Hourly Wage Distribution by Sector for Female Workers 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1998-2007) 
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Employment in the Health & Social Work Industries 
As discussed in Chapter One, in this thesis we also examine sector differences 
separately within the health and social work industries (referred to from here on as 
HSW).  This distinction is made by industry classification code.9  
Table 4 shows the proportions of workers by sector in the HSW sample.  Voluntary 
sector workers make up about 11% of the workforce in these industries.  Descriptive 
statistics on key worker characteristics are summarised in Table 5.  As in Table 2 
above, this table shows both the mean characteristics by sector and a test of 
significant differences in the means. 
Log hour wages in the voluntary sector are slightly but significantly higher than the 
private sector.  Within the health & social work industries, voluntary sector workers 
are again older and more experienced, but with no significant difference in job 
tenure.  The prevalence of part-time work is much higher across all sectors in the 
health & social work industries, and slightly lower in the voluntary than private 
sector.  The incidence of temporary jobs remains much higher in the voluntary 
sector.  Three times more workers in the voluntary sector than private sector have a 
degree education, and nearly twice as many are in professional occupations. 
 
                                                 
9
 Industry is coded using the UK Standard Industrial Classification Of Economic Activities SIC(92), 
which is a hierarchical 5-digit Industry Classifications code that conforms with and corresponds 
directly to the European Community Classification of Economic Activities (NACE) Version 1 codes.  
The industry classification analysed is SIC(92) N 85 Health & Social Work.  This broad industry 
classification includes: Human health activities: Hospitals, Nursing Homes, Dental practices, 
opticians, etc.; Veterinary activities: Vets and veterinary hospitals; Social work activities, with and 
without accommodation. 
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 Male Female TOTAL 
Private 17.80% 27.94% 26.11% 
Public 67.71% 61.74% 62.81% 
Voluntary 14.50% 10.32% 11.08% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 4: Proportion of Workers by Sector and Gender in the HSW Industries 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey) 
 
SUMMARY STATISTCS 
Variable Whole 
Sample  
Private 
Sector 
Public 
Sector 
Voluntary 
Sector 
Vol. versus 
Private 
All-Sector 
Difference 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Test Statistic† Test Statistic‡ 
 (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Probability) (Probability) 
Hourly wage 
(£) 
9.42 
(5.777) 
7.24 
(4.908) 
10.36 
(5.963) 
9.26 
(5.163) 
18.51 
(0.000)*** 
964.18 
(0.000)*** 
Age 
(years) 
41.43 
(11.18) 
40.25 
(12.43) 
41.71  
(10.58) 
42.62 
(11.15) 
10.55 
(0.000)*** 
68.03 
(0.000)*** 
Experience 
(years) 
23.68 
(12.15) 
23.10 
(13.10) 
23.75  
(11.71) 
24.64 
(12.18) 
6.34  
(0.000)*** 
20.62 
(0.000)*** 
Tenure 
(years) 
7.69 
(7.79) 
4.82 
(5.41) 
9.38 
(8.50) 
4.901 
(5.08) 
0.76 
(0.447) 
1825.04 
(0.000)*** 
Male 
(proportion) 
.179 
(.384) 
.122 
(.328) 
.194 
(.395) 
.235 
(.424) 
15.70 
(0.000)*** 
297.22 
(0.000)*** 
Part-Time Work 
(proportion) 
.385 
(.486) 
.431 
(.495) 
.360 
(.480) 
.413 
(.492) 
-1.82   
(0.068)* 
143.73 
(0.000)*** 
Temporary Job 
(proportion) 
.054 
(.227) 
.035 
(.185) 
.054 
(.227) 
.098 
(.297) 
13.54 
(0.000)*** 
188.53 
(0.000)*** 
Degree 
Education 
(proportion) 
.209   
(.407) 
.095 
(.293) 
.245 
(.430) 
.280 
(.449) 
25.46 
(0.000)*** 
896.31 
(0.000)*** 
Professional 
(proportion) 
.496 
(.499) 
.283 
(.450) 
.579 
(.493) 
.527 
(.499) 
25.78 
(0.000)*** 
2085.99 
(0.000)*** 
Observations 33,840 8,837 21,255 3,748 - - 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
†
 Significant difference between Voluntary and Private tested by regressing the relevant variable on sector dummies (Yi=α + 
βPPUB + βVVOL + ei by OLS for continuous variables and logit for binary variables, and testing the hypothesis that βV=0.  For 
continuous dependent variables the test statistic is a t-test, and for binary dependent variables the test statistic is a z-test. 
‡ Joint significance of the sector dummies in the regressions is uses an F-test for continuous dependent variables and a χ2 test for 
binary dependent variables, testing the constraint that βP = βV = 0 
Table 5: Summary Statistics by Sector in the HSW Industries 
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Characteristics of Voluntary Sector Organisations 
The second data-set used in this research is the Workplace Employment Relations 
Survey (WERS) 2004.  This is an employer-employee linked dataset.  This dataset 
provides much more detailed organisational-level data than that asked of individual 
workers through the UK LFS.  Here we present an overview of the characteristics of 
employers in the voluntary sector. 
Variable Private Public Voluntary Sample 
 
Mean 
(S.D.) 
Mean 
(S.D.) 
Mean 
(S.D.) 
Mean 
(S.D.) 
No. Full-Time Employees 1541.99   
(6801.58) 
964.34  
(1820.30) 
434.08 
(1228.18) 
1318.58 
(5656.09) 
     
No. Part-Time Employees 1608.67 
(12756.29) 
427.72  
(912.42) 
104.76   
(155.06) 
1183.32   
(10356.57) 
     
Turnover Per Annum 
(£1,000s) 
456,294 
(3281367) 
70,509 
(240553) 
25,477   
(66613) 
323,023   
(2677268) 
     
Total Employment Costs 
(£1,000s) 
49,899 
(219938) 
88,193   
(389176) 
17,673   
(42344) 
58,362   
(271666) 
     
N 377 177 32 582 
     
Table 6: Mean Organisation Size variables 
(Source: WERS 2004) 
 
Table 6 shows the means by sector of a number of measurements of organisation 
size.  These figures were collected through the financial questionnaire completed by 
a representative of the organisation.  Voluntary organisations are significantly 
smaller than private and public sector organisations in terms of number of 
employees, annual turnover and total employment costs.  While there are also many 
small private firms, there are very few really large voluntary organisations. 
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We also use WERS data to explore self-reported mission-motivation, as perceived by 
both workers and managers.  The WERS questionnaire for employees contains 
questions about the extent to which they share their employer’s values. The 
questionnaire for managers asks for their views on employees’ commitment to their 
employers’ values.  WERS also has a panel element, surveying the same workplaces 
but different employees within those workplaces.  We exploit this to compare 
employees reported values in 1998 and 2004. 
Here we test for sector differences estimated in multivariate ordered logit equations 
with sector dummies, controlling for worker characteristics including gender, age, 
education, job status, industry, and tenure, work hours and ethnicity.  
iiiiiji eyOrgJobIndxY +++++== ....)Pr( 4321 ββββα    (5) 
The regression is estimated with clustered standard errors to account for the fact that 
up to 25 workers are drawn from each employer, creating clusters by organisation.  
Issues of worker selection into sector are not tackled here; however this analysis is 
presented to provide a description of worker self-reported mission by sector. 
Organisational Attitudes 
Workers are responding to the following questions: 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about working 
here? (Strongly Agree /  Agree / Neither Agree or Disagree / Disagree / Strongly Disagree) 
(1) I share many of the values of my organisation 
Table 7 below shows the results of the Organisation Characteristics equation 
estimates. 
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EMPLOYEE ATTITUDES 
 
Whole Workforce 
 Share Values Share Values 
 1998 2004 
main   
Public Sector 0.0185 -0.121 
 (0.0908) (0.0759) 
   
Voluntary Sector 0.254 0.192 
 (0.166) (0.131) 
   
Female -0.0183 0.0712 
 (0.0480) (0.0368)* 
   
Health & S.W. 0.387 0.721 
 (0.130)*** (0.0978)*** 
N 11,457 17,058 
pseudo R2 0.051 0.031 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
Health & Social Work Industries 
 Share Values Share Values 
 1998 2004 
main   
Public Sector 0.107 -0.763 
 (0.145) (0.130)*** 
   
Voluntary Sector 0.637 0.0615 
 (0.212)*** (0.174) 
   
Female -0.137 0.0757 
 (0.116) (0.106) 
N 2,102 2,673 
pseudo R2 0.045 0.035 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Additional explanatory variables in regression include: age, tenure, education, working hours, job 
status, ethnicity and industry. 
 
 
Table 7: Organisational Attitudes 
(Source: WERS 2004)  
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Whole Workforce 
In the Whole Workforce sample, workers in the public and voluntary sectors are no 
more likely to report sharing the values of their employer than those in the private 
sector.  This finding has not changed between 1998 and 2004.  However, there is a 
significant generic industry effect, with workers in all sectors of the HSW industries 
more likely to share their employer’s values in both years. 
Health & Social Work Industries 
In the HSW sub-sample, public sector workers were neither more nor less likely to 
share their employers values in 1998 compared to the private sector.  However in 
2004 they are significantly less likely than the private sector. 
Voluntary sector workers were more likely to report sharing their employer’s values 
in 1998 than those in the private sector, and this is statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  However by 2004 this effect has been eroded, and there is no longer a 
statistically significant difference between the private and voluntary sectors. 
Employees’ Commitment to Values 
Managers were asked the extent to which they thought that employees shared the 
values of their organisation.  This is similar to the question asked to the individual 
employees. 
Question: 
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To what extent do you agree with this statement:  Employees here are fully 
committed to the values of this organisation.  
(Str. Agree to Str. Disagree, 5 point scale) 10 
Table 8 shows the ordered logit coefficient estimates for organisational values.  
Managers in the voluntary sector are more likely to agree more strongly that their 
employees are committed to the organisation’s values than those in the private sector, 
in all five specifications.  There is a similar effect for public sector managers 
compared to the private sector.  There is no significant difference between the public 
and voluntary sectors once organisational characteristics are controlled for. 
Mission Motivation 
This descriptive analysis of self-reported employer-employee value sharing suggests 
that within the HSW industries there has been a decline in mission motivation 
between 1998 and 2004.  Care should be taken in interpreting these findings, as the 
analysis does not control for the selection of workers into sectors.  There is also a 
concern about the extent to which reporting shared values with employers’ captures 
mission-motivation. 
However, workers in the voluntary sector have gone from being more likely to agree 
that they shared their employer’s mission at the start of the time period to not 
reporting significantly differently from the private sector in 2004.  This could be 
suggestive of a drop in mission-motivation, and will be explored further in Chapter 4.  
                                                 
10
 This is question APHRAS09 in the WERS 2004 Cross Section Management Questionnaire 
  
EMPLOYEE VALUES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Values Values Values Values Values 
      
Public Sector 0.508** 0.595*** 0.748*** 0.766*** 0.789** 
 (3.18) (3.53) (4.00) (4.05) (3.06) 
      
Voluntary Sector 1.151*** 1.022*** 1.095*** 1.089*** 0.964** 
 (3.83) (3.33) (3.54) (3.50) (2.71) 
      
No. of Employees - Y Y Y Y 
      
Annual Turnover - Y Y Y Y 
      
Union - - Y Y Y 
      
Region - - - Y Y 
      
Industry  - - - - Y 
      
cut1      
_cons -6.405*** -7.333*** -6.835*** -7.340*** -7.138*** 
 (-16.48) (-11.13) (-12.85) (-9.91) (-9.01) 
cut2      
_cons -3.257*** -4.036*** -3.987*** -4.046*** -3.834*** 
 (-15.35) (-11.97) (-12.94) (-8.46) (-6.91) 
cut3      
_cons -1.746*** -2.466*** -2.431*** -2.489*** -2.251*** 
 (-8.62) (-7.71) (-8.36) (-5.34) (-4.14) 
cut4      
_cons 0.738*** 0.151 0.170 0.164 0.459 
 (3.71) (0.49) (0.61) (0.36) (0.85) 
N 827 827 827 827 827 
AIC 1939.1 1924.6 1922.9 1935.1 1930.9 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(Notes: Each regression is an ordered logit model with five categories.  The control variables are included as indicated in the table above.  AIC is Akaike's Information 
Criterion, a measure of goodness-of-fit of the model.) 
Table 8: Ordered Logit Regressions for Organisational Values 
(Source: WERS 2004) 
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Describing Workers who Switch Sectors 
The LFS has a limited panel structure in which subjects are interviewed quarterly for 
five quarters after being selected for inclusion.  This allows us to examine how the 
make-up of the voluntary sector is changing by profiling the workers moving into 
and out of the sector. 
This analysis uses data from wave one and wave five for each worker in the 
Longitudinal LFS to identify workers who have switched sectors during the five 
quarters in which they were observed.  Table 9 shows the proportion of the sample 
by sector in each wave.  The majority of workers in each sector have remained 
within the same sector over the course of the year.  Over 1.5% of workers in the 
sample moved into or out of the voluntary sector.  Although the private sector 
workforce is approximately twice that of the public sector, around four times more 
workers switched to the voluntary sector from the private sector than from the public 
sector. 
In this section we particularly examine the differences between workers who are 
observed as employed in the voluntary sector in both periods – “stayers” – and 
employees who move either into or out of the voluntary sector between the two 
observations – “switchers”.  Human Capital theory would predict that workers switch 
jobs when the net present value of the utility stream from their current job is smaller 
than that available in an alternative job.  As such, we would expect switchers to be 
younger, more educated, and with less firm-specific human capital.11  Table 10 
summarises the mean descriptive characteristics of both voluntary sector stayers and 
switchers, and tests for significant differences in these characteristics. 
                                                 
11
 e.g. temporary jobs, lower tenure, etc. 
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SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR SECTOR SWITCHERS 
 Wave 1    
Wave 5 Private Public Voluntary  
Private 60.95% 1.17% 0.15% 62.27% 
Public 2.21% 32.34% 0.13% 34.68% 
Voluntary 0.97% 0.27% 1.82% 3.06% 
TOTAL 64.13% 33.78% 2.10% 100% 
Table 9: Sector Switchers 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1998 - 2007) 
 
Variable Vol. Sect. 
Stayers  
Switch IN Difference 
Stay vs. IN 
Switch OUT Difference 
Stay vs. OUT 
 Mean Mean Difference† Mean Difference† 
 (Std. Dev.)  (Std. Dev.) (Test statistic) (Std. Dev.)  (Test Statistic) 
Age 
(years) 
43.54   
(10.08) 
41.83   
 (10.84) 
-1.706 
(-5.27)*** 
41.25   
(11.64) 
-2.290 
(-5.36)*** 
Tenure 
(years) 
6.13   
(6.41) 
6.14   
(7.14) 
.0126 
(0.06) 
5.130 
 (6.322) 
-1.001 
(-4.21)*** 
Female 
(proportion) 
.693   
(.461) 
.696   
(.460) 
1.013 
(0.20) 
.694   
(.460) 
1.005 
(0.07) 
Part-Time Work 
(proportion) 
.374   
(.484) 
.389   
(.487) 
1.065 
(1.02) 
.414   
(.492) 
1.183 
(2.20)** 
Temporary Job 
(proportion) 
.083   
(.275) 
.098   
 (.297) 
1.204 
(1.73)* 
.137   
(.344) 
1.762 
(4.85)*** 
Degree Education 
(proportion) 
.295   
(.456) 
.294   
 (.456) 
.996 
(-0.05) 
.292   
(.455) 
.986 
(-0.17) 
Professional 
(proportion) 
.562    
(.496) 
.478   
  (.499) 
.712 
(-5.57)*** 
.4782   
(.499) 
.712 
(-4.51)*** 
Health & Social Work 
(proportion) 
.595   
(.490) 
.326   
 (.469) 
 
.329 
(-17.30)*** 
.500   
(.500) 
.681 
(-5.09)*** 
Observations 4,311 1,445 - 851 - 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
†
 Significant difference between switchers and stayers tested by regressing the relevant variable on sector dummies (Yi=α + 
βPIN + βVOUT + ei by OLS for continuous variables and logit for binary variables, and testing the hypothesis that βV=0.  
Coefficients for the logit regression are reported as odds-ratios.  For continuous dependent variables the test statistic is a t-test, 
and for binary dependent variables the test statistic is a z-test. 
Table 10: Mean differences between voluntary sector stayers and switchers 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1998 - 2007) 
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Switchers are indeed significantly younger than voluntary sector stayers.  There is no 
gender difference between switchers and stayers, supporting the relatively stable 
gender balance in the sector over the ten year period.  Workers leaving the voluntary 
sector have significantly lower job tenure than stayers and are more likely to be in 
part-time and temporary jobs, but there is no significant difference for workers 
joining the sector.  This could suggest that the lower job security observed in the 
voluntary sector is a feature of jobs in the sector rather than of the characteristics of 
individuals in the sector.  Switchers both in and out are less likely than stayers to be 
in professional occupations or to work in the health & social work industries. 
Figure 6 shows the number of workers moving into and out of each sector by age, to 
describe the net movement by sector.  The private sector has a significant spike as 
young workers move into the sector from education.  Movement into the sector then 
declines with age, with a significant net outflow for older workers.  The public sector 
has a later spike, for workers in their early twenties, and this is likely to be graduates 
entering the sector.  Movement in bulges again around 40 years, before declining as 
workers reach retirement age. 
The voluntary sector has a small post-university spike, but the biggest numbers are 
entering the sector in their late thirties and early forties.  There is still a significant 
net inflow of workers in their fifties, declining sharply from age sixty.  This is 
consistent with the anecdotal evidence of workers joining the voluntary sector after 
completing careers in the private or public sectors. 
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AGE PROFILE OF SECTOR ENTRANCES AND EXITS 
 
 
 
Figure 6: No. of Workers moving sector by age 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1998 - 2007) 
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Changes in sector switchers over time 
We have shown that there are significant differences between workers in different 
sectors, and between voluntary sector switchers and stayers.  We now examine 
whether the characteristics of workers switching into and out of the voluntary sector 
have changed over time by comparing workers who are in the voluntary sector in at 
least one wave in 1997-2000 with those in the sector for at least one wave in 2003-
2006.  We estimate simple regressions of worker characteristics on a time dummy, a 
switch ‘in’ dummy, a switch ‘out’ dummy and interactions of time with the two 
switching dummies.   
 =  +  +  +  +  +  +   (6) 
Workers who stay in the voluntary sector have SIN = SOUT = 0, workers who switch in 
to the sector have SIN = 1, and workers who switch out of the sector have SOUT = 1.  
βT captures the change in characteristic from the passage of time for stayers.  βIN and 
βOUT capture the differences in characteristics between stayers and switchers.  βTIN 
and βTOUT capture the changes in characteristics over time for switchers, separately 
from stayers.  Testing βTIN=0 and βTOUT=0 tests the hypotheses that the 
characteristics of switchers have changed differently between the two periods from 
those of stayers. 
Switching Status 1997-2000 2003-2006 Total 
  
  Stayers in Voluntary Sector 1,894 1,439 3,333 
Switchers IN to Vol. Sector 565 473 1,038 
Switchers OUT of Vol. Sector 338 248 586 
  
  Total 2,797 2,160 4,957 
Table 11: No. of Observations by Switching Status 
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Table 11 shows the sample of workers who are observed in at least one period in the 
voluntary sector.  Studying this restricted sample allows us to compare workers who 
stay in the sector with those who are entering or leaving.  The observations are 
pooled into two time periods at either end of our sample period.  Table 12 shows the 
results of these regressions for a number of worker characteristics.  It echoes the 
differences in characteristics between switchers and stayers shown above in Table 
10.  Across the sample period, stayers in the voluntary sector have become older and 
less likely to be in a professional occupation.   
Sector switchers have not changed most characteristics between time periods in a 
significantly different way from stayers, with some notable exceptions.  Workers 
switching into the sector are joining with greater tenure from their previous employer 
by the end of the sample period, while workers leaving are increasingly likely to 
have a degree.  Both workers switching in and out of the voluntary sector are more 
likely to be in professional occupations in the second half of the sample period than 
they were in the first half of the sample. Workers switching into the voluntary sector 
are more likely in the later time period to have been working in the health & social 
work industries, but there is no similar effect for those leaving the sector. 
Overall this suggests that there have been some changes in the characteristics of 
voluntary sector switchers over the ten years.  While human capital theory predicts 
that workers who are earlier in their careers will be more likely to be switch jobs, the 
contracting out of services would require that workers of all grades switch sectors in 
order that the services can be both managed and delivered in the voluntary sector.  
The increased movement of professional occupations and HSW workers across the 
sample period supports this. 
  
CHARACTERISTICS OF SECTOR SWITCHERS OVER TIME 
 
 
 Age† Tenure† Female‡ Part-Time‡ Temp. Job‡ Degree Educ‡ Professional‡ HSW‡ 
 Coef. 
(Std. Err.)   
 
Coef. 
(Std. Err.)   
 
Odds Ratio 
(Std. Err.)   
 
Odds Ratio 
(Std. Err.)   
 
Odds Ratio 
(Std. Err.)   
 
Odds Ratio 
(Std. Err.)   
 
Odds Ratio 
(Std. Err.)   
 
Odds Ratio 
(Std. Err.)   
 
Time 0.943 -0.284 0.972 1.098 0.850 1.125 0.779 1.103 
(T) (0.365)*** (0.222) (0.0738) (0.0792) (0.108) (0.0867) (0.0550)*** (0.0786) 
         
Switch IN  -2.149 -0.743 1.016 1.103 1.021 0.886 0.541 0.311 
(SIN ) (0.500)*** (0.304)** (0.106) (0.109) (0.170) (0.0971) (0.0524)*** (0.0320)*** 
         
Switch IN X Time  -0.130 0.938 1.055 0.808 1.160 1.091 1.453 1.283 
(TXSIN ) (0.746) (0.453)** (0.165) (0.119) (0.291) (0.174) (0.209)*** (0.192)* 
         
Switch OUT  -3.619 -1.585 1.047 1.396 2.175 0.746 0.561 0.684 
(SOUT) (0.616)*** (0.374)*** (0.136) (0.167)*** (0.355)*** (0.105)** (0.0667)*** (0.0810)*** 
         
Switch OUT X Time 1.554 0.291 1.022 0.814 0.693 1.568 1.472 1.064 
(TXSOUT) (0.946) (0.574) (0.203) (0.150) (0.192) (0.318)** (0.268)** (0.194) 
         
Constant 43.15 6.246 - - - - - - 
 (0.240)*** (0.146)***       
N 4957 4957 4957 4957 4957 4957 4957 4957 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
SIN  = SOUT  = 0 for voluntary sector stayers and =1 for workers switching into (out of) the voluntary sector.  T = 0 for years 1997-2000 and =1 for 2003-2006.  
Switch(IN/OUT)XTime = Switch(IN/OUT) x Time 
†
 OLS regression of variable on Switch dummies, Time and interactions (  =  +  +  +  +  +  + ) 
‡ Logit regression of binary variable on Switch dummies, Time and interactions (  =  +  +  +  +  +  + ) 
Table 12: Regression results of Changes in the Characteristics of Sector Switchers over time 
  67
Sector Switchers Wage Differences 
Table 13 shows the mean log hourly wage for workers by sector move.  From this we 
can calculate the percentage difference in mean wages for each group to describe 
how wages change between the sectors.   
Sector Move 
Time (t) 
Mean 
(Std. Dev) 
Time (t+1) 
Mean 
(Std. Dev) 
Difference 
(t-stat) † 
Percent Dif. †† 
(with Private Sector 
as Reference) 
Private 2.076379 2.134304 0.057925 - 
 (0.5466155) (0.5489315) (63.34)***  
     
Private to Public 1.998803 2.081143 0.08234 2.62% 
 (0.5140333) (0.488105) (13.12)***  
     
Private to Voluntary 2.032295 2.08936 0.057065 -2.71% 
 (0.499298) (0.4862863) (4.23)***  
     
Public 2.219736 2.279511 0.059775 0.29% 
 (0.4812104) (0.4809723) (49.87)***  
     
Public to Private 2.03392 2.063522 0.029602 -3.16% 
 (0.5257578) (0.5413346) (3.35)***  
     
Public to Voluntary 2.155765 2.203026 0.047261 1.84% 
 (0.4813902) (0.4662686) (3.26)***  
     
Voluntary 2.100577 2.173759 0.073182 2.75% 
 (0.4546233) (0.4633017) (16.89)***  
     
Voluntary to Private 1.981768 2.022818 0.04105 -3.40% 
 (0.497646) (0.5171415) (2.05)**  
     
Voluntary to Public 2.109722 2.186448 0.076726 3.78% 
 (0.4706355) (0.4692873) (3.79)***  
     
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Log hourly wages are observed one year apart.  The sectors of employment are those at the time of 
observation. 
 
†
 Statistical significance of wage difference conducted as a paired sample t-test with two observations 
on each worker 
†† Percentage difference calculated as ∆ = !"#$%&"# − 1.  The percentages reported are subtracted 
from the annual private sector percentage change as a reference. 
 
Table 13: Mean Log hourly wage and percentage difference in whole workforce 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1997 to 2007) 
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In all cases the mean log wage has increased, and this could be expected as the 
observations of wages are over a year apart.  In order to draw a comparison, the last 
column in the table uses the wage difference experienced from remaining in the 
private sector (5.96%) as a base, and calculates the relative percentage differences 
experienced by the other groups. 
Firstly, wages have grown faster for those staying in the voluntary sectors (2.75%), 
compared to those in the private sector.  Workers switching from the public and 
voluntary sectors to the private have experienced a net loss in wages compared to 
private sector wage growth of around 3%. Workers switching into the public sector 
from either sector have experienced a net gain in wages compared to the private 
sector.  Those workers who have moved from the private sector to the voluntary 
sector have also had a net loss in wages of 2.71%. 
These descriptive summary tables do not control for differences in characteristics 
between switchers, jobs and industries.  These factors will be analysed in Chapter 
Four. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that there are significant differences in characteristics 
between the three sectors.   
Workers in the voluntary sector are typically female, older, educated, and work in the 
health & social work industries.  The average age of workers has increased in the 
past ten years, but at a similar rate in all three sectors.  The voluntary sector appears 
to have increased slightly in its concentration of female workers. 
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Jobs in the voluntary sector are more likely to be part-time, and on temporary 
contracts.  Although there appears to be a trend in the past ten years for an increase 
in part-time work and a decrease in non-permanent work, there is no evidence that 
the voluntary sector has been affected any more or less than the private and public 
sectors. 
The analysis of sector switchers suggests that there is significant mobility into and 
out of the voluntary sector, to and from both the private and public sectors.  
Switching workers tend to be younger and in less secure jobs: either temporary 
contracts, part-time, or with lower job tenures.  There is some evidence that these 
less secure jobs are concentrated in the voluntary sector, from the differences 
between switchers moving into and out of the sector.  Lastly, there is some 
suggestion that over the sample period there had been an increase in the number of 
workers with professional occupations entering the sector and workers in the health 
& social work industries. 
This provides evidence for the increasing ‘professionalisation’ of the voluntary 
sector in response to increased service contracting.  This is occurring at least in part 
through attracting more professional occupations to switch into the sector.  It 
suggests that there have been changes in the marginal worker through time, and this 
is explored further in the next chapter. 
In the following chapters, we explore these differences between the sectors, and their 
impact on wages and hours of unpaid overtime. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
On the Up: Voluntary Sector Wages in the UK 1998 - 2007 
 
“A bigger role for the voluntary sector, in framing and delivering local services, is 
central to our vision.” 
 
The Rt. Hon Tony Blair MP (2002) 
 
 
“Politicians once thought the man in Whitehall knew best. Now we understand that 
the... mother from the playgroup... might know better.” 
 
The Rt. Hon Gordon Brown MP (2001) 
 
Introduction 
Government intervention in a market can often have unforeseen consequences.  
Studying the effects of a major policy change on a market can help us to understand 
how markets work, and evaluate the consequences of intervention. 
Since coming to power in 1997 the Labour government in the UK has promoted the 
involvement of the independent nonprofit sector in the provision of public services.  
As a result, the so-called voluntary sector has grown dramatically as the increasing 
use of commissioning and competitive tendering has exerted many market forces on 
the sector from which it had previously enjoyed some shelter. 
This growth has been fuelled by the rise in the number of public services contracted-
out to the sector.  The value of government contracts with the voluntary sector 
increased from around £2 billion in 1996/97 to £6.88 billion in 2005/06 (Public 
Administration Select Committee, 2008).  This has increased the importance of the 
sector, both as a significant employer in the UK and as a key part of public service 
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provision (Charity Commission, 2007).  In 2003 earned income from contracts and 
trading overtook donated income as the most significant source of funds for UK 
charities (National Council of Voluntary Organisations, 2008).   
Much has been made of the distinctive advantages of the voluntary sector, rooted in 
the profit-distribution constraint and the “warm glow” of motivated workers.  We 
ask: what effect has the exogenous shock of the government-supported expansion of 
the sector had on the make-up of the voluntary sector workforce? 
This chapter focuses on the paid workforce in the voluntary sector to examine the 
effect of the sector’s growth on pay levels and the wage differentials between 
sectors.  We show that the theory of compensating differentials predicts that the 
warm-glow wage discount will fall as the sector expands.  Using data from the UK 
Labour Force Survey (LFS), we find that while there is evidence of lower voluntary 
sector wages in 1998, this gap has been closing over the past ten years as the sector 
has experienced faster wage growth than either the private or public sectors.  The 
convergence of voluntary sector wage levels on the public sector wages has 
significant implications for the cost-saving potential of policies of the contracting-out 
of public services. 
The analysis of sector differences suffers from a potential bias from sample selection, 
as workers are not allocated to a sector randomly.  We tackle this in two ways.  
Firstly, we argue that government policy to expand the sector is an exogenous shock 
increasing the size of the sector beyond the warm-glow equilibrium and bringing 
many new workers into the sector.  Secondly, we use the limited panel structure of 
the LFS with workers switching their sector of employment, to estimate a fixed 
effects model. 
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A significant challenge in voluntary sector research is the availability of data in what 
is still a relatively small sector.  In this chapter, LFS data collected over the past 
decade has been pooled to permit detailed analysis of the trends in sector wage 
differences in the last ten years. 
A Growing Third Sector 
The starting point for the increasing interest of government in the voluntary sector 
can be traced back to the Deakin Commission on the Future of the Voluntary Sector 
(1996).  This led to the establishment of the Compact (Home Office, 1998), a 
statement of understanding between government and the voluntary sector over the 
provision of public services. 
“This Compact between Government and the voluntary and community sector 
provides a framework which will help guide our relationship at every level. It 
recognises that Government and the sector fulfil complementary roles in the 
development and delivery of public policy and services, and that the 
Government has a role in promoting voluntary and community activity in all 
areas of our national life. 
The work of voluntary and community organisations is central to the 
Government’s mission to make this the Giving Age.” 
 The Rt. Hon Tony Blair MP (Home Office, 1998) 
The rationale for the contracting-out of public services was increased value for 
money, incorporating reduced costs, increased quality and greater variety (Knapp, 
Hardy, & Forder, 2001;Le Grand, 2003).12  For many public services, the voluntary 
sector was seen as having a comparative advantage in the provision of quality; 
                                                 
12
 However, see McMaster (McMaster, 1995;2002) for a critique of the aims and success of this 
policy. 
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particularly where there were significant information asymmetries between recipient 
and provider.13 
The anticipated efficiency savings were to come from a number of sources. The 
competition for service provision in a market should result in efficiency gains.  The 
expertise of voluntary organisations, particularly at the local level, could help them 
to tailor and deliver services more cheaply than the larger public sector.  Wages in 
the voluntary sector were also lower than those in the public sector, and with lower 
levels of unionisation and more use of short-term contracts voluntary sector 
employers had more flexibility in their workforce and lower wage costs. 
The motivation to a cause is also identified as an important aspect of voluntary sector 
provision.  As organisations founded with a social goal, they were thought to attract 
like-minded motivated workers.  This ‘caring about the cause’ is seen as an added 
advantage in the provision of difficult-to-measure quality. 
An underlying assumption of this policy is that the benefits of voluntary sector 
provision outlined above outweigh any efficiency-loss from the removal of the 
profit-maximisation objective.  While private companies can and do compete for 
these types of public service contracts, the importance of credibly overcoming the 
information asymmetry in service provision has been foremost in the decision to 
choose voluntary sector providers. 
From 2002 a number of initiatives were introduced to increase the capacity of the 
voluntary sector to provide public services (National Audit Office, 2005), including a 
target to increase total spending on voluntary organisations.  In the 2004 spending 
                                                 
13
 See Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) for a discussion of pro-social motivation in the delivery of 
public social services. 
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review the explicit target was dropped, in favour of a commitment to increase both 
capacity and overall contribution of the sector, measured by an indicator of the size 
of the sector’s paid and unpaid workforce. 
Between 1996 and 2005 the voluntary sector workforce grew by 26%, a much higher 
rate of increase than the private sector (11%) and the public sector (14%) over the 
same period (National Council of Voluntary Organisations, 2007).  This represents a 
significant number of new recruits to the sector.  If the comparative advantage of the 
sector flows from the efforts of “mission-motivated” workers, then economic theory 
must describe the changes in motivation in a growing sector. 
Theories of Voluntary Sector Wage-Setting 
The economic rationale for the existence of independent nonprofit organisations, or 
the voluntary sector, is based on the combination of the profit non-distribution 
constraint and the existence of intrinsic motivation in those running the organisation, 
as discussed in Chapter 2.  These two elements allow voluntary organisations to 
more credibly provide services with significant information asymmetries, where 
quality is difficult to observe or contract over, than the private sector.14  The removal 
of the profit motive reduces the incentive to cheat on the provision of unobservable 
quality, and gives voluntary organisations an advantage in these industries.  This 
explains the concentration of voluntary organisations in the health, social work and 
education industries. 
                                                 
14
 See also Handy (1998), Kendall (2001) and Le Grand ( 2003) for discussion of the role of quasi-
markets and motivation in contracting to provide quality. 
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There are a number of explanations that come under the banner of warm-glow 
theories, suggesting that voluntary sector workers gain utility from their work which 
compensates them for lower wages. 
Compensating Wage Differentials 
Compensating Wage Differentials is the concept that characteristics of the work that 
affect worker utility are reflected in the wage paid for the job.  Classically, this has 
been shown in the form of “danger money”, where workers in dangerous or risky 
jobs are paid a wage premium to compensate for the greater risk of accident that they 
face in the course of their work.  This concept can be generalised to allow for lower 
wages in the presence of positive aspects of the job.  For the voluntary sector, this 
approach can be applied to the higher utility that workers receive from a nonprofit 
employer. 
The term “warm glow” was used by Andreoni (1990) to describe the utility received 
by a donor from the act of giving, rather than the outcome itself.  More recently 
Besley and Ghatak ( 2005) outline a model of ‘motivated agents’ that gain utility 
from producing goods or services that are in line with their ‘mission’, essentially a 
‘warm glow’ arises from working in the voluntary sector.  This warm glow forms 
part of the compensation received by workers for their efforts, and so predicts that 
motivated workers will accept employment in the mission-oriented sector at lower 
wages than non-motivated agents. 
In this chapter we use a simple model of equalising differences to model the effect of 
warm glow on the labour market outcomes.  The warm-glow utility described in 
Chapter 2 can be thought of as providing a positive benefit of work in the sector 
much as unpleasant working conditions might provide a negative cost to working in 
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job that is dirty or unsafe.  As discussed in Chapter 2, we do not separately identify 
intrinsic utility that might arise from working in a caring profession, where that 
utility is available to workers in all sectors.  Rather we identify the sector effect, 
given job characteristics.  This model also allows us to consider the effects of an 
increase in the size of the voluntary sector. 
Rosen (1986) outlines the classic model of compensating differentials.  He provides a 
framework for a theory of labour supply to jobs with different (un)desirable 
attributes.  These attributes are non-pecuniary by-products of undertaking the job.  
Examples provided by Rosen include: 
• Onerous working conditions; 
• Regional differences; 
• Work schedules / unemployment risk; 
• Composition of pay packages. 
Rosen’s model is outlined for an undesirable job attribute, without loss of generality.  
We will now outline Rosen’s model with a desirable, warm-glow attribute in place of 
the undesirable attribute.  Following Besley and Ghatak, we abstract from issues of 
public or private ownership of organisations, and instead discuss a profit-oriented 
sector and a mission-oriented sector.  As described in the literature on pro-social 
motivation, the mission-oriented sector could include both public and voluntary 
sector organisations, while for-profit companies make up the profit-oriented sector.  
The mission-oriented sector is distinguished by allowing jobs within this sector to 
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carry a non-pecuniary benefit of contributing to the mission – the so-called warm 
glow. 
The Sectors 
The labour market is made up of two sectors, denoted by D = (0, 1).  Sector D=0 is 
the profit-oriented sector, and sector D=1 is the mission-oriented sector, where 
workers receive a warm-glow utility.  The two sectors pay wages w0 and w1 
respectively. 
Workers 
In Chapter 2, equation (4) described our formulation of warm glow utility as 
dependent on the wage paid, the job characteristics, and the warm glow utility 
received in the nonprofit sector.  In order to explore a compensating differentials 
model in equation (7) below we now assume that all wages earned are spent on a 
numeraire consumption good (C).  We also hold job characteristics (j) constant, and 
for parsimony omit the term from the theoretical model outlined below.  Job 
characteristics will however be controlled for in the empirical analysis. 
Workers utility is dependent on their consumption of market goods (C) and their 
work sector (D). 
),( DCuU =          (7) 
If C0 is the level of market goods consumed by workers in the profit-oriented sector, 
then C* is the consumption level required by workers in the mission-oriented sector 
to be indifferent between the sectors. 
)1*,()0,( 0 CuCu =  0* CC ≤→       (8) 
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We can then define the compensating variation, Z, as: 
 0* CCZ −=          (9) 
Define the sector wage difference as: 
 10 wwW −=∆         
 (10) 
Workers will be indifferent between taking a job in either of the two sectors if: 
 
ZW −=∆
        
 (11) 
Z is an exogenous personal taste variable that varies from worker to worker.  In the 
traditional model, Z would represent the distaste for an unpleasant characteristic of 
the job.  In this context mission-motivated workers have a low Z, as they get warm-
glow utility from engaging in activities that are in accordance with their mission-
motivation.  Z can be thought of as the degree of mission motivation amongst the 
workforce.  These theories then predict lower wages in the mission-oriented sector, 
and W∆ can be thought of as the market price for accepting a job in the mission-
oriented sector. 
Heterogeneous Labour Supply 
The probability density function of tastes in the population is represented by g(Z), 
and G(Z) is the cumulative density function.  Workers for whom iZW <∆ will 
choose to work in the mission-oriented sector (where the loss of wages is not as big 
as the indifferent level of consumption).  This is illustrated in Figure 7.  The shaded 
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area shows the proportion of the workforce in the mission-oriented sector, where for 
an individual worker i: *ZZ i < . 
 
 
Figure 7: Probability Density Function over Z 
The proportion of workers choosing to work in the mission-oriented sector will then 
be: 
 ∫
∆
∞−
∆==
W
WGdZZgN )()(1       
 (12) 
And the proportion of workers in the profit-oriented sector will be: 
 ∫
∞
∆
∆−==
W
WGdZZgN )(1)(0      (13) 
This model implies that lower wages will be paid in the mission-oriented sector than 
in the profit-oriented sector, but workers will sort into their sector choice depending 
on their valuation of the warm-glow utility. 
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Heterogeneous Labour Demand 
Rosen outlines the demand-side of the labour market similarly, with firms facing 
variable costs to “clean-up” the undesirable job attribute.  This is not so easily 
applicable to the mission-oriented sector.  The nonprofit status of an organisation is a 
legal institutional constraint, and is not easy to change.  Glaeser (2001) outlines a 
theory of not-for-profit entrepreneurs, who forgo the profits of a private firm in order 
to harness the voluntary contributions that a nonprofit organisation can elicit.  
Entrepreneurs make an optimal choice of organisation type, choosing to form a 
nonprofit organisation when the benefits of harnessing contributions to the 
organisation through the credibility of nonprofit status outweigh the potential profits 
of forming a for-profit organisation. 
Voluntary organisations have a clear incentive to recruit mission-motivated workers.  
The provision of warm-glow utility as part compensation reduces the costs in the 
sector, and increases the level of output that can be produced in line with the 
organisation’s aims. 
Product Market Equilibrium 
The growth in the voluntary sector over the past ten years has been driven by an 
increase in the contracting out of public service provision (Kendall, Matosevic, 
Forder et al., 2003).  In recent years the amount of earned income received by 
voluntary organisations (through trading, contracting-out and commissioning) has 
been growing faster than the total voluntary income received through donations 
(National Council of Voluntary Organisations, 2008).  In 2003, the total earned 
income for the voluntary sector exceeded the total voluntary income for the first 
time, and the increase has continued. 
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With this in mind, we model the product market of the mission-oriented sector 
simply as supplying services to a public sector buyer.  These services are typically 
located in the Health and Social Work or Education industries.  The public sector has 
a fixed budget M to spend on purchasing services, shown by the budget constraint in 
equation (14), and so is represented by a downward sloping demand curve.   
 
PqpqpM VVPP ++=       (14) 
Where VP pp , are the prices and VP qq , are the quantities of services provided by the 
profit-oriented and mission-oriented sectors respectively, and P is spending on other 
public goods. 
Both the profit-oriented and mission-oriented sectors use the same production 
technology.  Increasing the quantity supplied requires an increase in employment, 
and so organisations face an upwards-sloping supply curve. 
 )(Lfq =         (15) 
The profit-oriented sector maximises profits: 
 
),(. PPPPq wqCqpMaxP −=pi       (16) 
The mission-oriented sector maximises its output given a zero profit condition (due 
to the non-distribution of profits constraint).  
 
),(.0 VVVV wqCqp −=       (17) 
The increasing demand for mission-oriented sector services is represented in this 
simple model as an exogenous shift in the public sector demand curve.  This is 
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driven by policy changes at a national level to contract out the provision of public 
services.   
The purchaser of services has a demand for services D.  These services can be 
supplied by either the Profit-oriented or Mission-oriented sectors.  The existence of 
warm-glow wage discounts gives the mission-oriented sector a cost advantage in 
service provision, and so it is able to provide the same level of service at a lower 
price.  The quantity of service demanded determines the mission-oriented sector’s 
demand for labour, and so the equilibrium level of Z* and wV. 
A Three-Sector Labour Market 
So far we have focussed on two sectors: profit-oriented versus mission-oriented.  
While it would generally be assumed that for-profit firms would be in the former,15 
and voluntary organisations made up the latter, the role of the public sector in this 
model also needs to be made clear.  The analysis of nonprofits in the literature often 
combines organisations in the public and voluntary sectors together.  Here we 
separate them, allowing for different levels of mission-motivation between the two 
sectors to exist.  As per the motivated agents model (Besley & Ghatak, 2005), the 
smaller size and increased flexibility of voluntary organisations is likely to enable 
them to offer motivated workers a better mission match, and so achieving higher 
levels of warm-glow utility for workers.  The reputational effects (Bénabou & Tirole, 
2006) of working for a voluntary organisation may be different from those of a 
public sector organisation.  If the marginal benefit to reputation of working for a 
prosocial organisation is decreasing as more people work for it then we would expect 
                                                 
15
 As per our discussion of voluntary sector definitions in Chapter 1 we do not rule out social 
enterprises – for-profits with a pro-social objective – from making up part of the mission-motivated 
sector, nor deny the existence of so-called nonprofits without a strong mission.  We simply argue that 
organisational form – private, public or voluntary – provides a good general indication of mission 
motivation for most organisations. 
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that smaller mission-driven organisations would provide greater intrinsic benefit 
through reputation.  This would also support different warm glow effects being 
observed in the voluntary rather than the private sector.  However, in our analysis we 
do not place a restriction on the ordering of sector effects in the empirical analysis. 
Considering warm glow utility from a mission match as being one element in the 
bundle offered by employers, in line with the compensating differentials model, we 
would expect that workers would move between any of the three sectors when 
offered a bundle in another sector that increased their utility.  As was shown in 
Chapter 3 through the analysis of sector switchers, around four times more workers 
switched to the voluntary sector from the private sector than from the public sector.  
Furthermore, the profile of sector switchers has changed over time as more 
professionals are attracted to work in the voluntary sector. 
Increasing the Voluntary Sector Workforce  
As the mission-oriented sector grows its demand for labour increases.  In equilibrium 
the marginal worker has a taste for warm glow Zi = Z*.  In order to attract workers 
for whom the utility of working in the profit-oriented sector is higher than that of the 
mission-oriented sector, wV must increase. 
The sector equilibrium wages, wP and wV, result in a split of the labour market at Z*.  
Workers with Zi < Z* will have U(C*, g) > U(C0,0) and so will choose to work in the 
mission-oriented sector.  Workers with Zi > Z* will have U(C*, g) < U(C0,0) and so 
will choose to work in the profit-oriented sector.  This proportion is given by N1 in 
Equation 12.  As the marginal worker at Z* is indifferent between working in the two 
sectors, the size of the mission-oriented sector workforce can only be increased by 
increasing the wV.  The additional workers will have Zi>Z*, and so the average level 
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of warm-glow utility will reduce in the mission-oriented sector.  This increased wage 
will reduce the size of the warm-glow wage differential, and bring wages in the two 
sectors closer together. 
Figure 8 shows the effect of an expansion in demand for mission-oriented sector 
production.  If the purchaser decides to increase the proportion of services sourced 
from the mission-oriented sector then this will shift the demand curve DX  rightwards 
to DX’.  The new equilibrium in the labour market will be a higher wage wV’.  The 
additional workers in the mission-oriented sector are provided by the shift in Z* to 
Z*’.  The additional workers recruited all have a preference for warm glow Zi that is 
lower than the existing mission-oriented sector workforce.  This in turn reduces the 
cost advantage of the mission-oriented sector.  Over time this would reduce the 
sector wage-gap as the sector grows. 
It should be noted that overall demand for the public services has not increased.  
What has changed is the mode of supply, in a shift from public sector provision to 
voluntary sector provision.  As such, the change in wage differential is not due to 
recruitment of additional workers into an industry or profession, but instead is a shift 
of workers within industries and professions between sectors. 
These theories can be tested empirically, by estimating sector wage differentials after 
controlling for observable differences in individuals, jobs and organisations. The 
theory makes two predictions: firstly, if the mission-oriented sector workforce is 
made up of individuals with a high taste for warm glow, then we would expect to 
find a wage discount in the sector.  Secondly, as the sector grows, fuelled by an 
increase in contracting-out, the wage gap should narrow.  
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THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR WORKFORCE 
 
 
Figure 8: Expansion of the Mission-oriented Sector 
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Empirical Research on Sectoral Wage Differentials 
There is an extensive literature on the apparent public sector wage premium found by 
examining the mean wages of workers in the two sectors (see Bender (1998) for a 
review).  This premium is often found even after adjusting measures for the different 
workers characteristics in the two sectors.  Disney and Gosling (1998) used the 
General Household Survey (GHS) and British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to 
estimate the public sector premium in the UK after taking worker characteristics into 
account.  They found that for men the premium fell from 5% in 1983 to only 1% by 
the mid-1990’s.  However, for women the public sector premium increased over the 
same period from 11% to 14%.  
Relatively little empirical work has been done where the voluntary sector is 
examined separately as a third sector.  The early literature, primarily using US data, 
focussed on specific industries or professions.  Weisbrod (1983) examined wage 
differences between lawyers employed by nonprofit and for-profit firms, and found 
evidence of a nonprofit wage discount of ~20%.  His analysis of a job choice 
equation suggested that lawyers in the nonprofit sector held different preferences to 
those employed in the private sector.  Preston (1989) conducted an analysis of the 
nonprofit sector wage differential for white-collar workers using Current Population 
Survey (CPS) in the US, and found a significant nonprofit sector discount of 18% 
even after controlling for differences in human capital and other worker and job 
characteristics.  She found a larger differential for male workers than female 
workers. 16 
                                                 
16
 See also Mocan and Tekin (2003), whose paper is discussed further in Chapter Five. 
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More recent work has analysed nonprofit wage differential across the whole 
workforce.  Leete (2001) used US census data for 1990 and found little evidence of a 
difference between the private and voluntary sectors overall.  However, she did find 
some significant differences at the disaggregated industry level.  Ruhm and Borkoski 
(2003) undertook both a cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis of nonprofit 
compensation using the 1994-98 Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation 
Groups.  They find little evidence of wage differentials, with industry and worker 
heterogeneity playing a larger role.  They conclude that nonprofit wages are set 
primarily by competitive markets, with little evidence of donated labour observed in 
wages.  Although their dataset has a longitudinal component, this is used only to 
examine workers switching between sectors, and not to analyse changes in wage 
differentials across time.  Our contribution to this literature is to examine the 
evolution of the sector wage differentials over time as the sector grows, while also 
controlling for sample selection bias through a fixed effects model. 
The questions that we seek to address in this study are as follows.  Firstly, are there 
significant sector wage differences found in the UK data, and do these support a 
warm-glow theory of wage setting?  Secondly, how have these wage differences 
evolved in the past ten years of government-driven growth in the sector? 
Exploring the Data 
This analysis uses the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS).  The LFS is a rotating panel, 
collected quarterly, following individuals for one year.  The sample used here is for 
the 10 years from 1998 to 2007.  This nationally collected dataset provides a large 
representative sample of the UK population, across all sectors and industries.  
Additionally, the pooled cross-sections permit analysis of changing wage 
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differentials following government intervention in the market that was not analysed 
in the previous literature. 
Table 14 below shows the breakdown of the sample by sector and gender. This 
shows that there are around 6,500 workers sampled in the voluntary sector over the 
10 year period.  This means that voluntary sector workers make up only about 2.5% 
of the sample.  However, the proportion of voluntary sector workers in the LFS 
sample has been growing over the period, from about 2.2% in 1998 to 2.7% in 2007. 
Sector                 sex   
     male female  Total 
  Private Sector 95,892 73,458   169,350 
 (56.62%) (43.38%)  
   Public Sector 26,343 49,728 76,071  
                (34.63%) (65.37%)  
Voluntary Sector 1,850 4,588 6,438  
                 (28.74%) (71.26%)   
    
           Total 124,085 127,774 251,859  
                (49.27%) (50.73%)  
Table 14: Number and proportions of workers by Sex and Sector 
Source: UK Labour Force Survey (1998-2007) 
The table also shows that the voluntary sector workforce is predominantly female, at 
over 71%, and this is higher even than the proportion of women in the public sector. 
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MEAN WAGES BY SECTOR OVER TIME 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Mean Wages 1998 to 2007 by sector 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1998-2007) 
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We now look at how voluntary sector wages have changed in the past ten years.  
Figure 9 above shows the mean wages by sector and gender over the ten years of the 
sample period.  In the first figure, the sample mean wages are plotted, showing that 
public sector wages are consistently highest, with private sector wages second and 
the lowest wages in the voluntary sector. 
The second and third panels split the sample into male and female workers, and a 
quite different picture emerges.  Voluntary sector male wages are still lower than the 
private and public sectors, although in 2005 and 2007 they edge above the private 
sector.  Voluntary sector female wages are consistently at a premium to the private 
sector, but below the public sector throughout the ten years. 
However, these differences in the mean wages between sectors could be explained by 
the differences in characteristics between workers in the sectors.  For example, 
systematic differences between the sectors in the age, experience or education of 
workers could explain the observed difference in mean wages.  In this chapter we 
estimate wage equations that allow us to control for observable differences in the 
characteristics of workers between sectors, in order to estimate the unexplained 
sector wage differential.  It is this wage differential that would allow us to test the 
theory of warm-glow wage setting. 
Estimating the Models 
In this chapter we estimate three models.  The first specification is a Mincer wage 
equation estimated on pooled cross-sectional data.  The second specification interacts 
the sector and year variables to explore how the sector wage differentials have 
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evolved over the past ten years.  The third specification uses a smaller panel dataset 
to estimate a fixed effects model using workers switching between sectors. 
MODEL ONE: Pooled Cross-Section 
In keeping with the existing literature, wage equations are estimated using a Mincer 
Equation (see (Heckman, Lochner, & Todd, 2006) for a review).  This models wages 
with the equation: 
ln() = + + ,-./01 + ,23/4 + ,235/4
5 +   (18) 
This framework allows other controls to be added in order to test various hypotheses.   
ln() = + + 3647 + 89:;< + ,-./01 + ,23/4 +
,235/4
5 + =>. >@ +        (19) 
 
Where PUB and VOL are sector dummy variables, and X is a collection of relevant 
control variables.  The equations are estimated separately for male and female 
workers.  In order to correct for potential selectivity bias due to non-participation 
(Heckman, 1979) a sample selection equation was estimated jointly with the wage 
equations.  This probit model of labour force participation included age, marital 
status, number of children, and disability as independent variables.17  The 
instruments in the sample selection equation were selected in line with the wage 
equation literature as predictors of employment participation.  A number of 
specifications of the selection equation were estimated, and the results presented are 
robust to these different specifications.   
                                                 
17
 The estimation results of the selection equation can be found in Appendix Three 
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The summarised estimation results are shown in Table 15 columns (1) and (2) below.  
This table shows the results for male and female workers across the whole ten-year 
sample, with the estimated coefficients for public sector, voluntary sector, age, 
experience and tenure reported.  Additional explanatory variables included in the 
model estimation but not reported include age, education, organisation size, 
occupation, industry, region, and time dummies for year and quarter. 
Male workers in voluntary sector receive 12.2% lower wages than the private sector.  
Those in the public sector receive 2.6% less than the private sector.18  Wages for 
female workers in the voluntary sector are higher than the private sector by 1.5%, 
while those in the public sector earn 3.4% more than their colleagues in the private 
sector. 
                                                 
18
 The sector coefficients βVOLS and βPUB have been converted from log coefficients to percentages as 
per Halvorsen & Palmqvist (1980) 
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MODELS (1) AND (2):  POOLED CROSS-SECTION WAGE EQUATIONS 
 MODEL ONE  MODEL TWO  
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
 Basic: Male Basic: Female Interact: Male Interact: Female 
Public Sector -0.0262 0.0490 -0.00469 0.0652 
 (0.00446)*** (0.00322)*** (0.00938) (0.00744)*** 
     
Voluntary Sector -0.130 0.0148 -0.199 0.00266 
 (0.00939)*** (0.00566)*** (0.0311)*** (0.0186) 
     
Experience 0.0102 0.00265 0.0102 0.00267 
 (0.000915)*** (0.000875)*** (0.000915)*** (0.000875)*** 
     
Exper2 /100 -4.957 -4.275 -4.960 -4.276 
 (0.170)*** (0.175)*** (0.170)*** (0.175)*** 
     
Tenure 0.0129 0.0145 0.0129 0.0145 
 (0.000368)*** (0.000378)*** (0.000369)*** (0.000379)*** 
     
Tenure2 /100 -0.0202 -0.0200 -0.0201 -0.0199 
 (0.00111)*** (0.00133)*** (0.00111)*** (0.00133)*** 
     
Part-Time -0.0652 -0.0363 -0.0653 -0.0363 
 (0.00506)*** (0.00217)*** (0.00506)*** (0.00217)*** 
     
Temporary Job -0.0411 -0.0360 -0.0410 -0.0359 
 (0.00552)*** (0.00431)*** (0.00552)*** (0.00431)*** 
     
PublicX2005   -0.0235 -0.0128 
   (0.0118)** (0.00921) 
     
PublicX2006   -0.0142 -0.0144 
   (0.0118) (0.00910) 
     
PublicX2007   -0.0239 -0.0275 
   (0.0141)* (0.0107)** 
     
VoluntaryX2005   0.154 0.0308 
   (0.0413)*** (0.0243) 
     
VoluntaryX2006   0.106 0.0323 
   (0.0409)*** (0.0234) 
     
VoluntaryX2007   0.150 0.0218 
   (0.0483)*** (0.0277) 
     
Inverse Mills  -0.111 -0.0442 -0.112 -0.0442 
Ratio (lambda) (0.00441)*** (0.00485)*** (0.00441)*** (0.00485)*** 
     
Constant 1.188 1.524 0.876 1.181 
 (0.0253)*** (0.0246)*** (0.0252)*** (0.0246)*** 
N 120169 124297 120169 124297 
R2 0.548 0.561 0.549 0.561 
AIC 102076.1 83749.9 102052.7 83756.2 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
(Models (1a) and (1b):             Models (2a) and (2b): 
      The experience and tenure variables are measured in years.  The Sector/Year interactions for 
1999-2004 have been omitted from the table to save space. Additional explanatory variables included in the model 
estimation but not reported above include Age, Education, Organisation Size, Occupation, Industry, Region, Year 
and Quarter.)  
 
Table 15: Pooled Cross Section Estimation Results 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1998-2007) 
εββ ++++= XβXVOLPUBCONSw VOLPUB)ln( ++++= VOLPUBXYRPUBCONSw VOLBPUBYRPUB βββ)ln(
εβ ++ XβXVOLXYRVOLYR
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MODEL TWO: Wage Differentials over time 
This model allows us to explore the evolution of the sector wage differences over 
time.  In the past ten years the voluntary sector has experienced significant growth, 
and has also seen a significant shift in its main source of funding from donated 
income to revenue from services.  We now consider how this has affected wages in 
the voluntary sector. 
The LFS data has been used to estimate wage differentials over time using the 
pooled-cross-section model, with the sector dummies interacted with the year 
dummies. 
++++= VOLPUBXYEARPUBLICCONSEXPEDUCw VOLPUBYRPUB βββ)],(ln[
εββββ +++++ XβX22EXPEXPEDUCVOLXYEAR EXPEXPEDUCVOLYR   (20) 
Table 15 above shows the estimates of this model, in columns (3) and (4). Also 
reported are the year and sector interactions for 2004 to 2007.  The coefficient on the 
sector dummies now represents the estimated wage differential in 1998, the base 
year.  The sector year interactions show how this wage differential has evolved over 
time.  Male workers begin with wage premiums in the private and public sectors of 
21.5% and 20.9% respectively.   This premium reduces over the ten years, dropping 
to 3.7% in the private sector and 0.9% in the public sector by 2007.  Female workers 
in 1999 earned 6.4% more in the public sector than the voluntary sector, but with no 
significant difference from the private sector.  The private sector year interactions are 
not statistically significant, however the public sector premium falls across the ten 
years to only 1.3% in 2007. 
Figure 10 below graphs these year specific dummies combined with the estimated 
individual sector and year effects, relative to private sector wages in 1998.  These 
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plots are produced by adding the year, sector, and interaction effects for each sector, 
and taking the Private sector wage level in each year as the base. 
We can see that for male workers the voluntary sector wage discount was greatest in 
1998, and the gap has been closing steadily over the ten-year period.  For female 
workers, voluntary sector wages began on a par with the private sector, but with a 
significant discount from the public sector.  Until 2004, voluntary sector wages seem 
to track the private sector wage growth, however in the last three years of this period 
they increase at a faster rate, approaching the public sector premium. 
Model Three: Fixed Effects 
The third model makes use of the limited panel structure of the UK Labour Force 
Survey.  The dataset is a rotating panel, with workers surveyed quarterly and exiting 
after a year.  This model uses the first and fifth waves of the panel, one year apart, as 
these are the two waves where participants are asked about the wage in their primary 
employment. 
Estimating a panel model allows us to control for individual fixed effects by 
observing the same individuals in two sectors.  Although this tackles some of the 
criticisms of cross-sectional analysis of wage differences, we must also address a 
number of issues.  Firstly, sector effects are now identified by those individuals who 
are observed in both sectors.  This requires that there are sufficient observations to 
fully identify the effects.  The relatively small size of the voluntary sector makes this 
more difficult, but by combining several years of the LFS we have assembled a 
significant dataset.   
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Notes: The wage differentials are calculated summing the sector, year and interaction effects for each 
sector.  The 95% confidence interval shown is for the voluntary sector estimates. The 95% confidence 
interval shows the interval around the voluntary sector wage level compared to the private sector base. 
Figure 10: Estimated Wage Differentials 1998 – 2007 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1998-2007) 
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Secondly, there is still a potential issue of sector selection as the decision to move 
job is not strictly exogenous.  The ideal case would be an organisation switching 
sector as an exogenous shock.  However organisations very rarely move into and out 
of the voluntary sector, and we would require observations on many employees of 
the firm to identify organisational effects.  The detailed worker data, collected so 
close to the sector switch, is likely to be the closest we will come to a random panel 
dataset of sector moves. 
Thirdly, estimating a fixed effects model increases the potential bias due to 
measurement error.  For this reason we use only the data collected 
contemporaneously by personal or telephone interview, and do not extend the dataset 
to analyse data recalled from the twelve months prior to selection into the LFS. 
Describing the sector switchers 
Table 16 shows the panel sample by sector, gender and wave.  Workers in the 
voluntary sector make up about 1.5% of the male workforce and about 3.5% of the 
female workforce. 
 Male    Female 
Sector Wave 1 Wave 5 Total  Wave 1 Wave 5 Total 
Private Sector 36,768 36,440 73,208  25,709 25,083 50,792 
Public Sector 11,309 10,896 22,205  19,969 19,454 39,423 
Voluntary Sector 744 758 1,502  1,653 1,739 3,392 
Total 48,821 48,094 96,915  47,331 46,276 93,607 
Table 16: Panel Sample by Wave and Gender 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1997-2002) 
Table 17 shows a breakdown of the sector switchers between waves 1 and 5 of the 
LFS.  Unsurprisingly the majority of workers in each sector do not switch over the 
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year of observation.  For males, 337 workers (0.7%) and for females, 813 workers 
(1.7%) switch into or out of the voluntary sector.   
   
  Wave 1       
  Private   Public   Voluntary  
Wave 5  Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent 
Private Male 36,062 73.87  594 1.22  136 0.28 
 
Female 24,340 51.43  815 1.72  329 0.7 
 
   
 
  
 
  
Public Male 634 1.3  10,647 21.81  61 0.12 
 
Female 1,167 2.47  19,003 40.15  131 0.28 
 
   
 
  
 
  
Voluntary Male 72 0.15  68 0.14  547 1.12 
 
Female 202 0.43  151 0.32  1,193 2.52 
 
   
 
  
 
  
Table 17: Panel Sample by Wave and Gender 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1997-2002) 
 
Although these sector switchers form a small proportion of the whole sample, they 
represent a significant proportion of voluntary sector workers.  This is indicative of 
the fact that voluntary sector workers make up about 3% of the UK workforce.   
Estimating the model 
The model used is a fixed effects estimator with two time periods, regressing log 
hourly wages on a set of explanatory variables with sector dummy variables.  
Separate models are estimated for male and female workers. 
++++= itVOLitPUBYRitPUBit VOLPUBXYEARPUBw ββββ0]ln[
itiititEXPitEDUCitVOLYR EXPEDUCVOLXYEAR εαβββ +++++ XβX22   (21) 
Results 
The Fixed effects estimation results can be seen in Table 18 below. The time 
dummies and sector/year interactions for the Public Sector have been omitted from 
the table to save space. Additional explanatory variables included in the model 
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estimation but not reported above include education, organisation size, industry, and 
region. 
They show a public sector wage premium in 1997 of ~3.5% and a voluntary sector 
wage discount of ~12.5% for male workers.  For female workers there is a public 
sector premium of ~5.7% and no significant voluntary sector wage difference. 
The change in sector wage differentials by year can be seen in Figure 11 below.  For 
both male and female workers wages in the voluntary sector grow faster than the 
private and public sectors.  Male workers begin with a significant voluntary sector 
wage discount, which disappears across the time period.  Female workers begin and 
end with no statistically significant wage difference, although the estimated premium 
grows over the period.  For male workers the public sector premium is steady over 
the time period, while it rises slightly for female workers. 
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MODEL 3: FIXED EFFECTS WAGE EQUATIONS 
 (3a) (3b) 
 FE: Male FE: Female 
Public Sector 0.0322 0.0585 
 (0.0137)** (0.0115)*** 
   
Voluntary Sector -0.137 0.0108 
 (0.0354)*** (0.0258) 
   
VoluntaryX1998 0.0583 0.0180 
 (0.0240)** (0.0183) 
 
  
VoluntaryX1999 0.106 0.0280 
 (0.0346)*** (0.0252) 
 
  
VoluntaryX2000 0.129 0.0160 
 (0.0396)*** (0.0280) 
 
  
VoluntaryX2001 0.160 0.0260 
 (0.0423)*** (0.0296) 
 
  
VoluntaryX2002 0.176 0.0519 
 (0.0467)*** (0.0323) 
   
Age2 /100 -0.0747 -0.0691 
 (0.00680)*** (0.00732)*** 
   
Tenure 0.00366 0.00216 
 (0.00107)*** (0.00122)* 
   
Tenure2 /100 0.00388 0.00618 
 (0.00385) (0.00545) 
   
Part Time 0.0226 0.0378 
 (0.0106)** (0.00534)*** 
   
Temporary Job -0.0256 -0.0126 
 (0.00788)*** (0.00659)* 
   
Constant 3.119 2.586 
 (0.112)*** (0.116)*** 
N 96915 93607 
R2 0.064 0.060 
AIC -140914.7 -130812.3 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
(Model (3a) and (3b): 
  
The age and tenure variables are measured in years.  The Sector/Year interactions for the Public 
Sector have been omitted from the table to save space. Additional explanatory variables included in 
the model estimation but not reported above include Education, Organisation Size, Industry, Region, 
and Year dummies.  Age is omitted due to collinearity, as all worker observations are one year apart.)  
 
Table 18: Fixed Effects Panel Estimation Results 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1997-2002) 
++++= itPUBitPRIVYRitPRIVit PUBLICPRIVXYEARPRIVATECONSw βββ]ln[ itiititEXPitEDUCitPUBYR EXPEDUCPUBXYEAR εαβββ +++++ XβX22
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Notes: The wage differentials are calculated summing the sector, year and interaction effects for each 
sector.  The differentials for the public and voluntary sectors are shown relative to the private sector as 
a base in each year.  The 95% confidence interval shows the interval around the voluntary sector wage 
level compared to the private sector base. 
Figure 11: Estimated Wage Differentials 1997 – 2002 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1997-2002) 
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Discussion 
This analysis has found evidence of a significant voluntary sector wage discount for 
male workers compared to equivalent workers in the private and public sectors.  
Female workers in the voluntary sector face a wage discount compared to public 
sector workers, but a premium over those in the private sector.  We also show that 
the voluntary sector wage gap with the other two sectors has significantly narrowed 
for male workers over the past ten years.  For female workers, voluntary sector 
wages began the decade level with private sector wages but below the public sector.  
By the end of the ten year period they are at a significant premium to the private 
sector, and much closer to the public sector wage level. 
These findings were supported even after controlling for worker fixed effects using 
the limited panel structure of the Labour Force Survey.  This suggests that the 
findings are not simply explained by sector selection effects due to unobserved 
worker heterogeneity.  For male workers the estimated voluntary sector wage 
differential halved between the cross-section and fixed effects models, suggesting 
that selection of motivated workers does play a role. 
This decade has seen a significant expansion of the voluntary sector workforce.  The 
theory of compensating wage differentials that forms the basis for warm-glow 
theories of wage-setting clearly predicts that as the voluntary sector expands the 
warm-glow wage gap should narrow. 
We must also rule-out alternative explanations for the sector wage growth over this 
period.  Firstly we consider gender differences.  A significantly higher proportion of 
voluntary sector workers are female.  This is in part explained by the industries and 
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occupations in which the voluntary sector operates.  Preston (1990) showed that 
female worker selection into the nonprofit sector is driven by the opportunities and 
responsibilities that they are able to access in this sector.  After controlling for this, 
Preston found no significant gender difference in sector selection.  If the additional 
voluntary sector workers moving into the sector in response to the policy have been 
disproportionately male due to the types of jobs created, then this could explain the 
greater erosion of the male wage differential.  Figure 12 shows the proportion of 
male workers by sector over the sample period.  This suggests that instead the 
proportion of male workers has actually fallen slightly, from 29% in 1998 to 26% in 
2007, and so this does not explain the wage difference. 
Alternatively, it is feasible that as public services have been contracted out to the 
voluntary sector the unions have followed the workforce.  If there has been an 
increase in unionisation in the voluntary sector in response to the growth of the 
workforce, then this could explain in part the faster wage growth.   
Figure 12 also shows the proportion of workers who are union members, and the 
proportion of workers who report that a union is present at their place of work, by 
sector.  This shows clearly that the proportion of workers in the voluntary sector who 
are union members has fallen since 1998 from 29% to 18% in 2006.  This suggests 
that the move of workers from the public to the voluntary sectors has not been driven 
by an increase in unionisation.  In fact, the reverse is true: wage growth has been 
higher in the voluntary sector despite a decline in unionisation within the sector. 
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GENDER BALANCE AND UNION MEMBERSHIP 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Gender Balance, Union Membership and Presence by Sector 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1998-2008) 
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This analysis also suggests that as the voluntary sector expands the average level of 
warm-glow motivation within the sector reduces.  The conclusions drawn depend on 
a stable distribution of Z in the population: if workers become in general more 
altruistic then the distribution of Z will shift, and we could expect an increase in the 
size of the sector without warm glow reducing.   
We argue that despite the increasing size of the voluntary sector the distribution of Z 
has remained constant.  Measuring this distribution is challenging. We use a proxy 
for levels of altruism in the population that is unrelated to the sector of employment.  
We consider levels of formal volunteering, defined as activities to help others 
undertaken without pay.  Volunteering takes place in all three sectors, private, public 
and voluntary.  It is an activity which takes place in leisure time, and volunteers 
undertake different types of roles from paid staff in all sorts of organisation.  The 
willingness to help others through unpaid activities provides a proxy for the levels of 
mission-motivation in the population. 
 National Survey of Volunteering Citizenship Survey 
 1981 1991 1997 2001 2003 2005 
Formal Volunteering in Past 12 months 44% 51% 48% 39% 42% 44% 
Regular Formal Volunteering in past 12 months 27% 31% 29% 27% 28% 29% 
Table 19: Percentage of Formal Volunteers over time19 
Source:(Low, Butt, Ellis Paine, & Davis Smith, 2007) 
 
Table 19 shows the percentage of the population who reported having undertaken 
formal volunteering work in the previous 12 months.  Figures are shown for both 
once-off and regular volunteering.  They show that levels of volunteering have not 
                                                 
19
 Figures from the Helping Out survey in 2006 showing higher volunteering proportions.  However 
the report notes that methodological differences mean that the figures for 2006 are not comparable 
with previous surveys. 
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significantly increased since 1997: in fact they seem to have experienced a dip 
compared to volunteering levels in the early 1990’s.  If the sector was growing due to 
an increase in altruism in the population (and so a shifting Z distribution) we would 
reasonably expect that levels of unpaid volunteering would also show a similar 
change.  This supports our assertion that the growth of the voluntary sector 
workforce has been fuelled by a movement of Z*, rather than by an increase in the 
number of altruistic workers in the population. 
There are a number of consequences if the distribution of Z has remained constant, 
and so the average level of mission-motivation in the voluntary sector has fallen.  
Firstly, the scale of the problem depends on the shape of the distribution of Z, the 
taste for warm glow.  If it is relatively uniform, then there will be little difference 
between existing and new voluntary sector workers.  If however it is steeply peaked, 
then the introduction of new workers could have a significant impact on the make-up 
of the voluntary sector workforce.  Two potential impacts of this are identified. 
Firstly, if the mission of an organisation is determined by negotiation between the 
employees then the introduction of employees with weaker mission-oriented 
motivation could have implications for the strength and type of mission.  The 
theoretical rationale for voluntary sector provision of public services is that the 
combination of the profit non-distribution constraint and the intrinsic motivation of 
workers allows the credible provision of quality where there are significant 
information asymmetries between provider and purchasers or recipients.  If the 
mission, or level of intrinsic motivation, is diluted then this could have implications 
for the comparative advantage of voluntary organisations in the provision of these 
types of services. 
  107
Besley and Ghatak ( 2005) extend their Principal-Agent model to allow a spectrum 
of missions that the Principal and Agent bargain over.  They show how 
compromising on mission can be used as an alternative to incentive pay.  The 
converse of this is that as incentive pay increases in the voluntary sector, and wages 
converge, there is less of a role for mission-matching between principals and agents. 
Akerlof (1986) discussed reciprocal gift exchange in the workplace, where 
workplace norms provide the framework for a system of reciprocal effort.  The 
introduction of new workers who do not share these norms could cause this 
reciprocal equilibrium within the organisation to collapse, and reduce effort even 
amongst the most mission-motivated workers. 
Secondly, a further rationale for contracting-out public services is to reap efficiency 
and cost-saving benefits from the competitive tendering of services.  At least some of 
these benefits arise from the lower wage levels attributed to warm glow.  However 
the findings in this chapter suggest that the effect over the past ten years of this 
policy has been strong growth in voluntary sector pay for both male and female 
workers, as pay in the sector has converged on pay levels in the public sector.  While 
cost-savings through lower wages are only part of the objectives of this policy, this 
will have significantly eroded the cost benefits. 
An additional aspect of the government’s policy is the change in the way that the 
nonprofits fund their activities.  The increased use of contracting-out has changed the 
balance of the forms of funding, with a move from grants and donations to greater 
use of service contracts.  At a simple level, we would expect the increased 
competitive pressure to exert a downward force on wages in the voluntary sector.  
However, the change of funding form could also impact the workplace norms of 
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Akerlof’s gift exchange, or crowd-out intrinsic motivation as there is a greater focus 
on performance and targets.  A further effect could be an impact on job quality.  
Cunningham (2001) suggests that the  pressure of contracting-out services is 
changing human resources practices in the voluntary sector, and creating conflict 
between employees and employers within nonprofits.  Furthermore, the evidence 
suggests that contracting-out is increasing work-intensity and driving down terms 
and conditions within social care in the voluntary sector (Baines, 2004;Cunningham 
& James, 2009) as competition between providers to win a contract puts a strong 
downward pressure on costs that did not necessarily exist when the organisations 
were funded by grants.  Further to this, the requirement in contracting to record and 
evidence results and targets puts more pressure on employees, reducing the 
flexibility in job tasks that they may have had in the past.  To the extent that this drop 
in job quality results in a compensating differential, we would expect to see wages in 
the voluntary sector rising.  Lastly, changing funding structures could have an effect 
on the organisations’ mission.  The mission of an organisation must balance the 
preferences of both funders and workers.  As Besley & Ghatak showed, worsening 
matches between the missions of principals and agents reduce the effect of mission 
motivation.  It seems likely that public sector purchasers, who are able to write 
enforceable contracts, have better information about the performance of a voluntary 
organisation than donors, who likely give without being able to enforce their wishes 
(beyond exit from donating) and are further removed from the work of the 
organisation.  As such, organisations may need to adjust their missions towards those 
of the contract funders, and away from the preferences of donors.  If this mission 
change reduces the quality of employer-worker mission matches, then it will reduce 
mission motivation and so increase nonprofit wages. 
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This illustrates that the link between the government policy changes and the growth 
of the sector is complex, and there are several channels through which the policy 
could impact the mission motivation of workers.  What this analysis has shown is 
that there is faster wage growth observed both in average wage differences across the 
sector (through cross-sectional analysis) and in marginal workers (through 
longitudinal analysis).  Although it is not possible to separately identify or 
decompose the effects of sector growth and changing funding structures, we argue 
that this analysis provides evidence of decreasing warm-glow effects in the voluntary 
sector during a period in which policy makers were trying to harness this motivation. 
There are a number of caveats that should be highlighted in interpreting these results.  
The LFS has been chosen for this analysis due to the richness and high quality of the 
worker data that it includes.  But, given the nature of the voluntary sector, it is not 
without fault.  Sector data is recorded only for respondents’ main jobs, and not for 
secondary or further jobs.  Since many jobs in the voluntary sector are part-time 
and/or temporary, it is conceivable that they make up a greater proportion of these 
omitted jobs.  This suggests that the estimate of sector size provided by the UK LFS 
is certainly a lower bound.  This feature of the data could be important if some of the 
movement into the sector is workers ‘upgrading’ from a second job in the voluntary 
sector to making that their main job.  This should not however significantly change 
the analysis: since we are concerned with the marginal worker indifferent between 
the two sectors we would still expect that there would need to be a change in the 
sector wage differential in order for the marginal worker to want to work one 
additional hour in the sector.  Note also that this effect is only a concern for workers 
with more than one job.  The effect of workers whose main job is part-time, 
upgrading to a fulltime job within the sector is still being directly observed in the 
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data, and so controlled for in the model.  Given the types of jobs involved, the effect 
of second jobs is likely to be minor in the estimation, but is an ongoing issue for 
voluntary sector researchers and is worthy of note. 
It should also be noted that this analysis does not provide an overall critique of the 
policy of contracting-out public services.  The cost savings from lower wages forms 
only one part of the policy’s objectives.  It does however show the unintended effects 
that a government policy can have, and raises some broader concerns for the effect 
that the policy has had on mission-motivation in the voluntary sector. 
Conclusion 
As with the findings in the US literature, the evidence for warm-glow wages is not 
clear cut.  Although male workers are paid less in the voluntary sector, this wage-gap 
has been narrowing in the UK in recent years, and now appears to be non-existent.  
For female workers (who make up more than two thirds of the voluntary sector 
workforce), the analysis suggests a small voluntary sector premium above the private 
sector.  While female workers still earn less than their colleagues in the public sector, 
the gap between the voluntary and public sectors has been narrowing.  Our analysis 
suggests that contracting-out services has driven up voluntary sector wages to the 
public sector wage level, to the extent that wage costs for services in the voluntary 
sector are now similar to the wage costs in the public sector. 
We have tackled the issue of sector selection bias by both examining the labour 
market in the voluntary sector in the face of an exogenous shock, and through the 
analysis of a fixed effects model to control for unobserved worker heterogeneity.  
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This has shown that the results are robust even after controlling for a potential 
sample selection bias. 
Over the past ten years the voluntary sector has moved closer to the market, engaging 
in competitive tendering and commissioning processes for service provision.  The 
government has specifically targeted increasing the capacity of sector to provide 
public services.  This chapter has shown that during this period the sector has seen 
significant growth, both as a proportion of the UK workforce and in the workers’ 
pay.   
We have explored the consequences of a government initiative to expand a specific 
sector through contracting-out public services.  The motive for this policy was based 
on increasing value for money, in terms of cost, quality and variety.  Through our 
analysis of voluntary sector workforce data, we argue that this policy has in fact had 
the opposite effect, by increasing wages to public sector levels and diluting the 
mission-motivation of workers in the sector. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Time Flies When You’re Having Fun? 
Donated Labour in the Health & Social Work Industries 
Introduction 
In this chapter we compare working hours between the private, public and voluntary 
sectors.  Specifically, we investigate the role of unpaid overtime as “donated labour” 
amongst employees within the Health & Social Work industries. 
Traditional warm-glow analysis uses wage differences between the private, public 
and voluntary sectors as a measurement of donated labour.  This, however, does not 
control for differences in effort between the sectors.  Here we test for differences in 
hours worked between the sectors.  Our main contribution in this chapter is to 
provide a more robust exploration of nonprofit wage differentials, as well as adding 
an additional explanation to the literature on unpaid overtime. 
This chapter uses ten years of pooled cross-sectional data from the UK Quarterly 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) in order to examine levels of unpaid overtime at a 
disaggregated industry level in industries where voluntary sector concentration is 
relatively high.  The rotating-panel structure of the UK LFS allows us to estimate a 
fixed effects model to control for unobserved worker heterogeneity.  We focus on the 
Health & Social Work industries for two reasons: firstly, to reduce the unobserved 
heterogeneity between organisations and jobs by narrowing the activities undertaken; 
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secondly, to examine the caring industries where theory predicts that warm glow 
should be strongest.20 
We begin by examining whether there are significant levels of donated labour 
observed in the voluntary sector, expressed as hours of unpaid overtime.  Next, we 
test whether donated labour explains the voluntary sector wage premium found in the 
caring industries.  Evidence is found of donated labour through significantly higher 
levels of unpaid overtime for voluntary sector workers at all industry detail levels.  
Wage equations are estimated with wages adjusted for these additional hours of 
unpaid work, showing that for female workers there is a significant warm-glow wage 
discount even after controlling for unobserved worker heterogeneity.  
Empirical Literature on Sector Differentials and Donated Labour 
We are unaware of any empirical work examining unpaid overtime in the voluntary 
sector, as distinct from the public sector.  The conflicting findings in the empirical 
warm-glow wage differentials literature, as outlined in the previous chapter, mean 
that the industry-specific differences in sector wage differentials remain unexplained.  
In particular, there is often a significant voluntary sector wage premium found in the 
caring industries such as health and social work. 
Leete (2001) used US census data for 1990 and found little evidence of a difference 
between the private and voluntary sectors overall.  However, she did find some 
significant differences at the disaggregated industry level.  Although the industry 
categories used in Leete’s paper differ from those in the UK LFS, it is possible to 
                                                 
20
 See Chalkley and Malcomson (1998) for a discussion of the role of mission motivation in health 
contracting. 
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identify some that are relevant to the industry classifications examined in this 
chapter. 
Industry 
Nonprofit Premiums 
(t-statistic) 
% Nonprofit 
(Sample Size) 
Nursing & Personal Care Facilities 
2.22% 
(3.5) 
19.40% 
(60,120) 
Hospitals 
5.02% 
(18.87) 
43.70% 
(171,612) 
Day-care services 
6.72% 
(6.54) 
35.40% 
(21,505) 
Figure 13: Estimated Nonprofit Wage Premiums from US Census 1990 
(Source: (Leete, 2001) 
Figure 13 shows that Leete found significant nonprofit sector premiums of between 
2.2% - 6.7% in caring industries in the US.  The table also shows that these were in 
industries with a relatively high concentration of nonprofit organisations.  Examining 
similar sectors, Mocan & Tekin (2003) used employer-employee matched data on 
child care workers in the USA, and found evidence of a nonprofit wage premium of 
between 6% - 15%. 
Gregg, Grout, Ratcliffe, Smith and Winmeijer (2011) tested the donated labour 
hypothesis in nonprofit organisations by examining data on unpaid overtime.  They 
include both organisations in the public and voluntary sectors within their definition 
of nonprofits.  They examine the probability of undertaking unpaid overtime, 
comparing for-profit versus nonprofit sectors and ‘caring’ versus ‘non-caring’ 
industries.  Data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) are used in both 
cross-section and panel form to test the hypothesis of sector differences in donated 
labour. Gregg et al find that workers in nonprofit organisations are more likely to 
donate their labour than those in the for-profit firms.  They show that this is not due 
to implicit contracts.  The results also suggest that individuals may select into sectors 
based on their propensity to donate labour. 
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This chapter extends this analysis in a number of ways.  We estimate a three sector 
model, to identify differences between public nonprofits and independent nonprofits.  
We focus on the health and social work industries to examine unpaid overtime and 
wage differences at the industry level.  Lastly, we estimate wage equations on 
adjusted wages in order to test for the existence of implicit contracts. 
The Economics of Overtime Pay 
Overtime hours are defined ‘as actual hours of work in excess of the standard 
contractual hours’ (Hart, 2004).  Commonly these hours are paid for at a higher rate 
than basic working hours.  However, a more recent literature has begun to explore 
the phenomenon of reported unpaid overtime.  Workers may work either paid or 
unpaid overtime in addition to their contracted hours, or they may work a 
combination of both, or neither. 
The total weekly hours Hi for a worker i are therefore shown below, where hb are the 
usual contracted hours, hpo are the hours of paid overtime and huo are the hours of 
unpaid overtime. 
A = ℎ
C + ℎ
DE + ℎ
FE
        (22) 
The total weekly pay Wi received by a worker i is shown below, where wb is the basic 
hourly wage rate, and pi is the overtime premium. 
G = 
Hℎ
C + I
Hℎ
DE
       (23) 
The overtime literature suggests that the term ‘unpaid overtime’ is a misnomer.  
Although there is no explicit contractual payment for hours of unpaid overtime 
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worked, the question that the literature addresses is: how is the worker compensated 
for these hours? 
Bell and Hart (2003) use the 1998 British New Earnings survey to investigate the 
relationship between basic hourly pay and overtime premiums.  They show that there 
is a significant negative relationship, with higher overtime premiums being 
associated with lower basic hourly wages.  They suggest that overtime premiums are 
driven by custom and practice within an industry, and are not related to the length of 
overtime worked.  Firms therefore can use the variable premium to maintain a 
competitive effective wage.  This supports an implicit contract between firms and 
workers over the effective hourly wage that will be paid, for a given mix of basic and 
overtime hours. 
Bell and Hart (1999) propose five explanations for the existence of unpaid overtime: 
• uncertainty over task completion times; 
• auctions for task allocation; 
• regulate team performance; 
• gift exchange; 
• compensating differentials.  
Firstly, unpaid overtime could permit the adjustment of contracts where there is 
uncertainty on behalf of both the employer and the worker about the time required to 
undertake a task.  With some probability, the worker will undertake additional hours 
unpaid to fulfil a contract. 
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Secondly, employers may allocate work tasks on the basis of ‘bids’ from workers as 
to task completion times.  Workers have an incentive to understate their task 
completion time in order to win the contract, and then work additional hours unpaid 
to fulfil it, if the payment from contracted hours still outweighs their outside option. 
Thirdly, teams of workers may use unpaid overtime as a regulation device to allow 
lower productivity workers additional time to complete tasks where the same wage is 
paid to all team members.  Effectively, the unpaid overtime allows the informal 
adjustment of hourly wages within the team. 
Fourthly, employers and workers may enter into an implicit contract, where workers 
‘gift’ extra effort in return for a higher basic wage.  This extra effort could be in the 
form of additional hours unpaid, holding work intensity constant.  Although the 
exchange is not explicitly contracted over, it is enforced through workplace norms. 
Lastly, if wage bargains regarding overtime premiums are reached outside the level 
of the relationship between employer and worker, there may be welfare 
improvements from negotiating a lower, local rate.  This could be reached through an 
implicit agreement to undertake a mix of paid and unpaid overtime hours. 
The fourth explanation has significance in the nonprofit literature, and could be 
relevant in the analysis of sector differences.  Bell and Hart find evidence of gift 
exchange through the association of unpaid overtime with higher wages.  They did 
not however find evidence of unpaid overtime being used to adjust rigidities in paid 
overtimes rates, tested by examining the link between undertaking both paid and 
unpaid overtime. 
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Pannenberg (2005) explores the long-term effects of unpaid overtime using data from 
the German Socio-Economic Panel.  Pannenberg finds evidence of increased real 
wage growth for male workers who work unpaid overtime, robust to the estimation 
of a fixed-effects model, but little evidence of a similar significant effect for women.  
This supports the role of unpaid overtime as an investment, with a positive expected 
value, at least for male workers.21 
We propose an additional explanation for unpaid overtime: if wages are rigid within 
industries across sectors, then the effective wages of workers in mission-motivated 
organisations can be adjusted by working additional hours of unpaid overtime.   
The traditional warm-glow model suggests that workers gain utility from both their 
wage and the intrinsic motivation of engaging in a mission-motivated activity.  
Building on equation (4) in Chapter 2, where we outlined the formulation of warm 
glow utility, the utility function Ui of a worker has three arguments: the total wages 
earned (Wi), the characteristics of the job, and the level of intrinsic utility derived 
from working in a mission-motivated activity (gi). 
 = (G(, ℎ), , 	)        (24) 
Warm-glow utility arises from the workers’ participation in the provision of the 
public good, rather than solely from the public good itself.  However, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, the organisational form determines whether there is a residual claimant 
with an incentive to expropriate the donated labour as profit.  This, together with the 
efficiency gain of ‘mission-matching’ of motivated agents to nonprofits with 
prosocial missions, leads to a prediction of donated labour in the nonprofit sector. 
                                                 
21
 See also Bell and Freeman (2001) for a more general discussion of the link between hours worked 
and future earnings. 
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This suggests two competing explanations for sector differences in unpaid overtime.  
Workers who receive a warm glow from their work could engage in unpaid overtime, 
which would lower their effective salary, whilst apparently receiving the same 
compensation as other workers.  Alternatively unpaid overtime can form part of an 
implicit bargain between worker and employer, where additional hours of unpaid 
overtime are expected and compensation is paid through a higher hourly wage for the 
“official” paid hours of work. 
We investigate sector wage differences to test between these two explanations for 
unpaid overtime in the voluntary sector. 
Warm-Glow Hypothesis: Workers engage in additional hours of unpaid work due 
to the intrinsic utility of working in the mission-oriented sector.  The compensation 
for the hours of unpaid overtime is received in warm-glow utility. 
Gift-Exchange Hypothesis: Workers in the voluntary sector engage in implicit 
contracts, where additional hours of unpaid work ‘gifted’ to employers are rewarded 
with higher basic wages.  The compensation for the hours of unpaid overtime is 
received through the higher level of the basic wage. 
It should be noted that we are examining sector differences between sectors within 
industries.  It is reasonable to think that there could be a level of job satisfaction 
arising from working within the caring industries independent of the legal structure 
of the employer, but we are not testing for an overall warm glow effect of caring for 
others, rather the additional warm glow arising from working in a mission-motivated 
organisation.  We are looking at sector differences in warm glow given that the 
workers are employed in the caring industries. 
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Bell and Hart suggest a method of controlling for the effect of unpaid overtime on 
final compensation, by calculating an adjusted wage which is then used as the 
explanatory variable in a wage equation.  First, we test for the existence of a sector 
difference in unpaid overtime.  Second, we test its impact in an adjusted-wage 
equation on the warm-glow sector difference. 
The Dataset 
This chapter uses the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey (UK LFS) between 1998 
and 2007 to create a pooled cross-section dataset with a large enough voluntary 
sector sample size to permit detailed analysis.  
Unobserved Heterogeneity 
A recurring problem in estimating differences between sectors is accounting for 
unobserved heterogeneity: whether observed sector wage differences are explained 
by differences between organisational forms, or by sector selection by workers.  
There are two main sources of unobserved heterogeneity that could affect our 
analysis: 
• Heterogeneity in jobs; 
• Heterogeneity in workers. 
We control for unobserved heterogeneity between jobs by restricting the sample to 
detailed industry classifications to allow comparison between similar job activities 
and roles.  In this chapter we estimate sector wage equations at the detailed industry 
level, coded using the UK Standard Industrial Classification Of Economic Activities 
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(SIC(92)).  The industry classification analysed is SIC(92) N 85 Health & Social 
Work. 
This broad industry classification includes: 
• Human health activities: Hospitals, Nursing Homes, Dental practices, 
Opticians, etc.; 
• Veterinary activities: Vets and Veterinary hospitals; 
• Social work activities: Social work services with and without 
accommodation, as detailed above. 
This reduction to more detailed job classification comes at a cost of reduced sample 
size. 
We control for unobserved heterogeneity between workers by estimating a fixed 
effects model using two observations on each worker.  This allows us to include an 
individual specific fixed effect in the regressions. 
Exploring a Three Sector Workforce 
Since the mid-1990’s the questions asked in the LFS allow the identification of 
organisations which operate in the Voluntary sector, permitting an analysis of a three 
sector model.22 
Although the voluntary sector as a whole accounts for only around 3% of the UK 
workforce, 60% of the sector operates within the industry classification SIC(92) “85 
Health & Social Work”.  In contrast, 29% of the Public Sector and 5% of the Private 
                                                 
22
 See Appendix Two for more detail on sector classifications in the UK LFS 
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Sector is engaged within this industry classification.  Table 20 below shows the 
industry sample size by sector and gender.  It shows that although the voluntary 
sector makes up a significant proportion of the industry, the private and public 
sectors are both still major players within each category. 
Sector MALE   FEMALE   
  Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Private 461 0.150 3057 0.246 
Public 2203 0.716 8028 0.646 
Voluntary 413 0.134 1351 0.109 
TOTAL 3077   12436   
Table 20: Sample by Sector and SIC(92) 
(Source: UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey 1998 – 2007) 
 
Mean values of a selection of key individual and job characteristics are shown in  
Table 21 below. 
In order to control for unobserved worker heterogeneity we also estimate a panel 
model using two observations on each worker, one year apart.  Due to data 
constraints in building the panel we estimate this model using a smaller sample based 
on worker observations between 1997 and 2002.23 
Table 22 below shows the panel sample by sector in wave 1 and wave 5.  Workers 
observed for at least one wave in the voluntary sector make up 14% (411 
observations) of the male sample and 12% (1,353 observations) of the female 
sample. 
 
                                                 
23
 See Appendix One for more detail on building the datasets. 
  
SAMPLE MEANS 
 MALE     FEMALE    
 Private Public Voluntary ALL  Private Public Voluntary ALL 
Age (years) 41.23 41.75 43.35 41.88  40.13 41.69 42.20 41.36 
Tenure (years) 4.81 10.10 5.14 8.66  5.05 9.85 5.14 8.15 
Part-time (%) 0.08 0.04 0.16 0.06  0.38 0.38 0.41 0.38 
Temp. Job (%) 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.07  0.02 0.04 0.08 0.04 
     
 
    
Unpaid Overtime (hours) 2.81 3.65 5.00 3.71  1.55 2.40 3.68 2.33 
 (5.569) (5.936) ** (6.366) *** (5.968)  (3.445) (3.811) *** (4.957) *** (3.913) 
Paid Overtime (hours) 5.37 4.45 1.63 4.21  3.83 2.96 1.97 3.07 
 (6.533) (6.653) *** (3.934) *** (6.424)  (5.279) (4.923) *** (4.066) *** (4.956) 
Total Overtime (hours) 8.23 8.10 6.63 7.91  5.38 5.36 5.65 5.40 
 (7.023) (7.688) (6.496) *** (7.456)  (5.611) (5.549) (5.509) (5.560) 
Total Work Hours (hours) 45.47 46.14 41.10 45.34  36.22 36.38 35.27 36.22 
 (10.993) (10.544) (10.786) *** (10.776)  (12.501) (11.254) (11.997) ** (11.658) 
          
Hourly Wage (£) 8.96 13.22 11.13 12.30  7.08 10.33 9.15 9.40 
     
 
    
Standard Deviations for working hours variables are shown in brackets.   
† For Public and Voluntary Sector working hours a t-test for significant difference from the Private Sector was conducted.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table 21: Sample Means by Sector and gender 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1998 – 2007) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Wave 1  Private   Public   Voluntary  
Wave 5   Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent 
Private Male  285 0.10  60 0.02  67 0.02 
 Female  2,262 0.20  187 0.02  209 0.02 
Public Male  77 0.03  2,042 0.71  20 0.01 
 Female  346 0.03  7,447 0.64  82 0.01 
Voluntary Male  28 0.01  31 0.01  265 0.09 
 Female  84 0.01  78 0.01  900 0.08 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
TOTAL  Male  2,875        
OBSERVATIONS Female  11,595        
Table 22: Sample by Sector in Wave 1 and Wave 5 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1998 – 2002) 
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Overtime Data 
In the UK LFS respondents are asked about their working hours and overtime.  
Respondents are asked to estimate the number of weekly hours of paid and unpaid 
overtime that they undertake in their main job. 
Table 23 below shows the sample tabulated by participation in the two types of 
overtime hours.  It shows that most workers work only either one type of overtime or 
the other.  About 13% work no overtime, and 11% report working at least some of 
both paid and unpaid overtime. 
 
COUNT No Paid Overtime 
(J@KL=0) 
Paid Overtime 
(J@KL>0) 
TOTAL 
No Unpaid Overtime 
(J@ML=0) 
2,001 5,905 7,906 
Unpaid Overtime 
(J@ML>0) 
5,850 1,757 7,607 
TOTAL 7,851 7,662 15,513 
Table 23: Breakdown of sample by overtime hours 
 
Table 21 above shows that unpaid overtime hours are significantly higher in the 
public and voluntary sectors compared to the private sector, whilst paid overtime 
hours are significantly higher in the private sector.  For both male and female 
workers, total working hours are significantly lower in the voluntary sector 
Figure 14 below shows histograms of the hours of paid and unpaid overtime by 
sector for workers with overtime working greater than zero.  This shows clearly the 
higher levels of paid overtime in the private sector. 
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HISTOGRAMS OF OVERTIME HOURS BY SECTOR 
 PAID OVERTIME 
(hpo>0) 
UNPAID OVERTIME 
(huo>0) 
   
PRIVATE SECTOR  
 
  
   
PUBLIC SECTOR  
 
  
   
VOLUNTARY SECTOR  
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 14: Histogram of Hours of Overtime by Sector 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1998 – 2007) 
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Estimating Working Hours Equations 
In order to investigate this, working hours equations (Bell & Hart, 1999) were 
estimated to attempt to explain the observed unpaid overtime.  Data on unpaid 
overtime, paid overtime, total overtime and total working hours were used to 
estimate sector differences, conditioning on a range of explanatory variables. 
The overtime data contains many observations censored at zero, as it is not possible 
to observe negative overtime.  Many workers in the sample worked only one type of 
overtime, or no overtime at all.  In order to control for this, overtime working is 
modelled with an underlying propensity to undertake overtime, hi.  The overtime 
hours are observed when hi is greater than zero, but zero overtime is observed when 
hi is less than zero.  This is estimated with a Tobit model: 
N	ℎ > 0 → ℎPQRS = + + 3647 + 89:;< + T +   (25) 
N	ℎ ≤ 0 → ℎPQRS = 0 
Where: 
PUB  Sector Dummy for Public Sector workers 
VOL  Sector Dummy for Voluntary Sector  
Xi Characteristics of jobs: organisation size, FT/PT, 
permanent/temporary, length of tenure; Characteristics of the 
workers:. age, experience, marital status, number of children; Time 
Dummies for year and quarter 
Following Bell and Hart (2003), a proxy for income is included in the estimation of 
the hours equations.  In order to avoid the endogeneity problem of the joint 
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determination of wages and hours, w* is the predicted hourly wage from a basic 
Mincer wage equation, rather than the observed hourly wage. 
lnV
HW = + + XY + Q       (26) 
ln	(
∗) = ln	([
H) = \+ + \XY      (27) 
The variables Zi included in the wage equation to identify w* are age, experience, 
tenure, part-time, job status, education, organisation size, occupation and region and 
time dummies.  The variables included in Zi but not  Xi as exclusion restrictions are 
education and occupation. 
The coefficients on the sector dummies for the public and voluntary sector relative to 
the private sector are shown below in Table 24.  Columns one to four show the hours 
equations for unpaid overtime, paid overtime, total overtime and total hours 
respectively. 
These estimates suggest that male workers work slightly more unpaid overtime in the 
voluntary sector than the private by about 2.3 hours per week.  We find that female 
workers work an extra 2.7 hours of weekly unpaid overtime in the voluntary sector.  
Levels of paid overtime are also significantly lower in the voluntary sector for both 
male and female workers, by 6.9 hours and 3.3 hours respectively.  Male workers in 
the voluntary sector work significantly fewer total hours of overtime (2.5 hours) and 
total weekly hours of work (3.9 hours) than those in the private sector.  For female 
workers there is no significant difference in total overtime, and evidence of only 
slightly shorter total weekly hours (1 hour) in the voluntary than the private sectors. 
 
  
OVERTIME EQUATIONS: CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA 
 MALE     FEMALE    
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Unpaid 
ℎ
FE
 
Paid 
ℎ
DE
 
Total OT 
ℎ
DE + ℎ
FE
 
Total Hours 
ℎ
C + ℎ
DE + ℎ
FE
 
 Unpaid 
ℎ
FE
 
Paid 
ℎ
DE
 
Total OT 
ℎ
DE + ℎ
FE
 
Total Hours 
ℎ
C + ℎ
DE + ℎ
FE
 
model          
Public Sector -1.217 -0.809 -1.602 -2.097  0.397 -0.793 -0.475 -1.219 
 (0.557)** (0.612) (0.438)*** (0.480)***  (0.165)** (0.215)*** (0.148)*** (0.173)*** 
          
Voluntary Sector 2.302 -6.887 -2.466 -3.853  2.770 -3.280 0.213 -0.976 
 (0.658)*** (0.840)*** (0.548)*** (0.600)***  (0.216)*** (0.321)*** (0.206) (0.241)*** 
          
ln	(
N
∗) 17.58 -12.30 3.627 4.733  9.553 -7.368 1.555 3.683 
 (0.738)*** (0.838)*** (0.560)*** (0.614)***  (0.271)*** (0.370)*** (0.245)*** (0.287)*** 
          
Age 0.214 1.200 0.475 1.439  -0.131 1.270 0.483 0.754 
(years) (0.255) (0.298)*** (0.201)** (0.220)***  (0.105) (0.149)*** (0.0967)*** (0.113)*** 
          
Age2 /100 -69.67 -100.6 -49.25 -152.9  5.880 -165.0 -58.73 -106.0 
 (28.99)** (35.62)*** (23.26)** (25.44)***  (12.56) (18.65)*** (11.73)*** (13.75)*** 
          
Tenure -0.333 0.239 -0.0556 -0.0234  -0.0890 -0.0148 -0.0755 -0.0547 
(years) (0.0651)*** (0.0811)*** (0.0542) (0.0594)  (0.0234)*** (0.0333) (0.0222)*** (0.0260)** 
          
Tenure2 /100 0.691 -0.491 0.0722 -0.00552  0.137 0.213 0.240 0.219 
 (0.202)*** (0.262)* (0.171) (0.187)  (0.0765)* (0.112)* (0.0741)*** (0.0869)** 
          
Part-Time Working -1.536 -1.422 -2.035 -19.44  -2.640 -0.837 -2.838 -17.24 
 (0.818)* (0.907) (0.627)*** (0.682)***  (0.139)*** (0.190)*** (0.128)*** (0.150)*** 
          
Temp. Job 1.264 2.714 2.843 4.579  0.833 -0.519 0.613 0.581 
 (0.702)* (0.873)*** (0.603)*** (0.662)***  (0.302)*** (0.467) (0.298)** (0.350)* 
          
Constant -41.34 8.861 -6.524 13.88  -18.05 -2.986 -4.942 24.80 
 (4.432)*** (4.866)* (3.354)* (3.667)***  (1.655)*** (2.239) (1.480)*** (1.733)*** 
sigma          
Constant 8.227 9.943 7.681 8.513  5.672 8.098 6.008 7.157 
 (0.158)*** (0.195)*** (0.105)*** (0.109)***  (0.0555)*** (0.0807)*** (0.0421)*** (0.0454)*** 
N 3077 3077 3077 3077  12436 12436 12436 12436 
AIC 12610.4 13485.5 19939.0 21986.5  45230.2 50781.9 72311.0 84318.6 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Models 1-4: Tobit N	ℎ > 0 → ℎPQRS = + + 3647 + 89:;< + T + ; 	N	ℎ ≤ 0 → ℎPQRS = 0  
Total OT = Unpaid OT + Paid OT; Total Hours = Basic Hours + Total OT;  ln	(∗) = + + XY 
Additional control variables not listed in the table above include experience, marital status, number of children, organization size, region, year and quarter dummies. 
Table 24: Overtime Equation Estimation Results 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1998 – 2007) 
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Although this indicates that there are higher levels of unpaid overtime in the voluntary sector, 
controlling for individual and organisational characteristics, it does not control for 
unobserved worker heterogeneity.  Gregg et al (2011) showed evidence of  worker selection 
into sector based on their propensity to undertake unpaid overtime.  In order to address this 
we estimate hours equations in the panel.  We estimate three different specifications: a fixed 
effects OLS regression, a random effects regression, and a random effects Tobit regression. 
Model (a): Fixed Effects 
ℎPQRS] =  + 3647] + 89:;<] + T] + ]    (28) 
Model (b): Random Effects 
ℎPQRS] =  + 3647] + 89:;<] + T] + ]; 	~__0(0, `5)   (29) 
Model (c): Random Effects Tobit 
 N	ℎPQRS] > 0 → 	ℎPQRS] =  + 3647] + 89:;<] + T] + ]   (30) 
N	ℎPQRS] ≤ 0 → ℎPQRS] = 0; ~__0(0, `5) 
Model (a) is the simplest specification, but it does not account for the censoring of the hours 
variable at zero.  Model (b) uses a random-effects specification, which assumes that 
individual effects are random factors independently drawn from an identical distribution 
across individuals.  This model is more efficient under the assumption that ] and  are 
uncorrelated.  If this assumption is violated, then the correlation can lead to inconsistent 
estimators.   This model also does not account for the censoring of the hours variable at zero. 
The Hausman test provides a method for testing the assumption that  ] and  are 
uncorrelated in order to select between a fixed effects and random effects specification.  
Hausman tests were conducted for the four hours variables.24  For all the estimations apart 
from Paid Overtime (Male) and Total Overtime (Male) the null hypothesis of no systematic 
                                                 
24
 Appendix Four contains the results of the Hausman tests. 
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difference in the estimates was rejected.  This suggests that the random effects specification 
could be biased.  We present the Random Effects estimates here for comparison with the 
other two models, but with due caution as to interpretation. 
Model (c) adds the Tobit structure, but at the cost of also imposing a random effects structure 
to the individual effects.  The Random Effects Tobit estimator is used as there is no straight-
forward estimator for a Fixed Effects Tobit model.  Efficiency is increased by the addition of 
the Tobit structure, but at the cost of a potential inconsistency from the random effects 
specification. 
The significant number of zeroes in the working hours data means that Model (c) is preferred 
on theoretical grounds, but the likely existence of a correlation between the errors and the 
explanatory variables mean that Model (a) is preferred on econometric grounds.  All three 
models have been reported for comparison.  Differences in the estimates from the three 
models are found mainly in magnitude and statistical significance, but not in the sign of the 
estimated effect.  Omitting the Tobit structure of the data leads to an underestimation of the 
effect.  Comparison of the three estimates in each case suggests that while the random effects 
structure might lead to an overestimation of the magnitude of the effects, controlling for the 
Tobit structure also has a significant effect. 
The panel data sample results are shown in Table 25 and Table 28 below.  Columns 1(a) to 
4(a) show the fixed-effects hours equations for unpaid overtime, paid overtime, total overtime 
and total hours respectively.  Columns 1(b) to 4(b) show the random-effects hours equations 
for unpaid overtime, paid overtime, total overtime and total hours respectively.  Columns 1(c) 
to 4(c) show the random-effects tobit hours equations for unpaid overtime, paid overtime, 
total overtime and total hours respectively. 
  
OVERTIME EQUATIONS: PANEL DATA FEMALE WORKERS  
Hours Equations: xttobit : LFS Panel : Female  
 (1a) FE 1(b) RE (1c) RE Tobit (2a) FE (2b) RE (2c) RE Tobit 
 Unpaid OT 
ℎ
FE
 
Unpaid OT 
ℎ
FE
 
Unpaid OT 
ℎ
FE
 
Paid OT 
ℎ
DE
 
Paid OT 
ℎ
DE
 
Paid OT 
ℎ
DE
 
       
Public Sector 0.176 0.0284 0.331 -0.640 -0.283 -0.672 
 (0.337) (0.0886) (0.167)** (0.397) (0.117)** (0.234)*** 
       
Voluntary Sector 0.574 1.122 2.232 0.0457 -1.229 -3.612 
 (0.373) (0.126)*** (0.222)*** (0.439) (0.166)*** (0.362)*** 
       
ln	(
∗) 0.660 3.238 7.244 0.596 -2.046 -5.880 
 (0.737) (0.132)*** (0.249)*** (0.867) (0.176)*** (0.382)*** 
       
Age2 /100 -0.382 0.0266 -0.0578 -0.123 -0.0281 -0.230 
 (0.344) (0.00464)*** (0.0644) (0.405) (0.00619)*** (0.0913)** 
       
Tenure 0.0945 -0.0000510 -0.00503 0.0197 -0.00913 -0.00393 
(years) (0.0607) (0.0137) (0.0245) (0.0714) (0.0182) (0.0380) 
       
Tenure2 /100 -0.347 -0.0162 -0.0398 -0.147 -0.00853 -0.0385 
 (0.234) (0.0484) (0.0859) (0.275) (0.0644) (0.138) 
       
Part-Time Working -0.755 -1.414 -2.440 -1.047 -0.682 -0.527 
 (0.241)*** (0.0696)*** (0.128)*** (0.284)*** (0.0921)*** (0.190)*** 
       
Temporary Job -0.0419 0.0498 0.268 0.230 0.303 0.0657 
 (0.377) (0.166) (0.286) (0.444) (0.217) (0.456) 
       
Constant -9.926 -3.376 -14.68 17.45 7.052 8.343 
 (30.99) (0.289)*** (1.048)*** (36.46) (0.383)*** (1.425)*** 
N 11596 11596 11596 11596 11596 11596 
R2 0.022 - - 0.019 - - 
AIC 38319.2 59801.0 42117.8 42090.3 66026.6 43360.2 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Model (a): Fixed Effects ℎPQRS] = + +  + 3647] + 89:;<] + T] + ] 
Model (b): Random Effects 	ℎPQRS] = + +  + 3647] + 89:;<] + T] + ]; ~__0(0, `5) 
Model (c): Random Effects Tobit N	ℎPQRS] > 0 → 	ℎPQRS] = + +  + 3647] + 89:;<] + T] + ]; N	ℎPQRS] ≤ 0 → ℎPQRS] = 0;~__0(0, `5) 
ln	(
∗) = + + XY 
Additional control variables not listed in the table above include organisation size, region, and time dummies. 
Table 25: Overtime Equations: Fixed Effects linear regression and Random Effect Tobit models  
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1998 – 2002) 
  
OVERTIME EQUATIONS: PANEL DATA FEMALE WORKERS  
Hours Equations: xttobit : LFS Panel : Female  
 (3a) FE (3b) RE (3c) RE Tobit (4a) FE (4b) RE (4c) RE Tobit 
 Total Overtime 
ℎ
DE + ℎ
FE
 
Total Overtime 
ℎ
DE + ℎ
FE
 
Total Overtime 
ℎ
DE + ℎ
FE
 
Total Hours 
ℎ
C + ℎ
DE + ℎ
FE
 
Total Hours 
ℎ
C + ℎ
DE + ℎ
FE
 
Total Hours 
ℎ
C + ℎ
DE + ℎ
FE
 
       
Public Sector -0.465 -0.253 -0.297 -0.352 -0.243 -0.227 
 (0.498) (0.133)* (0.155)* (0.585) (0.186) (0.186) 
       
Voluntary Sector 0.620 -0.133 -0.149 0.945 -0.525 -0.494 
 (0.551) (0.190) (0.220) (0.647) (0.263)** (0.263)* 
       
ln	(
∗) 1.256 1.183 1.822 1.373 2.646 2.749 
 (1.089) (0.199)*** (0.238)*** (1.280) (0.279)*** (0.287)*** 
       
Age2 /100 -0.505 -0.00125 -0.102 -0.194 -0.00697 0.191 
 (0.509) (0.00697) (0.0595)* (0.598) (0.00981) (0.0717)*** 
       
Tenure 0.114 -0.00949 -0.0245 0.132 0.0162 0.0268 
(years) (0.0896) (0.0206) (0.0240) (0.105) (0.0288) (0.0288) 
       
Tenure2 /100 -0.494 -0.0235 0.0105 -0.639 -0.0593 -0.0992 
 (0.346) (0.0728) (0.0852) (0.406) (0.102) (0.103) 
       
Part-Time Working -1.802 -2.089 -2.403 -9.956 -17.00 -16.92 
 (0.357)*** (0.105)*** (0.123)*** (0.419)*** (0.148)*** (0.150)*** 
       
Temporary Job 0.188 0.383 0.450 -0.282 -0.275 -0.258 
 (0.557) (0.250) (0.288) (0.655) (0.343) (0.341) 
       
Constant 7.525 3.657 0.807 75.93 35.68 38.58 
 (45.79) (0.435)*** (0.939) (53.81) (0.607)*** (1.132)*** 
N 11596 11596 11596 11596 11596 11596 
R2 0.036 - - 0.185 - - 
AIC 47374.2 69355.8 64441.7 51119.0 76616.4 76500.0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Model (a): Fixed Effects ℎPQRS] = + +  + 3647] + 89:;<] + T] + ] 
Model (b): Random Effects 	ℎPQRS] = + +  + 3647] + 89:;<] + T] + ]; ~__0(0, `5) 
Model (c): Random Effects Tobit N	ℎPQRS] > 0 → 	ℎPQRS] = + +  + 3647] + 89:;<] + T] + ]; N	ℎPQRS] ≤ 0 → ℎPQRS] = 0;~__0(0, `5) 
Total OT = Unpaid OT + Paid OT; Total Hours = Basic Hours + Total OT;  ln	(∗) = + + XY 
Additional control variables not listed in the table above include organisation size, region, and time dummies. 
Table 26: Overtime Equations: Fixed Effects linear regression and Random Effect Tobit models  
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1998 – 2002) 
  
OVERTIME EQUATIONS: PANEL DATA MALE WORKERS 
 (1a) FE (1b) RE (1c) RE Tobit (2a) FE (2b) RE (2c) RE Tobit 
 Unpaid OT 
ℎ
FE
 
Unpaid OT 
ℎ
FE
 
Unpaid OT 
ℎ
FE
 
Paid OT 
ℎ
DE
 
Paid OT 
ℎ
DE
 
Paid OT 
ℎ
DE
 
Public Sector 0.642 -0.625 -0.560 -1.249 0.654 1.596 
 (0.814) (0.332)* (0.583) (1.093) (0.391)* (0.761)** 
       
Voluntary Sector 0.301 1.022 2.919 -0.883 -2.031 -5.997 
 (0.863) (0.421)** (0.701)*** (1.158) (0.497)*** (1.069)*** 
       
ln	(
∗) 1.770 6.810 13.52 0.755 -2.420 -9.256 
 (1.494) (0.376)*** (0.685)*** (2.005) (0.436)*** (0.944)*** 
       
Age2 /100 -0.211 0.0244 -0.237 0.703 -0.0979 -0.326 
 (0.799) (0.0144)* (0.197) (1.072) (0.0166)*** (0.241) 
       
Tenure -0.0129 -0.0784 -0.172 0.0769 -0.0648 -0.135 
(years) (0.160) (0.0429)* (0.0739)** (0.215) (0.0498) (0.101) 
       
Tenure2 /100 0.0743 0.134 0.334 -0.481 0.232 0.607 
 (0.507) (0.142) (0.242) (0.680) (0.165) (0.336)* 
       
Part-Time -1.942 -0.655 -1.876 -0.962 -1.259 -2.122 
 (1.082)* (0.429) (0.798)** (1.452) (0.503)** (0.999)** 
       
Temporary Job -0.202 0.105 0.845 1.999 2.950 3.683 
 (0.754) (0.420) (0.698) (1.012)** (0.500)*** (0.970)*** 
       
Constant 66.38 -9.933 -31.31 -35.05 9.962 16.89 
 (73.15) (0.931)*** (3.518)*** (98.18) (1.086)*** (4.035)*** 
N 2875 2875 2875 2875 2875 2875 
R2 0.054 - - 0.024 - - 
AIC 11002.8 17406.3 12108.1 12695.0 18401.9 11801.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Model (a): Fixed Effects ℎPQRS] = + +  + 3647] + 89:;<] + T] + ] 
Model (b): Random Effects 	ℎPQRS] = + +  + 3647] + 89:;<] + T] + ]; ~__0(0, `5) 
Model (c): Random Effects Tobit N	ℎPQRS] > 0 → 	ℎPQRS] = + +  + 3647] + 89:;<] + T] + ]; N	ℎPQRS] ≤ 0 → ℎPQRS] = 0;~__0(0, `5) 
ln	(
∗) = + + XY 
Additional control variables not listed in the table above include organisation size, region, and time dummies. 
 
Table 27: Overtime Equations: Fixed Effects linear regression and Random Effect Tobit models 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1998 – 2002) 
  
OVERTIME EQUATIONS: PANEL DATA MALE WORKERS 
 (3a) FE (3b) RE (3c) RE Tobit (4a) FE (4b) RE (4c) RE Tobit 
 Total Overtime 
ℎ
DE + ℎ
FE
 
Total Overtime 
ℎ
DE + ℎ
FE
 
Total Overtime 
ℎ
DE + ℎ
FE
 
Total Hours 
ℎ
C + ℎ
DE + ℎ
FE
 
Total Hours 
ℎ
C + ℎ
DE + ℎ
FE
 
Total Hours 
ℎ
C + ℎ
DE + ℎ
FE
 
Public Sector -0.607 0.0114 0.269 -1.321 -0.356 -0.392 
 (1.279) (0.458) (0.506) (1.302) (0.531) (0.527) 
       
Voluntary Sector -0.582 -1.022 -0.843 -1.056 -2.309 -2.376 
 (1.356) (0.583)* (0.644) (1.381) (0.671)*** (0.667)*** 
       
ln	(
∗) 2.525 4.451 5.168 3.284 6.471 6.510 
 (2.348) (0.509)*** (0.586)*** (2.391) (0.601)*** (0.624)*** 
       
Age2 /100 0.492 -0.0741 -0.0378 0.628 -0.0992 -0.136 
 (1.255) (0.0193)*** (0.159) (1.278) (0.0230)*** (0.168) 
       
Tenure 0.0640 -0.144 -0.165 -0.120 -0.132 -0.138 
(years) (0.252) (0.0582)** (0.0652)** (0.256) (0.0686)* (0.0692)** 
       
Tenure2 /100 -0.407 0.369 0.424 -0.0476 0.300 0.316 
 (0.797) (0.192)* (0.215)** (0.811) (0.227) (0.228) 
       
Part-Time -2.904 -1.904 -2.222 -9.636 -17.88 -17.86 
 (1.700)* (0.589)*** (0.658)*** (1.731)*** (0.689)*** (0.685)*** 
       
Temporary Job 1.798 3.075 3.028 2.664 4.664 4.582 
 (1.185) (0.587)*** (0.647)*** (1.206)** (0.671)*** (0.667)*** 
       
Constant 31.33 -0.0502 -1.164 23.61 33.92 33.28 
 (114.9) (1.269) (2.705) (117.0) (1.487)*** (2.864)*** 
N 2875 2875 2875 2875 2875 2875 
R2 0.030 - - 0.077 - - 
AIC 13601.6 19325.0 18302.1 13705.3 20091.0 20046.6 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Model (a): Fixed Effects ℎPQRS] = + +  + 3647] + 89:;<] + T] + ] 
Model (b): Random Effects 	ℎPQRS] = + +  + 3647] + 89:;<] + T] + ]; ~__0(0, `5) 
Model (c): Random Effects Tobit N	ℎPQRS] > 0 → 	ℎPQRS] = + +  + 3647] + 89:;<] + T] + ]; N	ℎPQRS] ≤ 0 → ℎPQRS] = 0;~__0(0, `5) 
Total OT = Unpaid OT + Paid OT; Total Hours = Basic Hours + Total OT;  ln	(∗) = + + XY 
Additional control variables not listed in the table above include organisation size, region, and time dummies. 
 
Table 28: Overtime Equations: Fixed Effects linear regression and Random Effect Tobit models 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1998 – 2002) 
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All three models find that female voluntary sector workers work more hours of 
unpaid overtime, although the fixed effects model is not significant.  The difference 
between the fixed effects and the random effects model is about 0.5 hours, while the 
Tobit estimate is 2.2 hours of extra unpaid overtime per week. This is in-line with the 
cross-section estimates.  The Tobit model also finds significantly lower levels of paid 
overtime (-3.6 hours) in the voluntary sector, with no significant difference in total 
overtime and only a small difference in total working hours (-0.5 hours). 
The results for male voluntary sector workers are broadly similar, but with bigger 
estimated differences between the private and voluntary sectors.  The fixed effects 
estimate for unpaid overtime is not significant (0.3 hours), while the random effects 
(1.0 hour) and Tobit models (2.9 hours) show significantly higher levels of overtime 
in the voluntary sector.  The fixed effects estimate for paid overtime is negative but 
not significant (-0.9 hours), while the random effects (-2.0 hours) and Tobit models 
(-6.0 hours) show significantly fewer hours of paid overtime.  Male voluntary sector 
workers also work a significant two hours fewer per week than those in the private 
sector.  This is also in line with the estimates from the cross-sectional model. 
Unlike Gregg et al (2011), who examined the extensive margin and reported finding 
no difference in unpaid overtime between public and voluntary sectors, our results 
suggest that there are significant differences amongst all three sectors at the intensive 
margin in cross-section, with workers in the voluntary sector working the greatest 
number of hours of unpaid overtime. 
These results appear to support a donated labour theory – workers in the voluntary 
sector are providing additional hours of work unpaid, compared to those in the 
private sector.  However, the results are less clear after controlling for unobserved 
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worker heterogeneity.  Although the random effects model specifications (b) and (c) 
show higher levels of unpaid overtime in the voluntary sector, the estimated sector 
differences in the fixed effects model (a) are not significant.  This means that we 
cannot rule out that the sector differences in cross-section are the result of selection 
of motivated workers into the voluntary sector.  These results are in line with Gregg 
et al (2011), who found evidence of selection into the nonprofit sector by workers 
with a higher propensity for working unpaid overtime. 
As has been described, the literature on unpaid overtime offers an alternative 
explanation to donated labour.  Workers can use additional hours of unpaid work to 
adjust rigid wage contracts.  Workers need only care about the number of hours they 
work, and the total that they get paid, and not about exactly how this is recorded.  A 
contract with a low wage and fixed hours could be equivalent to a contract with a 
higher wage, but where additional hours unpaid are an implicit part of the contract.  
As mean wages for voluntary sector workers in the HSW industries are higher than 
the private sector, this could in part be explained by the additional hours worked 
unpaid.  We now consider whether there is still a sector difference after accounting 
for these additional hours. 
This can be tested by calculating an “Adjusted” hourly wage for each worker based 
on the wage per actual hour worked.  Calculating this wage for each worker and then 
using it as the dependent variable in the wage equations will provide a test for the 
presence of a “warm glow” through additional unpaid hours.  We would expect a 
drop in the estimated sector premium if these hours are unrewarded through basic 
pay. 
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Estimating the Wage Equations 
In Figure 15 below the mean hourly wages can be seen by sector over the sample 
period. 
Within the HSW industries the public sector wages are the highest, followed by the 
voluntary sector, and with wages lowest in the private sector.  There appears to be a 
significant gap between the private sector wages and the other two sectors, while the 
public and voluntary sector wages seem broadly similar. 
Although this does not take account of differences in individuals’ characteristics, 
such as age, education and experience, this suggests that there could be a voluntary 
sector premium paid to workers in this sector when compared to the private sector. 
We also test the robustness of the findings after controlling for unobserved worker 
heterogeneity by estimating a model using the limited panel structure of the LFS.  
This allows us to control for potential bias arising from worker selection between 
sectors. 
The adjusted hourly wage, taking account of unpaid overtime, is calculated as 
follows: 

a =

bH
cde
bH
fg
(H
cdH
fgdH
hg)
        (31) 
Where a is the Adjusted Hourly Wage for worker i, H is the contracted hourly 
wage, ℎC is the contracted basic hours per week, ℎ
DE
 is the number of hours of paid 
overtime, ℎFE is the number of hours unpaid overtime, and pi is the premium paid for 
overtime working.   
  
 
MEAN WAGES 1998 TO 2007 BY SECTOR 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Average Gross Hourly Pay by Sector & Industry between 1998 – 2007 
(Source: UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey 1998 – 2007) 
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As the Labour Force Survey does not provide data on wages for paid overtime an 
average premium of pi=1.28 was used as per the findings of Bell and Hart (2003) 
from the British New Earnings Survey.25 
The adjusted wage was calculated, and the wage equations estimated.  The effect of 
the additional unpaid overtime was estimated using standard Mincer Wage Equations 
(see (Heckman, Lochner, & Todd, 2006) for a review).  Separate equations were 
estimated for male and female workers, regressing log hourly pay on a range of 
explanatory variables with sector dummies for the public and voluntary sectors. 
The first model is estimated using the pooled cross-section: 
ln	(
H) = + + 3647 + 89:;< + T +    (32) 
The wage equation coefficient estimates for the Male and Female workers in the 
pooled cross-section are shown in Table 29.  The first and third columns show the 
wage equations with the log of the basic hourly wage as the dependent variable.  The 
second and third columns show the wage equations with the log of the adjusted wage 
as the dependent variable.  Coefficients for public sector, voluntary sector, age, 
experience, tenure, and job status are reported.  Also included in the regressions, but 
not reported in the table, are education, occupation, organisation size, region and 
year and quarter dummy variables. 
In the basic wage equation specification (models 1 and 3) significant wage premiums 
are found for male and female workers in both the public and voluntary sectors.  
Estimating the adjusted wage equations (models 2 and 4) reduces the wage premium 
                                                 
25
 The robustness of this assumption has been tested by estimating all specifications of the model with 
values of pi={1, 1.5, 2}.  The sign, magnitude and statistical significance of the voluntary sector 
effects were unchanged. 
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for male and female workers in the voluntary sector, but has no significant effect on 
wage premiums in the public sector. 
The second model is estimated using a fixed effects model in the panel dataset: 
lnV]
HW = + +  + 3647] + 89:;<] + T] + ]  (33) 
Table 30 shows the estimates from the fixed effects wage equations on the panel 
dataset.  As before, columns one and three contain the wage equations for the basic 
hourly wage, while columns two and four contain the adjusted hourly wage 
equations. Coefficients for public sector, voluntary sector, age, experience, tenure, 
job status and organisation size are reported.  Also included in the regressions, but 
not reported in the table, are region and year and quarter dummy variables. 
The basic model estimation (columns 1 and 3) with individual fixed effects removes 
the public and voluntary sector wage premiums found in the pooled cross-section, 
suggesting that these are due to unobserved worker heterogeneity.   
Estimating the adjusted wage model (columns 2 and 4), to control for overtime 
working, now leaves the male voluntary sector wage difference unchanged.  
However, female workers have significantly lower effective wages in the voluntary 
sector than the private sector.  No significant differences between effective wages in 
the private and public sectors are found for either male or female workers. 
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WAGE EQUATIONS: POOLED CROSS-SECTION 
 MALE  FEMALE  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Basic Wage Adjusted Wage Basic Wage Adjusted Wage 
Public Sector 0.139 0.144 0.147 0.140 
 (0.0193)*** (0.0184)*** (0.00739)*** (0.00720)*** 
     
Voluntary Sector 0.0534 0.0121 0.0861 0.0382 
 (0.0240)** (0.0229) (0.0102)*** (0.00995)*** 
     
Age -0.000428 0.00469 0.0187 0.0239 
(years) (0.00892) (0.00854) (0.00479)*** (0.00467)*** 
     
Age2 /100 3.507 2.608 0.701 -0.269 
 (1.025)*** (0.981)*** (0.584) (0.569) 
     
Experience 0.0109 0.00825 -0.00149 -0.00498 
(years) (0.00451)** (0.00431)* (0.00247) (0.00241)** 
     
Experience2 /100 -7.131 -6.401 -4.072 -2.959 
 (0.839)*** (0.803)*** (0.499)*** (0.486)*** 
     
Tenure 0.0145 0.0149 0.0160 0.0148 
(years) (0.00232)*** (0.00222)*** (0.00106)*** (0.00103)*** 
     
Tenure2 /100 -0.0291 -0.0302 -0.0301 -0.0280 
 (0.00743)*** (0.00711)*** (0.00363)*** (0.00354)*** 
     
Part-Time Working -0.0893 -0.0878 -0.0255 -0.00942 
 (0.0270)*** (0.0259)*** (0.00590)*** (0.00575) 
     
Temporary Job -0.0907 -0.0814 -0.00316 -0.0180 
 (0.0264)*** (0.0253)*** (0.0147) (0.0144) 
     
Constant 1.613 1.546 1.231 1.166 
 (0.155)*** (0.148)*** (0.0760)*** (0.0741)*** 
N 3077 3077 12436 12436 
R2 0.629 0.582 0.615 0.577 
AIC 2100.8 1830.8 5474.1 4842.5 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Model 1,3: ln	(H) = + + 3647 + 89:;< + T +  
Model 2,4: ln	(a) = + + 3647 + 89:;< + T +  
(Additional control variables not listed in the table above include Education, Occupation, 
Organisation Size, Region, and Time Dummies.) 
 
Table 29: Estimated Sector Wage Differences 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1998 – 2007)  
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WAGE EQUATIONS: FIXED EFFECTS MODEL 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Male: Basic Male: Adj Female: Basic Female: Adj 
Public Sector 0.00880 -0.0172 0.0201 0.00805 
 (0.0468) (0.0476) (0.0253) (0.0258) 
     
Voluntary Sector -0.0290 -0.0304 -0.0381 -0.0664 
 (0.0478) (0.0486) (0.0273) (0.0279)** 
     
Age2 /100 0.0348 0.0498 0.0590 0.0649 
 (0.0110)*** (0.0112)*** (0.00599)*** (0.00611)*** 
     
Tenure 0.0310 0.0274 0.00587 0.00352 
(Years) (0.00909)*** (0.00924)*** (0.00436) (0.00445) 
     
Tenure2 /100 -0.0892 -0.0833 -0.0187 -0.0129 
 (0.0290)*** (0.0294)*** (0.0172) (0.0176) 
     
Part-Time Working 0.0465 0.0784 0.0828 0.0820 
 (0.0604) (0.0614) (0.0175)*** (0.0179)*** 
     
Temporary Job -0.117 -0.0977 0.0215 0.0107 
 (0.0433)*** (0.0441)** (0.0282) (0.0288) 
     
OrgSize: 1-10 Reference category   
     
OrgSize: 11-24 -0.0174 -0.0306 0.000623 0.00388 
 (0.0422) (0.0429) (0.0218) (0.0222) 
     
OrgSize: 25-49 -0.0121 -0.0364 -0.0293 -0.0198 
 (0.0498) (0.0507) (0.0252) (0.0257) 
     
OrgSize: 50+ 0.0326 -0.00861 -0.0179 -0.00748 
 (0.0467) (0.0475) (0.0241) (0.0246) 
     
Constant 1.553 1.225 1.011 0.895 
 (0.220)*** (0.223)*** (0.120)*** (0.123)*** 
N 2875 2875 11596 11595 
R2 0.056 0.060 0.048 0.054 
AIC -5360.1 -5263.9 -21682.4 -21205.4 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Model 1,3: lnV]HW = + +  + 3647] + 89:;<] + T] + ] 
Model 2,4: ln	(]a) =  +  + 3647] + 89:;<] + T] + ] 
(Additional control variables not listed in the table above include Region and Time dummies.) 
 
Table 30: Fixed Effects Wage Equations 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1997 – 2002) 
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A comparison of the wage premiums from the Basic Wage and Adjusted Wage 
models for male workers is shown in Table 31.  The sector coefficients βVOLS and 
βPUB have been converted from log coefficients to percentages using the equation 
below as per Halvorsen and Palmqvist (1980). 
 
       (34) 
The first two columns for each sector show the estimated percentage sector wage 
differences from the wage equations.  The third column for each sector shows the 
difference between these estimates. 
MODEL Public    Voluntary   
 Basic Adjusted Difference  Basic Adjusted Difference 
Female XS 15.8% 15.0% -0.8%  9.0% 3.9% -5.1% 
Female Panel 1.9% 0.6% -1.3%  -3.6% -6.4% -2.8% 
Male XS 14.9% 15.5% 0.6%  5.5% 1.2% -4.3% 
Male Panel -0.1% -2.8% -2.7%  -3.0% -3.4% -0.4% 
Table 31: Differences in Sector Premiums 
(Source: UK Labour Force Survey 1997 – 2007) 
 
For female workers, both models suggest that controlling for hours of overtime has a 
significant effect on the sector wage differentials.  Controlling for individual 
unobserved heterogeneity accounts for the voluntary sector wage premium, but the 
addition of overtime then leads to the estimation of a voluntary sector wage discount 
of around 6%. 
Although controlling for overtime reduces the voluntary sector wage premium for 
male workers in the pooled cross-section model, in the fixed effects model we find 
no effect from overtime hours on the sector wage differential. 
1−= VOLSepercentVOLS
ββ
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Tests of Robustness 
We now outline a range of robustness tests carried out for these results.  One concern 
in this analysis is whether we have adequately controlled for unobserved job 
heterogeneity.  If there are still significant unobserved differences in the jobs that 
workers are employed in between the sectors then this could account for some or all 
of the sector differences.  To tackle this we have repeated the cross-sectional 
estimations for two more detailed sub-industry classifications: Social Work26, and 
Social Work with Accommodation.27  Although the sample size is small at the most 
detailed industry level, the results were robust in both sign and significance.  The 
sample size at this level was too small to permit panel estimation. 
The second concern is the role of part-time working, as this is prevalent in the 
voluntary sector, and affects the number of contracted hours.  The model was re-
estimated using only those workers who are on full time contracts, restricting the 
panel sample to 2,668 male observations and 6,537 female observations.  This has no 
effect on the sign or significance of the estimated effects.  Furthermore, it increases 
the estimated voluntary sector wage discount to 10% below the private sector wage 
for female workers.  The increased warm-glow estimate also supports the 
formulation of warm-glow utility as being related to effort rather than merely 
participation: the size of this effect is bigger for workers working longer hours in the 
mission-motivated organisation. 
The one-year panel structure of the UK LFS is too short to be able to test for sector 
differences in future job rewards resulting from overtime.  The fixed effects wage 
equations were estimated interacting tenure with the sector dummies, to test for 
                                                 
26
 SIC Code 85.3, A sub-category of Health & Social Work 
27
 SIC Code 85.31, a sub-category of Social Work 
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sector differences in the returns to tenure, and these coefficients were small and not 
statistically significant.  This does not lend support to a link between sector 
differences in unpaid overtime and later within-firm rewards. 
Overall, these findings suggest that there are differences in levels of unpaid overtime 
between the sectors.  Furthermore, for female workers the hours of unpaid overtime 
support a warm-glow donated labour hypothesis, where additional hours are worked 
without pay.  The same is not true however for male workers.  Although there are 
also significant levels of unpaid overtime in the voluntary sector, controlling for 
these hours does not affect the sector difference in effective hourly wage. 
Discussion 
This chapter has examined working hours and wage data from the UK Labour Force 
Survey disaggregated by Industry to examine sector differentials within Health and 
Social Work services, where the majority of voluntary sector workers are employed.  
The empirical analysis found strong evidence of higher levels of unpaid overtime 
amongst voluntary sector workers, for both males and females.  The basic hours 
wage equations showed a public and voluntary sector premium for both male and 
female workers.  This is broadly in line with the findings of Leete ( 2001) using US 
data.   Controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity with a fixed effects model 
accounts for the public and voluntary sector wage premiums. 
The findings of this chapter make two main contributions: 
• The apparent nonprofit sector wage premiums in health & social work 
industries are largely explained by unobserved worker heterogeneity; 
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• There are significant differences in overtime working between the 
sectors, and this has an effect on sector wage differences, providing 
evidence of warm glow for female workers. 
Previous analysis of nonprofit wage differentials using cross-sectional data has 
shown a variety of wage effects dependent on industry.  The caring industries are 
consistently found to have wage premiums in the voluntary and public sectors, 
compared to the private sector.  The analysis here shows that this can be explained 
through controlling for unobserved worker heterogeneity, as marginal workers 
switching sector accept lower wages within voluntary organisations. 
Our analysis of working hours and overtime in cross-section supports the assertion 
that workers in the voluntary sector work higher levels of overtime unpaid, while 
those in the private sector work more paid overtime.  Our analysis of the sector 
switchers in the panel suggests that this difference is driven largely by selection of 
workers into the voluntary sector.  Two alternative explanations for this were 
suggested.  The first – the warm-glow hypothesis – draws on the nonprofit literature 
to explain higher levels of unpaid overtime in the voluntary sector as being rewarded 
through intrinsic utility received from participation in a mission-motivated activity.  
Therefore workers are compensated for their ‘unpaid’ efforts through warm-glow 
utility. 
The second – the gift-exchange hypothesis – comes from the unpaid overtime 
literature and Akerlof’s gift-exchange model, suggesting that higher basic wages in 
the voluntary sector compensate for the unpaid overtime.  This overtime is not 
explicitly contracted for, but forms part of the wage bargain and is enforced through 
organisational norms.  This explanation does not require any difference in the 
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intrinsic motivation of workers between sectors.  Instead it relies on different types 
of employment contract being written between the sectors to explain both the 
differences in overtime patterns and basic wages. 
Our findings for female workers support the warm-glow hypothesis.  The higher 
voluntary sector wages for women are explained by controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity in the fixed-effects model.  As most workers in the voluntary sector are 
female, and the majority work in the health & social work industries, this finding 
would explain why little evidence of female sector wage discounts is found in studies 
of nonprofit wage differentials in the wider economy. Both unobserved worker 
heterogeneity and unpaid overtime must be controlled for in order to examine sector 
differences in effective hourly wages.  Adjusting wages for unpaid overtime leads to 
a significant voluntary sector wage discount for women – evidence of donated 
labour.  This means that the female workers engaged in hours of unpaid overtime are 
not paid a higher basic wage, and so adjusting wages for the unpaid hours reveals the 
donated labour in a lower effective hourly wage.  We therefore reject the gift-
exchange hypothesis of higher basic compensation for unpaid overtime. 
For male workers the evidence is less clear.  Although controlling for unpaid 
overtime has an impact on the size of the voluntary sector wage premium in the 
cross-sectional model, there are no significant sector wage differences after 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity even when unpaid overtime is controlled 
for.  The analysis of sector differences in unpaid overtime showed that men in the 
voluntary sector provided similar levels of unpaid overtime hours to women. 
An explanation for this finding is that there could be sorting by gender into job types 
along characteristics that are not observed in the data.  If prosocial motivation were 
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related to the proximity of the job to the service user even within a nonprofit (e.g. 
face-to-face caring versus managing the office) then unobserved sorting into jobs by 
gender would explain the difference.  As with other industries men are 
disproportionally found in management roles, while the front-line care staff are more 
likely to be female. This gender difference could then reflect differences in the wage 
contracts written for management versus service workers.  Pannenberg (2005) also 
found gender differences in the compensation of unpaid overtime, with only male 
workers reaping the long-run benefits of unpaid overtime.  Those findings support 
the assertion that male and female workers have different motives for undertaking 
unpaid overtime.   
The gift exchange hypothesis would allow norms for unpaid overtime to be 
established within nonprofits, compensated through higher basic pay, to explain the 
levels of voluntary sector unpaid overtime observed even amongst male workers.  
While these differences might in part be captured by occupational differences, the 
low resolution of occupational categories, relatively small sample size, and small 
number of workers switching occupational category with the period of a year, would 
make this unobserved job heterogeneity difficult to control for.  As such this remains 
a subject for further research, ideally using data from within organisations. 
This chapter provides some evidence for warm glow in the voluntary sector.  In 
particular, it shows the presence of warm glow amongst female workers, a finding 
absent in many other studies.  It also shows the role that unpaid overtime can play in 
effective wage differences.  This highlights the importance of effort as a largely 
unobserved variable in usual analysis of wage differentials.  Hours of unpaid 
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overtime provide one proxy measure for effort, but more detailed study at the micro-
level would be necessary to unpick this relationship. 
There is a limit to the extent that we can test hypotheses about wage contracts when 
we only observe data at the individual worker level.  We suggest that there is 
evidence here of a difference in wage contracts by sector, but further exploration 
would require the analysis of a matched employer-employee database to capture 
accurately differences at the organisational level.  This is the challenge for voluntary 
sector research: gathering this level of detailed data on a relatively small sector is not 
a trivial task.  However, the recent growth of the sector, and its increasing role in the 
provision of public services make it all the more important that these research 
questions are addressed. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
In Conclusion: Warm Glow and the Voluntary Sector 
Introduction 
This dissertation has explored employment in the voluntary sector in the UK, and 
how it has changed in the past ten years.  We have outlined the theories of warm-
glow wage-setting, and tested these empirically through an analysis of wage 
differentials and working hours between the private, public and voluntary sectors.   
In this final chapter we summarise the key findings from this research, and identify 
their implications for public policy.  In particular, we discuss what they can tell us 
about the policy of contracting-out public services to the voluntary sector, and the 
implications for the future of public service reform. 
Key Findings 
The exploration of the previous chapters has identified a number of research 
findings.  These are: 
• The main economic theories of voluntary sector wage-setting rely on 
some formulation of ‘warm-glow’ utility or intrinsic motivation derived 
from working for an organisation with a mission shared by motivated 
employees.  This leads to a prediction of lower wages in the voluntary 
sector; 
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• The empirical findings in the existing literature have focussed on US 
data, and the results have been mixed.  There are a number of issues with 
these studies; in particular low sample size and unobserved 
heterogeneity; 
• There is significant movement of workers into and out of the voluntary 
sector.  There is some evidence that the characteristics of these switchers 
have changed over time: particularly, they are increasingly likely to work 
in professional occupations and in the health & social work industries; 
• Using pooled cross-sectional and panel datasets, we show that there is 
some evidence of warm-glow wage discounts in the sector for male 
workers, but these wage differences have been eroded as the sector has 
grown; 
• Although there is not a significant sector wage difference found for 
women, there is evidence that they have also experienced faster wage 
growth in the voluntary sector than the private; 
• There are significant gender differences in wages between workers in the 
voluntary sector; 
• There are significant sector differences in working hours within the 
Health & Social Work industries, particularly in overtime working.  
Workers in the voluntary sector work more hours of unpaid overtime, 
whilst those in the private sector work more hours of paid overtime; 
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• Controlling for unpaid overtime has a significant effect on sector wage 
differentials.  In particular, accounting for unpaid overtime results in 
evidence of a warm-glow wage discount for female workers; 
Implications for Contracting-Out Public Services 
As we have shown, the levels of public services contracted out to the voluntary 
sector have grown dramatically over the period studied.  Over this time, and as a 
result of this policy, the sector has also experienced dramatic change.  There are a 
number of implications of these changes for the success of contracting-out. 
As discussed, one of the potential benefits of contracting-out was to be efficiency 
savings.  These were due to come, at least in part, from the lower costs of voluntary 
organisations in a competitive market.  We have shown that the result has instead 
been the faster growth of voluntary sector wages, bringing them above the private 
sector wage level and closer to the public sector wage level.  For many workers in 
low-paid jobs within the sector this will be a welcome boost.  But it has also come at 
a cost, as jobs are offered on shorter-term contracts, and there is greater uncertainty 
about job security. 
The second rationale for contracting out is the credible provision of quality that is 
difficult to measure, in the face of information asymmetries between purchaser and 
provider.  For many of the contracted-out services this is a particular problem.  There 
is often a physical separation between the provider (a voluntary organisations), the 
purchaser (a government body), and the recipient (a member of the public).  This 
creates the potential for market failure if the quality to be provided cannot be 
contracted over.  This problem is aggravated where the recipients of the service are 
themselves vulnerable, and so may be represented by a fourth party such as their 
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family.  In addition, some purchases may be costly to reverse, for example the 
decision to move into a residential care home, or may take significant time for the 
quality to be revealed, such as health care. 
The mission-motivation of voluntary organisations, combined with the non-
distribution of profits constraint are seen as necessary ingredients for voluntary 
organisations to be able to credibly provide this unobservable quality.  However, this 
in turn creates a similar moral hazard problem within the voluntary organisation, as it 
must then employ a staff that also shares this mission.  The warm-glow wage 
discount, where voluntary sector employees receive part of their compensation in 
utility, is one way to address this and help ensure that the organisation engages 
motivated workers.  As we have seen in Chapter Four however, the rapid expansion 
of the sector has inflated voluntary sector wages, and reduced the effectiveness of 
this sorting mechanism.  In line with the theory, we would now expect that the 
average level of mission-motivation in the sector is lower, as a greater number of 
workers with lower mission motivation have been recruited.  Of course, the original 
high-motivation workers will still choose voluntary sector employment, and remain 
within the sector.  The conventional analysis would suggest that they simply enjoy 
higher rents: they receive both high levels of warm-glow utility and receive a wage 
that is not significantly different from what they would expect in the private sector. 
The alternative theory of intrinsic motivation, outlined by Bruno Frey (1997) and 
discussed in Chapter Two, suggests a gloomier picture.  If we think of the mission-
motivated workers as donating part of their time through lower wages due to their 
intrinsic motivation, then Frey suggests that we cannot assume that intrinsic 
motivation and extrinsic motivation (from financial compensation) are simply 
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additive.  In fact they can interact: part of the intrinsic motivation derives from the 
fact that it is donated.  Introducing a payment for this work as sector wages rise could 
crowd out the intrinsic motivation.  This could leave the most motivated workers less 
motivated than they were before the expansion of the sector, and provide a further 
dampening of the level of mission-motivation. 
The sector differences estimated in this thesis focus on the marginal worker.  This 
means that the estimation of the warm-glow effects through sector wage differentials 
really provides a lower bound for these effects.  To the extent that this provides 
evidence of warm-glow in the sector, it raises some real concerns for the success of a 
policy that relies on the presence of that warm glow. 
Implications for The Nature of the Sector 
Hansmann ( 1980) provided a four-way categorisation of nonprofit firms, reproduced 
in Table 32 with examples.  In this framework, organisations can be either ‘donative’ 
or ‘commercial’ in one dimension, and ‘mutual’ or ‘entrepreneurial’ in a second 
dimension. 
 Mutual Entrepreneurial 
Donative Political clubs Traditional charities 
Museums, Art Galleries 
 
  
Commercial Credit Unions 
Cooperatives 
Voluntary Sector contractors 
Table 32: A Four-way Categorisation of Nonprofit Firms 
(Source: Hansmann ( 1980)) 
The traditional voluntary sector, collecting donations, identifying need and providing 
services; would reside in the top-right box, of donative entrepreneurial organisations.  
These are the organisations with a strong mission and popular support, and who have 
the reputation to provide difficult to measure quality.  These are the organisations 
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that provide the examples on which the government policy of voluntary provision of 
public services is founded.  
The contradiction is that the types of organisation that will be encouraged to enter a 
market of the sort created to contract-out these services will be more like those in the 
bottom-right box: commercial and entrepreneurial.  Whilst these organisations will 
also be mission-motivated, they are likely to be very different in culture and 
approach to the provision of services.28 
The growth of these types of voluntary organisation has been alongside, and 
sometimes in place of, the more ‘traditional’ donative organisations.  Many voluntary 
organisations have had to change their organisational culture to respond to the 
changing funding landscape. 
This raises the possibility of a divide within the sector: into donative voluntary 
organisations providing additional services and reliant on voluntary donations; and 
commercial voluntary organisations competing to deliver public service contracts.  
Working with employee-level data does not allow this distinction to be tested 
empirically here.  However the distinction could have real consequences for 
employment terms and conditions for the workers within these organisations.  It also 
has implications for the nature of the sector itself. 
The Role of Voluntary Organisations in Public Service Reform 
This is not to argue that voluntary organisations should not be part of public service 
provision.  The rationale for the involvement of voluntary organisations is broad, and 
their contribution significant.  Instead what we are highlighting here is the 
                                                 
28
 See also Weisbrod ( 1997) for a discussion of some of the implications of the ‘commercialisation’ 
of the nonprofit sector. 
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unintended consequences of a government policy, and how the scale of the 
intervention can have an effect on the nature of the sector.  Contracting-out services 
to the voluntary sector is not the same as contracting-out services to the private 
sector.  But conversely, neither can the principles of contracting-out be disregarded 
when dealing with voluntary organisations.  When mission-motivation can be 
crowded in or out by the form of a contractual relationship then this needs to be 
taken into account in the formulation of policy and practice. 
The voluntary sector provides an efficient solution to market failure driven by 
information asymmetry, though the harnessing of altruistic motives.  But those 
altruistic motives cannot be taken for granted. 
Developing a Research Agenda 
This dissertation has explored detailed data on employment in the voluntary sector.  
It has shown some evidence for warm-glow wage effects, but also identified the 
limits of extending this concept to an employment relation.  In doing so we have 
shed some light on the changes that have taken place while public services were 
contracted-out and the sector grew.  From this we now outline some areas that 
require further research attention. 
The extension of warm-glow theory to employment relations has been most robustly 
formulated in Besley and Ghatak’s ( 2005) work on motivated agents.  While this 
literature acknowledges the work of Bruno Frey (1997), it has not yet internalised the 
implications of the interaction between financial compensation and intrinsic 
motivation.  The work of Bénabou and Tirole (2003; 2006) goes some way to 
 157 
 
addressing this.  However, the empirical work in this dissertation has demonstrated 
the limits of the current theoretical framework, and further development is required. 
The sector is still growing in size, and this expansion looks set to continue in the 
future.  Public service reform, and in particular the localism agenda, is likely to lead 
to an increasing reliance on the provision of public services from outside the public 
sector.  This increases the importance of understanding both the sector as a whole, 
and the emerging organisation-types.  While there is a significant body of literature 
within the discipline of nonprofit studies in the US, the institutional setting is 
extremely important to understand both the incentives facing social entrepreneurs 
and staff, and the implications for public policy in the UK.  This evidence base is 
growing, driven by the establishment of the ESRC-funded Third Sector Research 
Centre, but economics is still under-represented in this growing field. 
The scope of this type of analysis is growing, as the boundaries between the sectors 
are blurred.  A big expansion in social enterprise, itself a contested term, has 
produced new organisational forms combining mission-motivation with some level 
of profit motivation.  Is this the professionalisation of altruism?  Is it the creation of a 
new sector?  Or is it an attack of for-profits in disguise?  Regardless, the key 
questions will be: what effect will this dilution of the non-distribution constrain have 
on the voluntary sector, and those employed within it? 
Conclusion 
In this dissertation we have explored the UK voluntary sector.  Difficulties in 
definitions, sample size and sector selection have been tackled to investigate the 
terms and conditions of workers within the sector, and relate this to theories of 
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warm-glow motivation.  We have shown how the sector has changed, and is 
changing.  The voluntary sector is an important outlet for altruistic motivated 
entrepreneurs and workers.  At the same time there are many attempts to harness, 
influence or control this independent sector.  Whilst its expansion should be 
supported, it is critical to ensure that its rapid growth does not remove the very thing 
that defines it – charity. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
This Appendix explains in more detail the construction of the UK Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) and Workplace Employment Relations datasets as used in this 
dissertation. 
UK Labour Force Survey: Cross Section 
Data from the UK LFS is supplied by the UK Economic and Social Data Service 
(ESDS)29 in data files for each quarter.  Each file contains data on individuals from 
all five waves of observation. 
To construct the dataset used in the analysis, the Wave 1 data from each individual is 
extracted and merged to produce a one file with one observation on each individual 
across the ten year period. 
The sector indicator variable was derived as per the criteria laid out in Appendix 
Two. 
UK Labour Force Survey: Panel Dataset 
Individuals in the UK LFS are not uniquely identified by a single variable, but 
instead by a combination of identifier variables.  This makes constructing a panel 
dataset challenging.  Furthermore, as the LFS is a household survey there is potential 
for attrition between waves as individuals and families move in.  In order to account 
for this the UK Office for National Statistics produces a panel version of the LFS.  
This is a balanced panel that has been selected and weighted to provide a 
                                                 
29
 http://www.esds.ac.uk/ 
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representative sample of the population.  The files are supplied by quarter, with 
individuals’ records now containing all five waves of observation in one record. 
However, the supplied panel dataset includes only a sub-sample of key variables that 
omits several of the variables used in this analysis.  In order to include proper 
controls in the estimations, and ensure that comparisons can be drawn between the 
cross-sectional and panel estimates, these additional variables had to be added to the 
dataset. 
This was achieved by using the nine LFS identifier variables to identify individuals’ 
records in the cross-sectional data files, and importing the missing variables into the 
panel dataset.  This allowed the balance of the panel to be maintained, whilst 
increasing the number of useable variables.  Due to changes in the way that 
individuals are identified in the UK LFS, this matching operation was only possible 
for individuals between 1997 and 2003.  This means that the panel models estimated 
are across a smaller time period than the cross-sectional models.  This drawback is 
outweighed by the ability to conduct panel analysis on a rich data in a representative 
sample of the UK population.  
UK Workplace Employment Relations Survey: Cross Section 
The data for the UK WERS 2004 were supplied by the UK ESDS.  Data files for 
each of the four questionnaires are provided.  Each workplace in WERS has a unique 
identifier that allows data from the four questionnaires to be combined. 
The four datasets were merged based on the unique identifier, and the relevant 
variables kept for analysis.  The attitudinal questions were re-coded with 1 as the 
lowest category, for ease of interpretation of the results. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
This Appendix explains in more detail the definition and construction of the key 
variables from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) as used in this dissertation. 
Identifying Organisations’ Sector 
Private Sector 
The Private Sector includes Public limited companies (PLC), Limited companies 
(Ltd), and small businesses often owned by one or more individuals. 
Public Sector 
The Public Sector includes any employer that is owned, funded or run by central or 
local government. 
Voluntary Sector 
The Voluntary Sector includes charities, private trusts, housing associations, trade 
unions, private schools that are registered as charities and other voluntary 
organisations.  In terms of the LFS, they are any employer coded with the LFS 
variable SECTRO03 coded “7”. 
Regression Equation Variables 
These tables contain the LFS names for the variables used in the regressions, and 
details of the variables derived from LFS variables.  
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LFS Variable Name Description 
HIQUAL Dummy variables for level of highest qualification held, split by National Vocational 
Qualification (NVQ) level 
AGE Individual Age in Years 
EMPMON No. of months with current employer 
SOCMAJM Major Occupation Category 
PTFT Part-time / Fulltime 
JOBTYP Permanent / Temporary 
DISCURR Disability status 
QULNOW Respondee is currently studying for a qualification 
INDSECT SIC(92) Industry Classification 
HOURPAY Gross Hourly Wage 
BUSHR Basic Usual Weekly Hours 
OTTHR Overtime Usual Weekly Hours 
POTTHR Paid Overtime Usual Weekly Hours 
UOTTHR Unpaid Overtime Usual Weekly Hours 
 
Derived variables Description and Source Variables 
EXPER AGE minus EDAGE (age at which completed fulltime education) 
ORGSIZE Recode of MPNOR 
MARRIED Recode of MARSTAT and MARSTATA (marital status) 
NUMCHILD Recode of FDPCH19 (number of dependent children in household) 
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APPENDIX THREE 
HECKMAN SELECTION EQUATION RESULTS 
Selection Equations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Employed Basic: Male Basic: Female Interact: Male Interact: Female 
     
Age -0.0372 -0.0345 -0.0372 -0.0345 
 (0.000259)*** (0.000215)*** (0.000259)*** (0.000215)*** 
     
Married 0.888 0.472 0.888 0.472 
 (0.00866)*** (0.00623)*** (0.00866)*** (0.00623)*** 
     
No Children Reference Category   
     
One Child -0.0559 -0.211 -0.0559 -0.211 
 (0.0107)*** (0.00875)*** (0.0107)*** (0.00875)*** 
     
Two Children 0.0462 -0.315 0.0462 -0.315 
 (0.0114)*** (0.00897)*** (0.0114)*** (0.00897)*** 
     
Three Children -0.271 -0.727 -0.271 -0.727 
 (0.0176)*** (0.0136)*** (0.0176)*** (0.0136)*** 
     
Four to Six Children -0.756 -1.246 -0.756 -1.246 
 (0.0272)*** (0.0226)*** (0.0272)*** (0.0226)*** 
     
Seven + Children -1.242 -2.606 -1.242 -2.606 
 (0.164)*** (0.290)*** (0.164)*** (0.290)*** 
     
No Disability Reference Category   
     
DDA Disabled & Work-
limiting Disables 
-1.087 -0.766 -1.087 -0.766 
 (0.0109)*** (0.0101)*** (0.0109)*** (0.0101)*** 
     
DDA Disabled only -0.892 -0.732 -0.892 -0.732 
 (0.0125)*** (0.0104)*** (0.0125)*** (0.0104)*** 
     
Work-limiting Disabled only -0.137 -0.0362 -0.137 -0.0362 
 (0.0168)*** (0.0167)** (0.0168)*** (0.0167)** 
     
Constant 0.387 0.645 0.387 0.645 
 (0.0150)*** (0.0141)*** (0.0150)*** (0.0141)*** 
     
N 181973 234836 181973 234836 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Probit selection equations of employment status (employed = [0,1]) 
 
Table 33: Employment Selection Equation 
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APPENDIX FOUR 
HAUSMAN TEST RESULTS 
 
The Hausman Test compares the fixed effects and the random effects estimates, 
testing that the difference in the coefficients is not systematic.   
 
The test statistic follows a χ2 distribution: 
 
χ5 	= Vβkc	−	βkeW′[var(βc) 	− 	(var(βe)&s](βkc	 −	βke) 
 
Where βc is the coefficients from the consistent estimator, and βe is the coefficients 
from the efficient estimator. 
 
H0: The difference in coefficients is not systematic. 
 
The fixed effects estimator is consistent under both H0 and Ha.  The random effects 
estimator is inconsistent under Ha, but efficient under H0. 
 
 
 
Model u2(21) Probability Reject H0? 
Unpaid Overtime (Female) 86.36 0.0000 Yes 
Paid Overtime (Female) 70.65 0.0000 Yes 
Total Overtime (Female) 77.35 0.0000 Yes 
Total Hours (Female) 420.99 0.0000 Yes 
Unpaid Overtime (Male) 50.32 0.0003 Yes 
Paid Overtime (Male) 19.75 0.5370 No 
Total Overtime (Male) 16.53 0.7394 No 
Total Hours (Male) 49.61 0.0004 Yes 
 
 
Table 34: Hausman Test Statistics
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